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NIETZSCHE'S IMPERATIVES
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1
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos

My dissertation examines three, interrelated themes in Friedrich
early writings.
writings.

The

first

theme

is

Nietzsche’s

the moral imperatives that appear in
these

These imperatives, which are scattered throughout
The Birth of Tragedy

and the Untimely Meditations
post-Kantian concept

ol

in

seemingly haphazard fashion, articulate a rigorous,

morality designed to respond to the problems of
modern

nationalism and modern nihilism. In the
the character, importance,

first

chapter of

my dissertation,

I

outline

and origin of Nietzsche's imperatives.

The second theme examine
I

is

imperatives and his political thought.

I

the relationship between Nietzsche's

show, through close readings of Nietzsche's

early texts, that they deploy a series of moral imperatives to
reformulate the tasks

and meaning

what ought

ol

modern

to be

done

political life.

These imperatives

tell

to avoid the twin dangers of nihilism

the political

community

and nationalism by

articulating a broad principle of justice with universally valid foundations. Politics,

Nietzsche argues, unlike Machiavelli or Hobbes, but like Kant, must bend
to necessary

The

its

knee

moral commands.

third

theme examined

in

my dissertation is the emergence,

in

Nietzsche's early writings, of a political position that he will eventual call "great
politics."

Great politics

is

Nietzsche's solution to the petty, or small, politics of

modern nationalism and modern

nihilism. This concept of politics shifts the realm

° f P°' ltiCal
state

StrUggle

and legitimate

awa y from
its

lhe state

existence in

its

™d towards those values that support the

modem I'orm.

It

achieves this end by

revaluing values in response to
the devaluation of values in
modernity. These

values are expressed in Nietzsche's
imperatives.
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I

NIETZSCHE'S IMPERATIVES

How

laughable, the

modem

concept of nationalities [moderne
18 a Clumsy wish to want
to see a
ation [ Nation ] as a visible
mechanical unity, equipped with a
glorious governmental apparatus and
military pomp
Nietzsche, a note to himself (1870/1871)

U

’

—

Between

the years of 1870 and 1876,

the University of Basel, set

down

Fnednch

his thoughts

Nietzsche, a classical philologist

on the world of Greek antiquity and

at

then,

turning his sights to the contemporary
world, issued four blistering polemics against
the

newly founded German Reich, condemning

for

it

its

European nationalism, while refusing

to give

dreamed of might still be transformed

into a political

up

his

failure to escape the petty politics of

hope

that the

German

state

community guided by

he had long

the highest

moral aims and worthy of the great cultural
achievements of the ancient Athenians. These
thoughts, penned in Nietzsche's

Meditations

first

two books- The Birth of Tragedy and

— are occupied with large-scale questions of politics and social

iepresent one of the earliest attempts by a
to

modern

less

left

and

right, revolutionary

life,

and

thinker to formulate a politics appropriate

an era in which the predominant vocabulary for theorizing

conservativism,

the Untimely

political life -liberalism

and counterrevolutionary— appear

less

and

and

capable of conceptualizing the problems posed by the period.

Nietzsche

s

1878 and 1888, the

writings from these years
final

— in contrast to those appearing between

year of his authorship— are of particular interest to political

philosophers, because they formulate, with great originality and foresight, theoretical
solutions to the predominant pathology of

modem politics— what Nietzsche calls,

with

prophetic foresight, the madness of nationalism— and they do so without retreating from
the sphere ol politics or renouncing the possibilities of
writings, Nietzsche

still

communal

in

1871

In these early

holds out the hope that modern political institutions— particularly

those institutions created by the unification of the various

Empire

life.

German

States into a single

— may be reformed and salvaged, that they may yet be saved from the
1

destructive forces of national,
s. identity politics and

made to serve ends higher than those
of
the accumulation of state
power, the subordination of the
individual to the ends of the
nation,

and the regulation of

The same may not be

social conflict for the
purposes of the accumulation of wealth

said of Nietzsche's great
later

works-Tta Spoke Zarathustra The
Genealogy of Mora,s, and Beyond
Good and Evil among them-and so m my
study of his
political thought,

termed

I

concentrate on his early writings, the
works of his

first

period, as he

it.

***
In Nietzsche's early

the

wntings-and

analysis that traces

it

back to

its

origins in a search for

and the nation-state, he argues, originate
that

holds true for

all his

works-he

modem politics- the pathology of nationalism -through

problem of

meaning

this

it

its

in the process

addresses

a genealogical

potential solution. Nationalism

of secularization and the

crisis in

produces in Western society. They are a
response to the decline of the

power of religion over

social life, the eclipse of theological
values,

and the waning of the

influence of the church in modernity. This
process of seculanzation terminates in what

Nietzsche famously describes as "the Death of
God," an event that marks the onset of
nihilism in the

West and

the devaluation of those values that have
historically given

meaning and purpose. These

values, Nietzsche

argues— and he means

theological values promoted by the various Christian
societies with a horizon ol

first

of

all

life

those

Churches- provided pre-modem

meaning and an explanation of

life sufficiently

strong to bond

society together, and with their collapse in modernity, forces
previously held in check are

unleashed and suppressed social antagonisms reemerge, creating a
a

new form

of

communal

For Nietzsche,
torm

ol organization.

creates the

organization.

it is

It

the nation-state,

more than anything

bond necessary

power of

new

the church and

to hold together the inimical energies of secular society.

,

meaning created by nihilism and

religious values with

else, that provides this

steps into the void created by the declining

Nationalism on the other hand, as devotion to one's nation,
spiritual

political crisis requiring

newly created

in turn fulfills the

need for

the process of secularization, replacing ineffective

political values.

The

result, for

Nietzsche,

is

that in

modernity, the state replaces the medieval church as the predominate organizing force

in

society, nationalism
set of

becomes

idols— the symbols and

the

dominant creed orienting

rituals

the political

of the church-, s replaced by
anolher-those of the

nation-state. In the end, Nietzsche
tells us, Christian theology
gives

theology of the

state,

community, and one

and citizens rediscover

life's

way

meaning and purpose

to a political
in

a devotion to

the nation-state.

This genealogy of the nation-state,
which

Untimely Meditations, and
out as part ol Nietzsche's

in writings

is

articulated in

from the period which he did not publish,

critical assault

point

the creation of a

German

volunteer to serve in the Franco-Prussian

cause of
ot the

his extraordinary military

maneuvering with France and the South German

welcomed

German

unification, quickly

Second Empire devolved

to icalizc the political, cultural,

long independent

German

is

the

carried

on the theological pretensions of the German

Reich founded by Otto von Bismarck in
1871 through
political

The Birth of Tragedy,

state,

States. Nietzsche,

even longed for

War of 1870-1871

became

in

it,

going so

and

who at one
fai

as to

an effort to advance the

the Reich's sternest critic after the founding

into grotesque self-satisfaction

and educational

and a thoroughgoing

possibilities created

failure

by the unification of the

states. It is these possibilities that Nietzsche's
early writings

articulate in opposition to the ideology

and theology of the

most Germans minds

after their rapid defeat of the

into a unified political

community

in 1871.

state that

French and

their

quickly took hold of

sudden incorporation

Along with Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy,

the

Untimely Meditations attempt to conceptualize how those possibilities—
justice, morality,

and lreedom, among

them— could

be realized

in

Germany and

existence independently ol the state and free from
these

two books work

to

formulate a

new

ol Periclean

life,

its

remnants of theology. Taken together,

vision of political

conditions, in which the lullest flowering of

Greeks

all

thereby legitimate

life,

suited to

modern

exemplified for Nietzsche by the classical

Athens, could once again be realized.

***
Scholars are largely divided on what

this

new

vision of political life looks like.

group, emphasizing Nietzsche's concept of "perspectivism," believes that

it

One

runs along a

horizontal axis, as liberal societies do, in which individuals evaluate the world from their

own

perspectives, creating their

own

systems of value independently of any constraining
3

authority, without an ultimate
ground for their decistons
evaluate.'

Accord, ng to

this

view, at once

American form, Nietzsche’s importance
negating, relativtzing

unmask, ng

and

pluralistic,

own power to

their

postmodern, and

leftist

m its

for political life lies in his
transformation of the

power of Western nihtlism

illegttimate

beyond

into a positive, creative force,
capable of

forms of authority by encouragmg
indtviduals to create themselves

their interpretations of the

world

in

Nietzsche, the perspectival
Nietzsche,

accordance with their own needs and ends.
This

is

the advocate of a rad, cal, ex, stent,
al tndiv, dualism,

a herald of the micro-poli ties of
self-creation,

who welcomes the death

of

God and

the loss’

absolute standards of value as an
unparalleled opportunity for genuine
freedom, beyond
the horizons created by the
imperatives of the nation-state and independently
of the
constraints imposed by conventional
ol

moralities.

Another group

ol scholars,

importance not

political

revalue values in the

in his

wake of

approaching Nietzsche from the

advocacy of a

pluralistic perspectivism, but in his call to

nihilism and establish a

again be capable of guiding collective

life

right, locate his

new

table of virtues that

towards a greater

common

would once

2

good. These

political

philosophers, taking their cue from the late Allen
Bloom, see liberal interpretations of
Nietzsche's thought as an unwarranted over-evaluation
of the importance he assigns to selfcreation and relativistic value creation.

They emphasis

instead Nietzsche's cnticisms of

liberalism

and

capable

guiding society beyond the contingent and unproductive seas
of pluralism. Their

ol

his call lor a

new

aristocracy of philosophers

interpretation of Nietzsche's luture political

separates the

lrom the

more

slave.

who would

community runs along a

legislate values

vertical axis,

which

virtuous from the less virtuous, the noble from the base, the master

They emphasize, with

as

much justification

as Nietzsche's

more

liberal

German philos opher's impatience with liberal individualism and its
This interpretation is best lormulated in the works of William Connolly and Bonnie
Honig. See, for example, William Connolly, The Ethos o/Pluralization (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the
Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
intcrpicters, the

This interpretation is best formulated in the works of Peter Berkowitz and Bruce
Detwiler. See, for example, Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the
Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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tendency

devolve into a complacent
mediocrity which undervalues humanity's
greatest
accomplishments and future possibilities.
to

Both of these interpretations of
Nietzsche's response
secularization have

much

one-sided nature. In
thought

to offer.

I

mention them, however,

my dissertation, show

l,es less in his

I

advocacy of a

to nihilism
in

and the process of

order to emphasize their

that Nietzsche's contribution
to political

liberal relativism

or an aristocratic conservatism,

than in an attempt to think the
possibility of both together. This
possibility,
realized

most perfectly

a political

community

in

that

I

believe,

is

Nietzsche's early writings, where he
formulates the possibility of

would give

full

reign to the development of the fullest
and most

dilfercntialcd forms of individualism
without falling into the abyss of an indifferent,
and

ultimately dangerous, relativism. In
these works, Nietzsche attempts to

dichotomy

would

at

ol liberalism

and conservatism

in

overcome

the

order to theorize a form of community that

once advance the cause of the individual and
simultaneously promote the common

gtxxl ol society. Nietzsche believed that
he had uncovered (his possibility in the Greek
polls,

I

and

in his critiques of the

our Untimely Meditations, he

could be realized

in the

German

tried to

formulated

in

The Birth of Tragedy and

show how some of the

works— in

Greek tragedy, Ike Birth of Tragedy— is

virtues of classical Athens

the Untimely Meditations

essentially moral.

At

and

lalse.

Nietzsche himself declared that he was the

im moralist of

in his

Genealogy of Morals he subjects

and

,

values
solid

good and

evil" to a critical revaluation

which reveals

and authoritative foundation than the immoral needs and

in his

first sight, this

appear paradoxical, or even
the West,

his

modern world.

Nietzsche's strategy in these
ol

stole,

study

might

first

the value of the moral

their origin to lie less in a

interests of individuals

and

society. Rather than simply constituting an unbridled assault

on the principles of morality,

however, Nietzsche's genealogical revaluation of morality

carried out in the service of

morality, in the service of a

more

perfect and

is

more rigorous morality, something perhaps

best characterized as a meta-morality, or a morality of morality. Far from asserting that

should give up morality and

feel Iree to kill, steal,

Nietzsche's "assault" on morality aims at

its

we

and commit crimes of all kinds,

perfection and refinement, a task necessitated

5

by Che emergence of nihilism

itself,

which deprives Judeo-Chnstian morality
of

its

theological foundations.

What, then, does Nietzsche's morality
look
political life? Nietzsche's morality,
as

like,

and what role does

it

play in

a response to nihilism and a rejection
of nationalism,

takes the lorm of a series of imperatives,
scattered throughout his works, that

tell what
ought to be done. They are not
hypothetical imperatives, but categorical
imperatives,
descendants of Kant s critical morality.
Hypothetical imperatives tell what ought to be
done
in order to achieve something
else. They are expeditious and
prudential, matters of

eliiciency, utility,

and pragmatic

interest:

by contrast are unconditional. They

tell

Do

"x" to achieve "y." Categorical imperatives,

what ought

to

be done irrespective of the particular

circumstances or desired ends. They simply
articulate universal laws that

command what

must be done, no matter what.
Nietzsche's imperatives look nothing like Kant's.
Their content

they are derived irom dillerent sources. But
Nietzsche's morality

is

is

different,

and

nevertheless a

3

descendent of Kant's. Nietzsche acknowledges

many ways, and
and

it

is

their originality.

was by choosing

worth noting some of them

The most obvious way

to write his dissertation

Judgement. Nietzsche never finished
his first

in

his debt to

Kant

in

many

places and in

to understand the nature of his imperatives

which Nietzsche acknowledged

on Kant's

third critique, the Critique

this dissertation, but the signs

this debt

of

of that project appear

in

book. The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche himself acknowledges that he used a

Kantian Iramework

in that

work

to the political life ol Athens.

Meditations

owe something

to interpret the logic of

And

Greek tragedy and

its

importance

Nietzsche also acknowledges that his Untimely

to Kant. In a Preface to that

work wntten

in

1885, nearly 10

Two important essays examine the concept of the imperative in Nietzsche's writings
and

Werner Hamacher's "The Promise of Interpretation:
Reflections on the Hermeneutical Imperative in Kant and Nietzsche," and Jean-Luc
Nancy's "'Our Probity!' On Truth in the Moral Sense in Nietzsche." Both may be found in
Looking After Nietzsche ed. L.A. Rickels (Albany: State University of New York Press,
their relationship to Kant:

,

1990 ).

6

years

al Cer its

creating
I

new

completion, he

tells

us that the Meditations furthered
Kant's legacy by

"categorical imperatives" suitable
for the post-Kantian era."

mention these examples of Kant's
importance

to Nietzsche because Nietzsche's

imperatives are to a great extent a
product of, and shaped by, his
engagement with the
critical philosopher. Why
is this so? Kant shows us
that human reason is finite,
limited,

and impcrlecl, fundamentally
incapable of fathoming ultimate

reality.

profound effect on Nietzsche, and he
mentions the

it

human

aspects of

existence in

many

places.

More

difficulties

This discovery had a

poses for thinking about

than anything else,

it

all

revealed to

Nict/sehc the true ground and source
of nihilism in modernity— our inability
to truly
understand our world and the impossibility
of perfectly grounding our moral, political,
and
epistemological judgements in any of the
traditional sources: Reason, revelation, or
nature.
Nietzsche treats this discovery, however,
like the death of god
rather than a liability.
civilization, to get

open now

He

sees

it

itself,

as an opportunity

as a chance, perhaps the first chance in
Western

behind conventional morality and consider what
good might

that the traditional sources of

still

remain

authority-God, reason, and nature-have been

closed off.
Ills this morality

and good

that Nietzsche's categorical imperatives articulate.

express the one remaining authority that Nietzsche
believes to
beset by the impcrlections of

human

s

exist in a secular age

reason. This authority, however,

than a positive, authority, and Nietzsche derives

Kant

still

it,

in

is

a negative, rathcr

a manner reminiscent of some of

deductions in his critiques, from the limits of human reason and the essential

unknowability of human nature, the nature of the world, and the nature of God. The
ol

human

reason, Nietzsche believes, act to subordinate us to the authority of what

cannot know. This authority acts as a check on or a limit to
humanity, be they those articulated by a
this

authority

moral

Colli

They

is

purely negative, and yet

state,

it

all

limits

it

authoritative delimitations of

a people, or an individual.

sullices lor Nietzsche to

As

I

command

have

said,

specific

acts.

See Friedrich Nietzsche, Sdmtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausga.be, ed. Giorgio
and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), vol. 1, 670.
1
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some examples from

give

I'll

how

this is possible. First,

Meditation, his second,

Nietzsche

is

”On

Nietzsche’s texts to concretize

an example lrom Nietzsche's
best known Untimely

Use and Abuse of History

the

my discussion and

for Life.” In this essay,

concerned with showing how our
preoccupation with history

serve the political

community by expanding our conception
of

coniines of national characteristics.

in

modernity can

humanity beyond the

He

writes about history in this essay,
because he
believes that the rise of historicism
in modernity has produced a
debilitating relativism

which

rightly exposes

our cherished beliefs

cultures and times, but

deeds

ol the past to

which nevertheless

to be the contingent effects of
particular

fails to

mobilize our knowledge of the great

advance the cause of humanity and
individual

self-cultivation. In the

final section

of the meditation he recalls a categorical
imperative of the past which would
advance the cause of humanity and the
individual alike, were it only heeded.
This
categorical imperative

"Know

Delphi:

is

the simple

ol

° ur valucs and
God, leach us

now

bclicfs
that

we

the

For Nietzsche, the command

thyself."

imperative necessitated by the
°!

command which

rise

Modern

-

arc not

of historicism and

to

its

"know

thyself"

in their
is

temple

at

a categorical

exposure of the contingent nature

historicism, like Kant's critique of reason and
the death

who we

interminable process of gelling to

imperative, Nietzsche believes,

Greeks inscribed

may

know

we,

we

thought

were, that

ourselves.

like the

we must

Only by heeding

begin

anew

the

this categorical

Greeks of classical antiquity, once again

take possession ol ourselves and achieve a freedom
worthy of the name.

Nietzsche announces another, analogous imperative

one concerns not the individual but the
concept

ol a "people':

Y ou can never conceive

imperative compliments the Delphic
political

community

inability to

Nietzsche oilers
is

as a whole.

know how
it

collective.

It is

command

it

It

to

to

in this

same

meditation. This

says, "Create lor yourselves the

be noble and lofty enough." This

know

yourself by expanding

necessitated, like the Delphic

it

to the

command, by our

great a people could be or what a people should properly be.

as an alternative to the

achieved through the achievement of a

German
state.

people's belief that greatness and nobility

For him,

it

is

necessary fora people to

aspire instead to the highest possible accomplishment, for anything less,

lie

argues, docs an

injustice to the concept ol a people. In fact, both of Nietzsche's imperatives— the one for

8

'he

CO " CCUvC

-

lhc

° lhcr for lhc

individual -arc motivated by
a concern for justice, and
this

holds true lor his other
imperatives as well.
Nietzsche's concept of justice
differs from most concepts
of justice.

It is

not

concerned with the distribution
of resources within a society
or with retribution or
ministration ol the law, though n
remains in contact with

the

these conceptions through

difference from them. Nietzsche's
concept of justice

philosopher Heraclitus,
Nietzsche,

who

he often

means doingjuslicc

cites,

to reality.

It

like Plato's

is,

its

and the pre-Socmtic

an ontological concept. Being just,
for

means recognizing how

things arc, and

respecting them rather than concealing
them behind convention or mendacity.
Justice

is,

therefore, like the authority Nietzsche
derives his categorical imperatives from,
a largely

negative concept. Because

never

know with

we can

never

know

perfectly

the certainly of gtxtd conscience
that

how

things are, because

we have doncjusticc

to

we can

something or

someone, because we can never be sure we
have properly understood and responded to
events and persons in the right way, we
always risk, in our actions and our thoughts,
being
unjust.

Nietzsche sees
important role
Sophocles.

concept of justice

guiding the course of

in

What

at

work

many dramas,

these dramas reveal about the

Nietzsche believes,

humanity cause

this

it

is

the reality ol

to be hubristic,

nature to perfectly guide us,

we

human

hubris.

we can

condition, in

all its

bottom

ol things

although

and do

intentions.

life, is

the administration of justice.

attempt to

fail,

it

and those we

anything

less,

we
Greek

thereby teaches

command,

We must, like Oedipus,

justice to ourselves, the world,
this

dimensions,

Without God, reason, or

never be perfectly just, and

Oedipus or a Prometheus.

we must also expect

plays an

finitude and imperfections of

us that the attempt to be just, which Nietzsche's categorical
imperatives
the hcioic lorlitude ol an

it

prey to hubris, and the suffering that

fall

cxpei icncc lrom our imperfect deeds and mortal
tragedy, lor Nietzsche, teaches us that

The

its

Greek tragedy, where

particularly those of Aeschylus and

human

however good

inevitably

in

requires

try to gel to the

live with,

and

Nietzsche argues, would

be a form of injustice.
I

it is

he

name

lor this sort ol ethical altitude

and the categorical imperatives

that express

"pcrlcctionism." Greek tragedy, like the great examples of historical deeds that

9

Nicl/schc focuses on

second Untimely Meditation,
compels us to perfect ourselves
and promote the perfection of
those we live with, our people,
our community, and
ullnnatcly, humanity itself.
Anything else, for Nietzsche, would
do an injustice to
ourselves, our people, and our
humanity. Nict/.schc seems to have
derived Ins moral
perfectionism from Aristotle, whose
Politics he studied in preparation
for writing The Birth
"J Tragedy. Just as Aristotle claims
that the end of life is the
good life, and that the good
life is

the best,

best life

,s

the

most

his

perfect

life,

most perfected

and diverse, expansive and

so too docs Nietzsche

life,

the life, as he puts

assert, in all

of writings, that the

that is spacious

it,

and multiple,

rich

inclusive.

Nietzsche's belief that perfectionism can
be our only moral position in a secular
age
without absolutes, that it constitutes the
highest good of individual and collective
life,

explains

why

pluralistic,

his

new

vision of political

postmodern

community

is

not quite the

same

liberalism. Nietzsche's perfectionism
prevents

as that of a

him from being a

straightforward advocate of value pluralism,
because he values, as should already be clear,

some

things

more than

others. His

imperatives- his "oughts" or values- command the

vciy highest accomplishment. They express
a concept of justice that always demands

moic— more
Once

the absolutes of

knowablc,
cvci

self-knowledge, a higher concept of a people, a more
perfect

moic

we

way of

God, reason, and nature arc swept away and rendered never

are placed in a position in which, Nietzsche believes,

pcilcct lorm of individual and collective

life,

should

life.

perfectly

we must strive

we wish

for an

to be just. Rather

than advocating a straightforward value pluralism, then,
Nietzsche believes that the value of

a perspective on the world increases as that perspective

itself

bioadci dccpci, richer, and ultimately more universal.

A

,

more valuable and more just
exist

is

self

is,

for him, a

perspective. Perspectives arc unavoidable, but differences

therefore a morality that

-perfection and

becomes

broader perspective

between perspectives, and these differences have different

morality
self

increases and

commands

values. Nietzsche's

us to refine our perspectives by striving for

-overcoming, not for the sake of accruing power, but

increase our capacity for justice, responsibility, and the good

order to

life.

Nietzsche's advocacy of moral perfectionism also explains

considered simply a partisan of an aristocratic conscrvativism.
10

in

To

why

he should not be

be sure, there

is

an

aristocratic

clement to his morality, but the
aristocratic excellence which
he wishes to

substitute lor

myopic nationalism

is

an excellence available to

Nietzsche's early works are valuable,
available excellence

works
he

is

is

more clearly than

all.

because they articulate

Indeed, one reason

why

this all-inclusive, endlessly

his other writings, since
his

concern in these first
with the political community
as a whole, and not simple
with the "free spirit" who

latter identifies as his

primary audience. In his third Untimely
Meditation, for example,
which is concerned to prove that the
end of humanity is not the suite, as
Hegel had argued,
but the perfection of individual
and collective life, Nietzsche tells
us that our task is to
become a genius and help others to become
geniuses.

etymology shows,

the

one who generates,

the

one

The genius

who

is

is,

as the word's

involved

in the process of
genesis, of creating and advancing
the cause of humanity. Everyone,
Nietzsche believes,

has this capacity, and by calling on
everyone to become geniuses, he advances a
position
which is very far from promoting the cause
of a few, conservative, aristocrats, who
revalue
values for the rcsl of us.
It is

tempting to describe Nietzsche's vision of

political

community

in his first

writings as aristocratic democracy. This concept
of politics would not be a concept that he

himself speaks o( during this period, but

That

is, it

might best do justice

it

might be the best way to get

to his intentions in

at

The Birth of Tragedy,

what he

is after.

the Untimely

Meditations, and in the other writings from this period
that articulate his political thought.

For these writings continually hold out the hope
collectively elevate
their self-perfection

works

tell

itself

beyond

to be

done

of lhc demos. Whether or not

ol

1

community could

the ends ol the nation-state and

overcome

nihilism through

and ennoblement. The categorical imperatives announced

what ought

one's perspective.

that a political

to achieve this,

this

and Nietzsche intends them

in these

for the

whole

adds up to a concept of democracy, perhaps depends on

believe, however, that his

works can help us

to theorize the possibility

a non-nationalistic form of political community, capable of confronting the disorienting

cllccts of nihilism

and promoting the highest excellences of the demos.

CHAPTER II
"THE LAW OF ETERNAL JUSTICE”:

THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY

The
in

relationship of the Dionysian
and the Apollinian
every form of the state [Staatsform]
....

is

recoam/ able
recognizable

— Nietzsche, a note to himself

Aesthetics and Politics
In

and

The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche

of politics

on

aesthetics.

1

His purpose

investigates the effects of aesthetics
is

twofold.

On

why,

in the classical polls, "tragedy

their loundations [in ihren

and the

Greek tragedy which

state [Stoat] are

Fundamenten verwachsen sind

]

"

(§23).

2

bound together

On

object of philosophical, theoretical, and
political speculation in order to

at

the other hand,

Nietzsche presents the structural
transformations which tragedy undergoes as

to the disastrous

politics

the one hand, art's effect on

politics is to be presented through
a genealogical investigation of

discloses

on

it

becomes an

awaken modernity

consequences resulting from the politicization of
art and the

aestheticization of politics. Nietzsche's intentions
are so far
the aesthetic into an

all

removed from

encompassing ideology-and no charge

Major discussions

efforts to turn

has been leveled against

The Birth of Tragedy have not done justice to these basic
dimensions of Nietzsche's argument. John Sallis's otherwise
close reading of the book
pays no attention to it (see Crossings: Nietzsche and
the Space of Tragedy [ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press, 1991]); M. S. Silk and J.
P. Stern almost entirely avoid it m
their encyclopedic discussion of the work
(see Nietzsche on Tragedy [New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1984]); Peter Sloterdijk makes more
headway, but remains
ar from the book's lundamcntal problems (see Thinker
on Stage: Nietzsche's Materialism,
trans. Jamie Owen Daniel [Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1989]); Barbara
\ on Rcibnitz s excellent "commentary"
on The Birth of Tragedy pays attention to questions
aesthetics and politics, but only comments on the first twelve
of the book's twenty-five
sections (see Ein Kommentar zu Friedrich Nietzsche "Die Geburt der
Tragodie a us deni
Geiste derMusik " (Kap.1-12) [Stuttgart und Weimar, 1992]).
of

T ranslations of Nietzsche's texts are my own. All references to The Birth of
Tragedy will appear in the body of the text. In order to facilitate use of both the German
text and English translations, references will cite the section numbers in
Nietzsche's text.
Translations are from the Sdmtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe ed. Giorgio Colli
and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), I, 9-165. The unfortunate state
of English translations has been often noted. For an instructive reading of Walter
Kaulmann's "ideological misreading" of The Birth of Tragedy his mistranslation see
Andrzej Warminski, Readings in Interpretation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota,
‘

,

—

1987), xliv-xlv.
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—

Nietzsche's writings with

very oppostte:

It

more frequency -that The

polemic, zes against the various
political ideologies
intention to

Birth of Tragedy accomplishes
the

offers an elaborate critique
of the tdeology of the aesthet.e
and ruthlessly

do so on

the

first

it

enables.

5

And

it

announces

its

page of the "Foreword to Richard
Wagner." There Nietzsche

places an "aesthetic problem
[asthelisches Problem]- and a

"German problem [deutschen
Problem]" at the center of his
investigations, and although each
of these problems results

1

rom a

certain conllation of politics and
aesthetics, he insists that resolving
them depends

upon more than simply distinguishing
between

the playful values of the aesthetic

and

the

more

serious problems of polities. Treating
an "aesthetic problem" senously
requires more
than the construction of antitheses
such as "patriotic excitement and aesthetic
revelry" or

"courageous seriousness and cheerful play."
In the "Foreword to Richard Wagner,"
Nietzsche tells his readers that the "aesthetic
problem" he investigates is so little opposed to
politics that

it

lies "right in the

middle" of "German hopes":

You

will recall that I collected these
thoughts together during the same
period when your marvelous Festschrift on
Beethoven came into being, that
is, during the terrors and
sublimities [Schrecken und Erhabenheiten] of
the
war that had just broken out. Yet, as regards this
collection, anyone would
be mistaken who should think of the antithesis
between patriotic excitement
and aesthetic revelry, of courageous seriousness and
cheerful play: Rather,
to their astonishment, it would become
clear to them, with a real reading of
this writing [einem wirklichen Lesen
dieser Schrift], what a serious

German

problem we are treating— one placed by us right in the
middle of German
hopes, as vortex and turning point. But perhaps it will
be simply offensive

tor just these readers to see an aesthetic problem
taken so seriously, in case
they are namely in a state to recognize in art nothing more
than a cheerful
sideline, a readily dispensable ringing of bells
accompanying the
seriousness of existence [Ernst des Daseins\ " As if no one knew
what
:

For interpretations of Nietzsche which charge him with aestheticism, see
Gert
Sautermeister, "Zur Grundlegung des Asthetizismus bei Nietzsche. Dialektik,
Metaphysik
und Politik in der 'Geburt der Tragodie'," in NaturalismuslAsthetizismus, ed. Christa^
BUrger, Peter BUrger, and Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1979),
224-243; Henning Ottmann, "Nietzsches Politische Philosophic. Versuche in

Postmoderner Politik," in Bayreuther Nietzsche -Kolloquium (Frankfurt am Main: Peter
Lang, 1989), 107-129; Thomas Heilke, Nietzsche's Tragic Regime: Culture, Aesthetic,
and Political Education (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998); Jurgen
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity trans. Frederick Lawrence
(Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1987), 83-105; Josef Chytry, The Aesthetic State: A Quest
in Modern German Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 318-358;
Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University
,

Press, 1985); Nicholas Martin, Nietzsche

and Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1996).
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was involved in this contrast
with such a
( Foreword to Richard
Wagner")
Taking an

"aesthetic problem" seriously

problems of politics; under certain
conditions
they pose seriously. This

is

"seriousness of existence."

may

not only not be inconsistent
with

may

be the only

way to take the problems
never truer than when politics
becomes something more than
it

just rational calculation, the
implementation of a program, a technique
for actualizing a
theory, or a procedural means
for realizing the law. Under
these circumstances, politics

not simply rational, programmatic,
technical, or procedural.

employing abstract concepts, enforcing
universal

Nor is

it

always

will

only a matter of

values, or according with timeless
truths.

Rather, problems of aesthetics must
be taken seriously once politics
it

is

recognized for what

have been -ineluctably sensational and
irrevocably worldly.

aesthetics, the

"German problem" and

to dissociated

themselves from the sensuous

moods, and emotions, from

its

,s

and

Politics

the "aesthetic problem," are united
in their inability
life

of the body, from

its

feelings, passions,

drives and instincts, from, in short, the
dimension of

life

which, in contrast to the timeless universality
of essences, the term "existential" was

designed to capture. 4 This dimension, which
Nietzsche identifies
the

word existence [Dase in],"

extent, the aesthetic

is

is

ol theory, the

supersensible.

"Foreword" with

the sphere of the aesthetic and the political, and
to this

already political. Not simply because

sensibility with politics, but because

tyranny

in the

it

marks

it

shares the sphere of

the rebellion of the material world against the

despotism of the philosophers, and the abstractions of the

The philosophers and

their theories

— the whole phenomenon of

"Socratism" which Nietzsche struggles with throughout The Birth
of Tragedy— have

always attempted

to suppress this rebellion of the sensuous, irrational, contingent,
non-

conceptual, and non-programmable. Problems of aesthetics, then, are indissociable from

problems

ot politics to the extent that the

contingence of sentiment constantly threatens to

upset the rule of reason and destabilize the order of the polis.
to this unstable situation has

The

philosophers' response

always been to provide a theory of the aesthetic— what

Aristotle called a "poetics"— capable of determining the types of art and forms of feeling

which accord with

the moral en ds of the polis.

Once

these theories are in place and put into

On aesthetics and the realm of sensibility, see Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche vol.
(Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1989), 99-100.
,
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1

,

pract.ce, mt.onal.zed

works of art can be produced
and a program of aesthetic
education
nstuuted. However much these
programs may vary, they a„ attempt
to

make

the .rational

rahonal and the contingent
necessary, and in each case they
do so through the hab.tnal

exposure

ol the

young

works of

to

art

whose effects ought

to

harmonize

their souls in

accordance with the moral ends of
the polls.

No better example of these efforts to
Socratism— exists than

the one

politicize

art- no

better

example of

which serves as Nietzsche's point of
departure

in

The Birth

of Tragedy. This point of departure-the
"aesthetic problem"-is announced
on

the book's

lirst

page, but not until

responsible for placing

its

it

twenty-second section

at the center

is

the philosopher

named who

is

of debates on tragedy: Aristotle.

And only then does
Nietzsche finally identify the aesthetic
phenomenon which Aristotle made the central
problem lor

all

future investigations of tragedy:
Catharsis. Since Aristotle's Poetics
every

interpretation ol tragedy has had to
grapple with the problem of tragedy's
cathartic effect
with tragedy's strange ability to produce
a feeling of pleasure in its audience
through the

representation of painful, pitiable, and even
terrifying events. 5

And every

,

interpretation of

tragedy has had to decide upon this feeling's
significance. These, then, are the problems

which define Nietzsche's

"aesthetic problem."

aesthetics. Aristotle's first

Catharsis

is

But they are not simply a problem of

and longest presentation of catharsis takes place

a political problem

— and this

is

the formulation

in the Politics.

6

which Nietzsche

adopts -because the sound of music affects the polis.
Indeed, the different forms of

sound

the dillerent melodies

— attect the polls in different ways. According to the

typology laid out in the Politics and put into play in The Birth
of Tragedy, the only form of

music suitable tor purposes

and pleasure

in the right

of rational

education— for

training citizens to experience pain

way- is one which makes the souls of the young moderate,

For

Aristotle's discussion of catharsis, see Poetics trans. Richard
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 17-18 (53b 1-14).
,

Janko

For Nietzsche's comments on the role of catharsis in the Politics, see Sdmtliche
Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. VII (notes from the period 1869-1874),
196, 220,
285. For a general discussion of Nietzsche's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of

Hedwig Wingler, "Aristotle in the Thought of Nietzsche and Thomas
Aquinas," in Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition, ed. James O'Flaherty,
Timothy Sellner, Robert Helm (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976)
33-54.
catharsis, see

15

,

courageous, and balanced, and
the ab.lity to create this
effect, Aristotle says, makes
this
type of music an indtspensable
tnstrumenl of education for the
virtuous polls. Other
melodies, however-and it is
these which attract Nietzsche's
attention- have the very
oppostte effect: That of catharsts.
Rather than attun.ng the soul to
a moderate temperament
catharric melodtes produce
enthustasm (enthousiasmos) and
an orgiastic (orgiasOkos)
feeling of inspiration.

When

p asant feeling of release.

these melodtes conclude,
Anstotle says, the effect

ts

a

In tragedy, this cathartic
leelingof release is experienced as

joy— "harmless joy." Such joy,
7

however, has no ethical value, so these
melodies must be

excluded from the process of education
and confined to the
Politics, then, catharsis

belongs in the theater and nowhere

theater.
else.

According

Tragedy

to the

in turn

becomes

an instrument lor the cathartic purification
of the emotions, while Aristotle's theory
of
tragedy turns the theater into a site where
the pathologies of the polls can be
safely purged

and immoderate and excessive emotions-fear
and

most concerned

momentary
body

harmlessly released. In the end, catharsis

is

two with which

Aristotle

is

politicized therapy,

psychoanalysis, or, as Anstotle himself says, a
"medical treatment" for the

politics.

8

Nietzsche already indicates

Foreword

pity are the

to Richard

how

close he

is

to Aristotle's

Wagner." Of the two events referred

concept of catharsis

to there

—

"I

in the

collected these

thoughts together during the same period when your
[Wagner's] marvelous Festschrift on

Beethoven came into being,

that

is,

dunng

the terrors

hrhahenheiten ] of the war that had just broken out"

own way,
their

are

bound up with problems of

own way,

and sublimities [Schrecken und

— of these two events, both, in their

the emotions

and

their excesses,

and both,

in

are the subject of Nietzsche's book. Indeed, the two feelings which

Nietzsche associates with the Franco-Prussian

sublime— originate

in the failed efforts to

War — the

terrifving

and the

comprehend a magnitude so excessive

resulting emotions are themselves pure expressions of excess.

It is all

the

that the

more remarkable,

then, that Nietzsche should refer to Wagner's Festschrift on Beethoven and the terrors and

Anstotle, Politics trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 240 (1342a
14-15).

Politics,

240 (1342a

10).

16

subhmit.es of the Franeo-Pruss.an

War in one and

the

same sentence,

tor the Festschrift

has no other aim than to
demonstrate music's properly
sublime-and not at all
beautiful— character. And by
suggesting that the FrancoPrussian War and Wagner's
"

theory of music are united in
the similarity of their effects,
Nietzsche indicates just
close he
catharsis
p.tv

is

to Aristotle's theory of
catharsis.

For according

how

to that theory, the structure
of

homologous, even, as has often been
remarked, homeopathic: Fear and
are purged by means of fear
and pity. Tragedy's fearful and
is itself

pitiable events inspire fear

and

pity in the audience,

and when the drama ends, these
emotions are

Nietzsche departs from Aristotle's
theoiy of tragedy-and

this

relieved.

departure

Yet

lies at the root

of

each of his criticisms of Anstotle in
The Birth of Tragedy-^ he refers
not to the
emotions of fear and pity but to the
"sublimities of the war" and to a text
on the sublimity
of music. Rather than following
Aristotle's understanding of tragic
catharsis as a

homeopathic remedy for those members of
the polls who are prone
the virtuous

to being

catharsis, achieved

by a sublime,

ecstatic

form of music,

is

"German problem" has

its

that tragic

a necessary remedy and cure

lor a people subjected to the sublime
excesses of war. 10 Indeed, Nietzsche
that the

swayed from

middle by excessive emotions, Nietzsche's
"Foreword" suggests

seems

to suggest

origin in nothing other than the passionate
excesses of

war, in a violence and terror whose magnitude
renders them so incomprehensible, so

meaningless, senseless, and lacking in reason, that the
pathos of politics gives way to the

apathy and resignation which Schopenhauer counseled
desire.

And

although Nietzsche's

letters

from

this

in the face of the Will's insatiable

period clearly indicate that he was

beginning to lose sympathy with the present German war of
conquest" for precisely these
reasons, he waits until the twenty-first section of The Birth
of Tragedy to openly thematize
the various suggestions first outlined in the "Foreword."

tragedy

s

relationship to war, and only then

is its

Only then does he speak of

relationship to politics

— even to the

Richard Wagner, "Beethoven," in Richard Wagner's Prose Works,
William Ashton Ellis (New York: Broude Brothers, 1966), 77, 93, 103.
This was

first

as a medical orderly.

vol.

V,

trans.

of all the case for Nietzsche, who served in the Franco-Prussian War
He wrote "The Dionysian Worldview" for this reason, and as his

make clear, the war was a horrifying experience for which he was entirely
unprepared. See his letter of 23 November, 1879 to Erwin Rhode, in Selected Utters
of
Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Christopher Middleton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 69-71.
letters
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pohticul itself— addressed. There,
as Che book's finale gets under
way, Nietzsche provides
a description of tragedy's effect
on polil.es whieh beg, ns to explain
why he would place an
"aesthetic problem” "right in the
middle of German hopes":

we can

learn only from the Greeks
what an almost miraculous sudden
awakening of tragedy means for the
innermost ground of the hie of a dcodIc
\ileii mnersten Lebensgrund
eines Volkes It
is

].

,lKtt

lghl ' hC baUlCS

Shnh
%ht these wars
'

ihc people of ihc iraihc

'he Persians;

in turn

Zt

needs tragedy as a ncecssary drink
of recovery
Whc wouid have supposed that precisely
these people, after having been
agitated to their vciy core [bis in's
Innerste ] for several generations by the
lonysian demon, should still have
possessed such a uniformly vigorous
lil,cal
8
deling
P°
[einfachsten politischen

—

The analogy Nietzsche constructs

here

is

unmistakable: Just as tragedy enabled the

C.iccks to recover their feeling lor the
political, even after the interminable
carnage of the

Persian Wars, so too would a rebirth of
tragedy enable the

Germans

to recover their feeling

lor the political al ter the "terrors and
sublimities" of the Franco-Prussian War. But

Nietzsche goes

still

further, finding in the tragic

passion lor politics which

suP cr lativc— "the simplest

is

so elemental and original that

die 'politischen

Aristotle.

Menschen an

As Hie

political lecling"

Birth of

/

It

sich'\."

makes

n

is

it

becomes ever

"political

men"

because

its

Gefuhls]"— but

men

'*

is

recall the

"Dcr gricchischc
771

this

emphasis on the

Indeed, just as Aristotle gives tragedy a place
it

to a slate of moderation,

become immoderate,

Staat," in Samtliche

if

a people's

unhealthy, and even pathological.

Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol.

I,

.

On
326

to

importance which

cathartic purging of the passions returns

not to

as such'

arc the result of a sensibility and a

so too does Nietzsche insist that the moderating effects of tragedy arc essential
passion lor politics

the

clearer that this outstanding

moderate rather than excessive, and

Aristotle's Politics assigns to these values.

and a

must not only be judged

the tragic Greeks "the 'political

moderate, the medium, and the mean cannot help but

in the polis

political

Here again, Nietzsche owes something

ragedy unfolds,

and these outstanding

passion for politics which

it

political feeling [des einfachsten politischen

very foundation lor politics as such:
I

Greeks a feeling for the

Nietzsche's readings of Aristotle's Politics sec to Chylry,
,

.
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I’lie

Aesthetic State,

Immoderation, however, results not
only from the suspension of the
will in the face of
sublime and terrifying excesses
of war. At the other extreme
lies the danger of total
politicization, of

the

a rampant nationalism or a
nationalist enthusiasm whose
excessiveness

can be no less deadly. In contrast
to the threat of

political nihilism posed by the
FrancoPrussian War, the danger which
political nationalism poses to
"German hopes" has its
origins in the "patriotic excitement"
which swept across Germany after
Bismarck's
trouncing of the French forces. ’ This
danger is not one of a deadly and
annihilating
1

violation of the borders of the state
and

its

soldiers.

The danger posed by

"patnotic

excitement" comes from the opposite
extreme: The establishment of the borders
of the
nation and the identity of
in

Germany

this

the subsequent
state:

its

citizens.

This danger arises the moment a

moment- the Reichsgriindung-c ante with

state is

the conclusion of the

war and

uml ication of northern and southern Germany
under the banner of a

single

Deutschland.

With

the conclusion ol the

war and

then, the question of the political arises.

teeling

arises.

For "the

the subsequent founding of the

Or rather,

political" is neither

German

formulation

when he goes on

an entity nor a concept nor an idea;

manifestations of the political
life

its

is

united in

theoretical systematization.

provide a theory of the political or a
consternation of so

many

their differences,

and even a

each of these

resistance to the rational elucidation of political

Not without reason,

political theory in

then, does Nietzsche

fail

to

The Birth of Tragedy. Indeed,

to the

readers, he never does write a systematic treatise on politics. 14

political is too variant

medium

its

Whatever

it is,

this

to speak of a "political drive [politischen Triebe ]"

"political instinct politischen Instinkte ]"
[
(§21).

nation,

the question of the "simplest political

Nietzsche says, a leeling. But he just as quickly admits
the insufficiency of

The

founded, and

and too

irrational to allow for

of the concept. These excesses

may

its

perfect translation into the

save

it

from being

philosopher-kings and Socratic theoreticians, but

it

also

makes

fully
it

programmed by

into an

enormous

13

For a discussion of Nietzsche's views on nationalism, see Carol Diethe, "Nietzsche
and Nationalism," History of European Ideas, vol. 14, no. 2 (March, 1992), 227-234.

For an explanation of

Bonnie Honig, "Nietzsche and the Recovery
Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell

this failure, see

ol Responsibility," in Political

University Press, 1993), 73-75.
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problem— a

German problem,"

"serious

since the problem of excess,
of too

indeed, a problem for modernity
as a whole.

much

or too

nationalism or nihilism -since
this problem

is

little,

And

of pathology or apathy, of

impossible to resolve theoretically,
the task

of realizing that simplest of
political feelings must be
approached some other way.
This other way, of course, leads
Nietzsche back to the tragic Greeks.
It is,
Nietzsche says, "only from the
Greeks" that we can learn what
"tragedy means

for the

innermost ground of the

And

life

of a people [den innersten
Lebensgrund eines Volkes]

the first thing to be learned

mockingly wrote

in the

"Foreword"

the 'seriousness of existence'."

"innermost ground,"

its

from the Greeks

that tragedy is

mood of the middle

Nietzsche argues that the effect of tragedy
on

"form of existence [Daseinsform]"
(§15,

its

§ 19),

it

its

moderates, mediates, and

or a middling mood. Indeed,

spectators

is

even capable of altering

their

of altering their attunement and retuning

midpoint or medium between the extremes of

).

accompanying

strikes at the very core of existence,
at

"very core [bis in's Innerste}," and

(§2 1

not-as Nietzsche

- "a readily dispensable ringing of bells

Tragedy

attunes the sphere of sensibility to
a

to a

is

political nihilism

and

it

political

nationalism. Everything in The Birth
of Tragedy revolves around this elusive "middle

world [Mittelwelt ]

(§3, §7, §24), this midpoint or

medium which

constitutes a "third

form" (§21) of existence between the extremes
of nihilism and nationalism. Everything

Ihe Birth of Tragedy, then, revolves around the problem
of retuning the
moderating
extremes.

It

its

tendency to extremism. But

means finding

the midpoint or

this

"Perhaps

we may

in the

medium where

"Foreword"— constitutes

touch upon

Which aesthetic effect

this primordial

[dsthetische

Wirkung ]

of

means something other than avoiding

as Nietzsche says, they "enter into simultamous
activity."

problem announced

political,

And

this

problem

the primordial

when

the

they effect one another, where,

— the "aesthetic

problem of tragedy:

problem [Urproblem] with
arises

in

this question:

the essentially separated powers

of art [ Kunstmachte ], the Apolliman and the Dionysian, enter into simultaneous activity?

Or more

briefly:

How

does music behave towards image and concept?" (§

Plato tries to answer this question— what
Aristotle takes

up

the problem in the Poetics

is

15
1

6).

catharsis?— in his Philebus (48a);

( 1448b 8-19, 1453b 10-14). On the history of
this problem as formulated by Aristotle, see Max Kommerell, Lessing und Aristoteles.
Untersuchung iiber die Theorie der Tragodie (Frankfurt am Main: 1960), 63-107.
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The Problem of the Extremes:
Solving

this

the Apollinian

and

the Dionysian

problem and comprehending

the effect of tragedy upon
human
existence depends upon avoiding
the extremes of the
Apollinian and the Dionysian in
order
to discover their middle
ground, the place where they
"enter into simultaneous activity,"
Indeed, the tragic effect,
Nietzsche insists, is nothing other
than an experience of the
middle. Not only does "Dionysus,
the proper hero of the stage
and center
,telpmkt\ of
the vtsion" (§8), appear at the
middle point of ,rag,c art, but the
world of the stage, as the
presentation of the satyr chorus's
ecstatic visions, ,s a "world
of the middle IMittelwelt}-

[M

(§24, §8), neither simply worldly or
other-worldly.

The absence of tragedy and

the tragic

attunement, on the other hand, leads
to various extreme effects
and expenences, resulting
not in tragic pathos but in the
pathologies of nihilism and nationalism.
Avoiding
these

extremes depends on understanding the
effects of what Nietzsche
the Dionysian.

The concepts of the Apollinian and

historical aliective states (Zustand)

They

are, Nietzsche says,

calls the Apollinian

and

the Dionysian signify the concrete

and

and moods (Slimming) investigated by

"powers"

(

aesthetics.

Macke ), capable of affecting individuals,

18

inducing

affects that are at

once cognitive, non-subjective, and definitive
for human existence. 17

They correspond

exactly to the extremes of universality and
particularity, and resolving the

"the primordial question" of tragedy and
understanding

investigating

them

in turn before turning to their

its

cathartic effect requires first

mutual interaction and "simultaneous

activity."

The Apollinian sphere
and within

its

is

the sphere of particularity and therefore of
individuality,

jurisdiction, the individual

is

held sacred and obliged to follow the law of

individuation:

Considered as imperati ve and as giving prescriptions, this divination of
° n the Dionysian " Zustand " see §5, §6, §8, §9; on the Apollinian " Zustand " see
_
„
§9. For a "an abbreviated survey" of Nietzsche's basic states, including
the Dionvsian
state but excluding the Apollinian state, see Karl Jaspers,
Nietzsche: An Introduction to the
Understanding of His Philosophical Activity trans. Charles F. Wallraff and Fredenck J.
Schmitz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 339-349.
On the Dionysian " Stimmung" see §5, §8; on the Apollinian "Stimmung" see §6.
‘

6

,

On

the significance of Nietzsche's understanding of

Nietzsche vol.
,

On

I,

moods

see Martin Heidegger,

114-26.

the Dionysian etfect see §4, §7; on the Apollinian effect see §2, §4.
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pamllcl lhe

aesthetic necessity of beauty.
(§4)

Under

the influence of the
Apollintan effect

a

m the figurative character of sculptural art, in

state

of measured res, takes over:
In dreams,

the

formal borders of the "conscious"
individual and the phystcal body,
in the measuredness of
the ethical law,
the measured

harmony ol beauty, and

in the formal frontiers of
the state.

remembered, N.etzsche emphasizes,

that the

But

it

must always be

"power [Macht]’ of the Apollintan "does
not

90

respec, the tndivtdual"
(§2).'°Thc paradoxtcal law of the
indtvtdua. produces not

Thomas Hei
I

r^,’

IlhnoisU^tfvK

Dekalb: Northern

“

Thus, when
T*? inaccessiblc
Political Education

^

-

pproa( hes The Blrth of tragedy
the perspective of a "philosophical
from
r
anthronokw- n
anthropology
seeking to discover in Nietzsche’s
(11),
text a "thonrv nf man" fo«
u

T

8 ? d rca on why uch difficulties are encountered: not
only does Nietzsche reiect
,?
f
t
,
^
h
y and wilh it all accounts of the "human in itself [dir Mensch
u tV
an sichV
f
s
gf
(§ 19), but he locates the foundation of political
life outside the himan being
and
dl
n hropo,ogi 1 accoun t s ol its "nature."
Man
*•

o

T

i

e

human

,

is

subject

is to

be delimited. What

is

not the measure here and the authoritv
of

authoritative, then,

is the Dionysian
categorical imperative that eventually
emerges in The Birth of Tragedy and its authoritv
6 mablhty ° f the human be,n to ,ve
an authoritative account of the
8
8

"rumanmTieir’^

^S^

issues lar too vast to be

°n
he anthropological problematic opens up another
series of
more°m
than indicated here. They concern the work
of

Ctl

^

the

anthropologist Levi-Strauss. Like Nietzsche, he
is concerned with the structure of
myth.
oreover, his texts have consistently taken up the
problematic of Nietzsche's own
investigation: what is the relationship between
the Apollinian and the Dionysian or in
terminology scared by both Levi-Strauss and Nietzsche,
between myth
Raw and the Cooked trans. J. D. Weightman (London: Jonathan Cape, and music. See The
1970), 14-30- The
Naked Man, trans. J. D. Weightman (London: Jonathan Cape,
1981), 645-667- Myth and
Meaning (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 34-43.
Furthermore, the earliest of
these texts opens with a critique of senalist methods
of composition and theories of musical
signification. Sigmlicantly, this movement's greatest
theorist, Pierre Boulez, is only the
most recent and important theorist ol Wagner's "emancipation of
dissonance," an

emancipation which

is not only at the very center of The Birth
of Tragedy, but which
equally constitutes the tirst attempt at a post-structuralist theory
of music without a
governing, gravitational center point in the diatonic system of tonal structure.
Boulez even
conducted The Ring cycle at Bayreuth in a famous interpretation, the occasion
of which
lead to a number ol important essays on the significance of Wagner's
musical innovations;
see Orientations, trans. Martin Cooper (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1986), 223291, esp. 275-6. As if to counter Boulez and with him Nietzsche and Wagner, LeviStrauss interprets The Ring in Myth and Meaning in a section which has as its themes

precisely those of The Birth of Tragedy, the section— which could have been called "The
Apollinian and the Dionysian"
is entitled "Myth and Music." Any evaluation of this
complex chain of relations would have to consider Derrida's critique of Levi-Strauss and

—

name of a Nietzschean play of dissonance. In Dela Grammatologie
Les Editions de Minuit, 1967) Derrida's deconstruction of the structuralist project
takes as its point ol departure Nietzsche's writings on the problematic of "play" (73), only
to bring that text to an end with the conclusion that "writing is always atonal" (443).
Finally, while it has been often noticed that Derrida's work has done much to delimit the
structuralism in the
(Paris:
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Chile, cnccs,
Ol

,

but sameness— abstract,

identifiable unities

whose

mathematically equivalent "individuals."
The law. then,

ascribed into the individual as

its

possibility

and

is

indivisibility

the basis

is at

"One" and the same for all.

limit. Failing to

heed the law, the

individual— exemplified by Prometheus's
"heroic

m

effort" to "stride forth into the
umvcrsal.
the attempt to transcend the
spell of individuation and
be the one essence of the world"

(§9)— is doomed. Rather than
hunt

universalizing the individual, the

to the individual's absoluteness
brings

"wisdom" not only

a pre-theorelieal and non-philosophical

into relation with practical
activity, but, surprisingly,
into a certain

correspondence with beauty. Their similarity
measure: In every case, be
beauty, measure rules.
ilscll

it

And

since, according to

phenomenon, hence an effect of

Apolhman and

aesthetic,

n°l overstep lest

shine [Schein]

Apollo:

\Ruhe]

1

il

ol the

would deceive us

myth
I

god of sculpture"

ol

fundamental to the sphere

(§1).

,

own

line,

But as

which

the

(he

image of

that wise repose

cognitive quality of the Apollinian state

its

lire

which the dream image must

freedom from the wilder emotions,

The

word-an

rule as well, thereby requiring

must not be absent from

however seductive

sell

,

the ethical law,

ol politics.

most easily gives way

Indeed,
itself,

to fear

that "delicate line" separating illusion

from

Ircnzy to deny the illusory character ol

the

its

as crude reality,

Apollinian cllcct most clearly shows

its

the strict sense of the

lies in a

and the ^substantiality of

beauty.

Apollinian measure exerts a valid lawfulness which not only makes

possible a knowledge of the

will that rest

remains-in

it

the illusory character of the individual

ol the heroic sell

he mlc

concept, measure must necessarily show

"That delicate

limit:

limitation, that

wisdom which recognizes
the epic

own

the ethical law, or the necessity
of

cllcel us pathologically [pathologisch
zu wirken], failing

measured

hat

its

its

and analogous function of

the aesthetic language of the Apollinian.

measure measures

addition of a line delimiting

lies in the parallel

knowledge of wisdom,

the

and be representable and recognizable,

aesthetic

acknowledgement of the

all

it

for

and beautiful works of art;

is in this

it is

is

also

region, Nietzsche argues, that the

precisely in the practical realm of the

and anxiety, leading
reality.

it

The effect

is

directly to the forgetting of

uniform:

A

pathological

borders, in particular those of the individual and

collective expression, the state. In ancient Greece, Nietzsche writes, the emergence

Dionysian

"cllcct

|

Wirkung]" (§4)— and

this effect
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always causes the borders

ol

constitutive of identity to

tremble-led

to the birth of an author,
tanamsm

'orgetlulness of the law. Resistance
to the Dionysian

the

knew only one goal: The maintenance

m WhlCh measurc a, °ne became thc "** value,

o' IOrm

symptomatic of a

A poll ini an effect:

provoking a pure manifestation of

r^

Dionysian Penetrated, the A poll,
man was sublimated
just as certain that wherever
the first onslaught lof the
Dionysian] was withstood, the
authority and majesty o f the
^Delphic ioi
e xp re s sed itself stronger and
more threatening than ever I am
0 Dorlc st e and Donc art as
a permanent military encampment
of
th^A m
r
lf° rtg SetZteS Krie sla er des ApollinFchen)'.
S
S
An
art
so
defi
defiantly
A encompassed
unyielding and
with bulwarks, an education so
varlikc and harsh, and a state
so essentially cruel and ruthless
\ein so
grausames and rUcksichtsloses Staatswesen
] could only exist for any length
m a P 1Stent reSiSta "Ce ‘° titamc ‘ barbaric cLncc
of the
D,on y s,un ( M)

and
and^ated
negated. But

it is

oKtetn

m

.

f

^^n^l\^

%

The Doric

stale

and Doric

art

deserve consideration together to the
extent that both are

founded upon a more fundamental value:
The value of measure.

makes clear,

is

the political value par excellence.
Without

even community would be impossible,

let

"delicate line" delimiting this value's limit

it,

1

’

This value, as Nietzsche

the individual, the state,

alone beautiful works of
is

art.

and

But when the

forgotten, an exemplary demonstration of the

complicity between Apollinian art and politics
occurs. Since Apollinian

art is

always

beautiful, the complicity manifests itself through
a frightening confusion of art and a state

whose overriding function has become
|

the maintenance of

schone Schem]" (§1) through the preservation of

are,

however,

of beauty.

like all Apollinian

The

state s borders

aestheticization of the political results

whatever

their

was

to

form

"beautiful illusion

identifying borders. These borders

when

the beautiful illusion of the

— becomes so majestic that their apparent authority
which suspends

have protected. Aesthetics

beauty— becomes

own

measure, merely Sc he in, the illusory brilliance constitutive

effects a pathological seductiveness

the state

its

its

the will of precisely those individuals

— here the pleasurable feeling of

the sole criterion of politics, and the illusion

becomes

total.

Here, as

Nietzsche writes in a contemporaneous essay on "The Greek State," the " archetype
of the

For a further discussion of the complicity between the Doric state and Doric
Volker Gerhardt, Friedrich Nietzsche (Miinchen: C. H. Beck, 1995), 78-79.
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art,

see

—

Me |Ul b" d dCS Slaates|

”

rcvcals ilsdr a" d i"
‘ype
-

exemplary— as

is

the "military genius"

Lycurgus

,s

the "original founder
of the state
lursprunglichenStaatengrunder].'*

n contrast to the political
consequences of the purely
Apolltnian effect- pure
because ,ts validity (Geltung,
§21) is elevated to the sole value
the world-the Dionysian
cl lect could not be
more antithetical: "This is the first
effect of the Dionysian tragedy
The
1

and society, the chasm between
humans as such, gives way

state

to

an overpowering

ing ol unity [EinheitsgeJUhl\,
which leads back to the heart of
nature” (§7).

extreme

ant, thesis to the

Dionysian effect unites individuated

From

even maddening, for

principle as

its

experience,

it

ol the

entities

A pol

li

the

by upsetting the restfulness of
individuation

the perspective of the individual,
such unrest is not simply upsetting:

terrilying,

As

grounding effect of the Apollinian
prmciplc of individuation the

it

indicates the

overcoming of the

i,

appears

individual's foundational

borders arc set into motion. Despite
the exceptional character of such

has a long history. Nietzsche's

nian principium individuationis

own

discussion departs-as

it

had

in the

case

— from Schopenhauer's The World as Will and

Representation, the work in which he found
that individuating principle's
exemplary
presentation:
In the same plaec Schopenhauer
has depicted for us the monstrous horror
which seizes man when he suddenly comes to
doubt the

cognitive form of
appearances because the principle of sufficient reason
[Satz vow Grunde 1
in one ol its possible figures,
appears to suffer an exception [eine
Ausnahme zuerleiden scheint]. If we add to this horror the
blissful ecstasy
that rises up Irom the innermost ground
[innersten Grunde] of mankind,
indeed ol nature, with this disintegration of the
principium individuationis
we glimpse the essence Wesen] of the Dionysian, which is
brought nearest
to us by the analogy ol intoxication
[Rausches].
|

(§1)

The

ecstatic lecling ol being liberated

Irom

rational

grounds

particular political significance. If the state founded
in 1871

is,

is

according

to have

and thus be something other than a repetition of a totalizing
Socratism,

must

dil lerentiate itself

from

all

forms

ol politics

Paradoxically, then, "German" political
rebirth ol

Greek

rather than
20

political

makes

and

cultural

Staat," 775.

strive

towards

any proper existence
its

political

form

total stability.

hopes— the realization of a specifically "German"

forms

absolute, the validity of

Dcr gricchische

which

to Nietzsche, of

— can only be realized

its

own

if this

new

stale delimits,

sphere. Lacking such delimitation,

its

undamental value- Apollini an
measure-grows to enslaving proportions
as Done
pathologies set ,n. Ancient Rome"exhausting itself in a consuming
chase after worldly
power and worldly honor"-is
illustrative of just such an
unchecked extension of the
I

political:

"From out of the unconditioned

GellUng der P°
the

m^"

Triebe\,

it is

validity of the political
drive

[

jus, as necessary that a people
should

most extreme secularization whose
most magnificent but also most

expression

is

the

Roman imperium

(§21

Against

).

its

own

its

the world's enormity in comparison
to the individual
is

single world:

The

human

the path of

Roman

attempt to secure as

exemplary movement outwards becomes
incessant,

enslaving, and finally, as history
attests, self-defeating.

significance

its

go

terrifying

intentions,

imperialism, leads not to control and
sovereignly. Rather, in

ground as possible,

unbedinglen

self is lost not

much

irresistible,

only because of

or individual stale; of greater

the confusion which reduces
the infinite variety of possible
worlds to a

The

empirical, aesthetic world of the
political sphere.

It is

hardly surprising,

then, that such confusion tends toward
the unconditional expansion of the
fundamental
political value to the point of terrifying

an end

in itself.

command ol

Modernity, distant as

just such dictates. Their

it

extremes and passionate dictates: The

may

stale

becomes

be from ancient Rome, remains under the

command, no

less than the Socratic obsession wilh

grounds, has only one effect: "Slavery
[Knechtschaft]" (§20). Avoiding enslavement
requires the liberating yet anti-political motions
of the Dionysian, for

its

force alone resists,

indeed, dissolves, the political instinct which strives
to realize the illusion of

every

signil icant

spreading of the Dionysian excitement one always traces

Dionysian liberation [Losung] from the chains of the individual
makes

totality:

how

"With

the

itself fell first

of all

Ihiough an injury to the political instincts [politisclien Instinkte],
increased to the point of
indifference, yes, even hostility to them; just as certainly, on
the other hand, the slate-

lorming Apollo [staatenbildende Apollo]

is

individuationis , and the state and sense of

also the genius of the principium

home cannot

live

without the affirmation of the

individual personality" (§21). Just as the sphere of individuation

so too must

its

antithesis be moderated. Failure to

"Germany" from Roman
to

an end and wilh

it

style politics, but

"Germany"

it

do so would,

would

itself.
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is

to

not to be absolutized,

be sure, liberate

also bring political life in

"Germany"

The Play of Metaphor
Avoiding the extremes of the
Apollinian and Dtonystan depends
on a tragic
expenence of a "middle world," on
a passage between the
extremes of total politicization
and total nthdtsm. And determ,
nmg the structure of that passageway
requtres explatntng
how the extremes of Apollinian
individuality and Dtonystan
universality come

into contact

w„h one another in
mode

of

politics.

effect anses

the tragtc effect to prcxiuce
a

Everyth, ng

when

rests, then,

mood

of the tmddle and correspond,
ng

on answenng one

the essentially separated

quest, on:

"

Winch

aesthetic

powers of art, the Apollinian and the

Dionysian, enter into s.multaneous
activity? Or more bnefly:

How does music behave
towards image and concept?"
(§16). In his desorption of the folk
song-and this contains
tragedy's bas.c structure in embryonic
fom, -Nietzsche speof.es the character
of the
relationship of music to image and
concept:
In the poetry of the folk song,
language
egree to imitate music [die Musik

is strained to the most intense
nachzuahmen]: Thus does a new world
poetry begin with Archilochus, a world
which contradicts the Homeric
one in its deepest undament. We have
thus indicated the only possible
relationship between poetry and music,
word and tone: The word, the
image seeks an expression analogous to music
and now suffers the violence
o music as such [einen der Musik analogen
Ausdruck and erleidet jetzt die
Gewalt der Musik an sich\. (§6)
1

By

placing analogy at the center of his analysis of
tragedy, Nietzsche brings his

investigation into relation with one of philosophy's
oldest and most powerful themes.

Analogy has consistently been employed

same through
unities.

to

comprehend difference under the aspect of

the

the perception of proportional similarities between
otherwise diffenng

Analogy

is

therelore a

way of acknowledging

subsuming them under a larger
mathematical and ontological
ideal polis in Plato's

totality.

relations,

Originating in the pre-Socratics's efforts to specify
it is

Socrates'

Republic which insured

political investigations."

differences while nevertheless

its

employment of the term

to

found the

centrality for future philosophical

and

1

It

not only plays a fundamental role in insuring the success of

Aristotle's Metaphysics, but the use of this figure

dominated Scholastic debates over

See "Socrates'" analogical presentation of the essence of the
foundation of Being, in the Republic, 508a- 509b.
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Good as

the

the

,

problem of .he analogy of being .»
And

it

precisely these debates

is

which provided the
framework for Schopenhauer's own
metaphysics of music - Building
on exactly tins

moment

in

analogy

in the successl ul tragedy:

Schopenhauer's

text,

Nietzsche enters into the debate.
For analogy has also
played a decisive role in discussion
of tragedy. Aristotle attributes
a unique function to
1

1 is

dithyramb or epic- most appropriate
however, derives from the fact

to

form

is

the analogical

poet or rhetoritician,

its

its

is

is

is

the

most general and defining

metaphorical

in

the very

mark of genius,

dependence

and metaphysics.” Analogy, metaphor,

ol Aristotelian

to

success.

its

a long tradition to which he

See Book V

is

the very

on subjects as diverse as

poetics,

home in

and rhetoric,

it,

cvcn-as

is

of analogy not only places

far

from

the

at

him squarely within

otherwise self-consciously opposed, his further
specification

between music and image deepens

form of analogy

It
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While Nietzsche's own employment

particular

thus not simply an attribute

and Platonic metaphysics upon analogy

demonstrate— fundamental

ol the relationship

that the ability to create

decisive significance begins to appear:

challenging the sovereignty of metaphysics,
arc quite at

font, of

form, the essence of tragedy's

possibility of philosophers such as
Aristotle writing treatises

poetics, rhetoric,

those of the

specific poetic form. Its
appropriateness

metaphor” When Aristotle claims

metaphors and perceive analogies
ol the

mode of diction-different from

analogy

that

metaphor, and since tragedy's diction
linguistic

ihc

work

this

debt

when he

reveals that the

precisely that attributed by Aristotle's Poetics to the

is

of the Metaphysics.

I

On Schopenhauer's use of scholastic analogies in his philosophy of music sec Die
Welt als Wille and Vorstellung, Sdmtliche Werke cd. Wolfgang
von

Lohneysen (Frankfurt
Main: Suhrkamp, 1993) vol. I, §52, csp. 367. Nietzsche constructs his
explanation of
tragic catharsis exclusively on the basis of this section.

am

See Poetics,

1

457b -57b
1

1

8;

1

459a5-59a

1

Sec Poetics, 1459a7-9; Rhetoric, 141 2a9-

5; Rhetoric,

1

4 0b36.
1

13.

On the relationship between metaphysics and metaphor in Aristotle sec Derrida's
discussion— one largely dominate by Nietzsche's own writings on these issues— in the
essay, "la mythologie blanche: la mdtaphorc dans lc texte philosophique" in Marges de la
philosophic (Paris: Lcs Editions dc Minuit, 1972), 247-324.
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proper form of tragedy—
metaphor:

WjrKAetawwi. which

wmsmim
pi

T o,ts;issav^:;r„"r"
^ ^ WMkK

SSuT
Wh.le Aristotle understands
metaphor constructed on

a " S,e "e einesBeSrWes,

the proper

form of tragic diction to involve an
analogical

the basts of a transference
of shared properl, es

between pans of

substances similarly related to one
another and discerned on the basis of
theoretical
ultimately philosophical in kind,
Nietzsche defines the metaphor

image

anew as a

that really floats before the poet
in the place of a concept." 27

On

the

abilities

"vicarious

one hand, a

’vicarious image" takes the place of a
concept, substituting a nondiscursive "image"
for a

predicated property, Aristotle's onoma, the
proper
transferred

1

rom one

hand, the "image"

open

is

to theoretical

metaphor from

its

name which would have been

pair of relations to another in order to

no longer grounded

in the identity

form the metaphor.

On

the other

of a particular nominal substance

perception— the sine qua non of Aristotelian ontology—
freeing

dependence on Aristotelian metaphysics and

its

concomitant poetics of

tragedy. Rather than the nominal transference of
metaphor, an image appears which takes
the place ol Aristotle's proper name.

substitution of an

Z

On

is

accomplished through the

image not only for a transferred property, but equally

substance to which such a property

and image

Such place taking

in tragedy through the

attributed.

Music, then,

is

to be imitated

by language

appearance of metaphorical images and words whose

Nietzsche and metaphor

Asthetik der Metaphor:

is

for the very

in

The Birth of Tragedy, see Anne Tebartz-van

Elst,

Zum Streit zwischen Philosophie und Rhetorik bei Friedrich

Nietzsche (Miinchen: Karl Alber, 1995); Detlef Otto, "Die Version der Metapher zwischen
Musik und Begnff," in " Centauren-Geburten: Wissenschaft, Kunst und Philosophie beim

jungen Nietzsche,

ed.

Tilman Borsche, Fedenco Gerratana, Aldo Venturelli

(Berlin: Walter

de Gruyer, 1994), 167-190; Anthony Stephens, "Nietzsche und die poetische Metapher,"
in Friedrich Nietzsche, Perspektivitdt und Tiefe, cd. Walter Gebhard (Frankfurt am Main
Peter Lang, 1982), 79-120.
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similarity to

music should present

at least

one of

its

propcrt.es in the

Apollm.an." But music lacks any
permanent substance:
space, indeed,

"it

puts

all

I,

medium of "the

neverappears phenomenally

,n

appearances to shame.- The
temporality of mus.c and the

spatiality of the .rnage prevents
the s.mple creation of
music's

metaphor through the
transference of shared propert.es
between pa.rs of substances
similarly related to one

another and demands in
transferring attributes
stracture,

place another form of creation,
one wh.ch, instead of

its

on

the basis of an identical
substance and a totalizing rhetorical

forced to substitute a supplement
to take the place of music's
insubslant, ably
and failure to appear, namely, a
non-rhetoncal form of "metaphor" as
the "primordial
artistic

is

appearance and "primordial aesthetic
phenomenon."
11

This supplement, as

is

well

known,

is

Nietzsche asks, "as what does music
appear

the "will." In his analysis of the
lyric poet,

in the

mirror of images and concepts?"
(§6).

His deceptively simple answer immediately
follows

:

"

Music appears as will" The

substituting, supplementing image,
suspended before the eyes of the

Apollm.an poet

analogical "metaphor" mimetically similar
to music, appears to be the will.
peculiar lorm ol hermeneutics imageless
music

a metaphor— analogically similar to

music cannot possibly be
longing.

"

"

will:

Music appears as

of the analogical

musics

music-somehow

only appears as

will ":

The

By means of a

brought into relation with the image, and
appears. But, Nietzsche insists,

will, as "the eternally willing, desiring,

structure of interpretation at the basis of the creation

metaphor unctions through a pointing
1

interpreting and pointing in
is

It

is

as an

which something

is

away—

"

a deuten " (§6) as both

always understood as an other. The other

other, "for," as Nietzsche writes, "music cannot possibly
be, according to

its

gssence, will" (§6). This

is bec ause music essentially has no appearance.
Rather, it calls
See the indispensable fragment— originally intended for The Birth
of
Tragedy— which has come to be known as "On Music and Words" in Samtliche Werke
VII, 359-369. An unreliable translation by Walter Kaufmann may
be found in Carl
Dahlhaus's Between Romanticism and Modernism trans. Mary Whittall (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980), 106-116. Exemplary of the translation problems
found in this and other works by Nietzsche, in particular The Birth
of Tragedy, is the
rendering of "allgemeinste Erscheinungsform" (361)— "most general form of appearances":
,

,

i.e.,

the transcendental condition for the possibility of the experience of appearances, an

obvious and extraordinary attempt to rearticulate Kant's and Schopenhauer's
Transcendental Aesthetic— as "most general manifestation" (108). Time and again, the
historical weight ol Nietzsche's very precise language is lost and with it the significance of
his argument.
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l

orth an appearance as

I

at I ure

its

supplement.

Its

to appear, provoke the
attempt to

'Music necessitated the

incomprehensibility,

comprehend

lyricist to figurative

it.

its

lack of presence and

setting the imagination in
motion:

speech [Bilderrede]" (§6). Music
necessarily

appears iguratively, namely, as a
Bilderrede, a figure of speech
whose figure is the
analogical metaphor. Such analogical
relating, however, does
anything but insure the
I

possibility of

a simple transference of properties
from the medium of music to that
of
language. For language, and with
the "lyrical eloquence" brought
to bear on the content
of such language, can do nothing
to bring the sense of music
"one step closer" (§6). A
fundamental disjunction prevents a simple
passage from one to the other. However
much
language

may strain

itself to imitate

music, the mimetic relation between
the two lacks ihe

integral passage required to insure
the successful synthesis
antithetical relation

between the two media. Not

integrity

and

dialectical resolution of the

and integration between

apparently disparate mediums, but the
suffering-erfei&n-of one
the other results

takes place:
I

On

when a
the

"unification" of the

one hand, melody

unctions as "the first

at the

hands of

Apolliman image and the Dionysian music

the enabling condition of musical

is

and the universal

medium

[das Erste

works and

und Allgemeine], which,

sul ler in itself several objectifications
in several texts

therefore, can

[mehrere Objektivationen.

in

mehrerert Texten, ansich erleiden kann]"
(§6); on the other hand, such texts- epic,

tragic-are subject to a process of disintegration and suffering
characteristic of
I

lyric,

the

undamentally violent and violating movement of passage from
music's melodic

indeterminacy into a particular textual objectification: "The word,
the image seeks an
expression analogous to music and

now

suffers the violence of music as such [einender

Musik analogen Ausdruck and erleidet jetzt die Gewalt der Musik an sich ]"
Unification
integrity;

(§6).

takes place through the violating disintegration of each signifying medium's

each sulfers

at the

hands of the other as a representational image takes the place of

music's non-representability.

No necessary

link

between music and the

though altogether necessary, movement
disintegrating process of substitution.

synthesizing passage between media

in

The

is

will

can be found, only a contingent,

which opposites

are linked in a violent and

"analogical" "metaphor" securing the

neither analogical, metaphorical, nor synthesizing
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m any proper sense. The use of each of

rhese terms remains
unjustified

from the

perspective of a philosophically
grounded rhetoric, while the
"primordial aesthetic

Phenomenon” produced through

substitution remains, thanks
to the process of

substitution, itself subreptitious.
Contrary to

all

expectations, but on the basis
of this

necessary contingency, music's
Dionysian effect
than

its effect:

interpreted as the cause of
music rather

is

Music, the effect of which causes
things to vibrate and

sets

them

in motion,

interpreted as will, the ability to
set something into motion.
This non-Aristotelian
of transference cannot
possibly be metaphonc. Rather,
this mode of contingent
is

transference

,s

metonymic.

In

metonymy

substitution of

another takes place, but not on the
basis of the theoretical
ol totalizing

metaphors. Substitution

quality— suffering, a

mood

is

for

the creation

achieved through the abstraction of an
experiential

of unrest as the feeling of being
moved by an invisible and

incomprehensible power-into an independent
essence now said
cl lect,

one name

which enable

abilities

mode

thereby personifying the affective
quality by giving

it

to

be the cause of the

a will and a causal

ability.

The

spiritualization achieved through
personification naturally brings things to

life, namely,
gives them a will of their own. Nietzsche
attributes just such an enlivening function
to the

non-rhetorical and

ongmary

aesthetic

phenomenon called "metaphor": "Fundamentally [Im

C,mnde\ the aesthetic phenomenon [Osthetische
PMnomen ]

one has the capability to continually see a

is

simple; one

living play [lebendiges Spiel]

is

a poet when

and to

live

constantly surrounded by crowds of spirits
[Geistersclmren]" (§8). The "vicarious image"
floating before the poet's Apolliman eye

is

a "play."

The

as a "vicarious image" and taking the place of
a concept

without a ground to bring

its

contingent, unstructured

"analogical" "metaphor" serving

is

not only playful because

movements

to rest, nor

it

floats

simply

because the image appears to be "alive" and moving without any
definite purpose. The

image

ot "play"

medium

should represent— analogically, metaphorically, mimetically— music

of the Apollinian, just as

it

in the

should represent, through a transference of properties,

a unification ol these antithetical media. But the unification takes place through
a
substituting

and supplementing

"as"-structure

which leads through

"analogical" dissociation, through, in other words, the

ungrounded, metonymic substitutions without any
33

the violent

medium of play

itself,

medium

of

the play of

sufficient reason or necessity, a play,

crc ore, ol signification
carried out between signif
ying media, a play, finally,
that can
properly come to no end, for
it finds no final
ground to rest upon. No, without
reason then

does Nietzsche compare such
intetprctation- V>,,,,„,
_to soothsaying (§ 1 §8) m
which the disclosure of the
present is delayed by the veiy
ac, of supplementing and
substituting until a future
revelation. For such
supplementing and substituting take
and
hold the place of the other, hold
i, open, suspending
the disclosure of its

r

,

content

indefinitely.

(§8)-",he

When

true

that other turns out to

be the "archetype of man
[Urbilddes Memchen]'

man” (§8)-, he significance of
tragedy shows

itself,

for Ihe substituting

image— the
Ur-bild

—

"metaphorical" image of "play"-is
the veiy ,mage-its primordial
archetype,
ol man's being.

The Dramatic Play
Aneicnt Greek tragedy, as drama,
puts
Just as the "primordial aesthetie

this "play"

phenomenon"

is

is

the "primordial dramatic

element-a performance of that

in

a play about play.

an image of the violent and disintegrating

process of substitution produced by the
transformative
dissociation, so

on stage

medium of "analogical"

phenomenon" -tragedy's second formal

process of "play" in which actors play the
role presented

bclorc their eyes as the "primordial
aesthetie phenomenon": "The process
[Prozefi]" of the
tiagic

chorus

is

the primordial dramatic

phenomenon dramatise he Urphanomen ]: To
\

oncscll transformed before oneself and

now

body, into another character" (§8). Tragedy

to act as if
is

one

really

see

had entered into another

a play about play, the play of disintegration

and transformation which performs the archetypieally
human: Transformation and
disintegration, in time, and, linally, to death. While
the "primordial

arche-typc ol "the true man"
Nietzsche's presentation

too evident.

As a term

—

makes

is

an image whose figure

Dionysus,

typed out as "Willed

the contingency of this particular configuration of letters

signifying substitution and transformation,

with other names just as easily referring to the
chorus,

is

image of man" — the

traits

it

inscribed in the

tragic hero," "Oedipus," "Prometheus."

too

may

be substituted

word " Wille ":

"Satyr,"

Each of these terms, each

substitutable lor the other, each signifying the playful process of signification in
which

appearances are brought into the world, type out a spelling of the typically human's
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all

Characters.

As characters -the

(§8)- they

spell out the role to be
played

"written traits of nature
[Schnftenzuge derNatur\"

on stage and the chamcter

each case, however playful the
perfomrance, they

ab°u, tHe

human and

essentially determ, ntng

tell

to

be performed In

the story of suffenng
as a

drama

the character, she process
of interpret, vc inscription

Betng human means suffenng
from individuation, from the
feeltng of betng torn to pteces
by a process of tndividuating
tnscriptton which exceeds the
individual will. Thus does
Dtonysus-the figure of the essenttally
human and so the figure
it.

igurtng the playful process of
inscription, disintegration, and
transformation-appear on
stage wearing the mask of the
trag.c hero, a mask beanng
all the markings of
Apollo the
CP* 0 anteCedenl of ,he tra «‘ c hero.
Dtonysus can appear in no other form,
for no other form
of appearance exists:
I

m

aPPCarS
plUraHty ° f flgures in the mask of
a
ensnared
the net of the individual will As
the appea nng god now speaks
and acts, he resembles an erring, striving
suffering individual: And that he
appears as such with this epic
determination and distinctness Deutlichkeit
] is the effect [Wirkung 1 of the
rAP
Wh ° mterpretS
to ‘he chorus ttXnysLn
gh that Parabollc appearance [gleichnisartigen
?
Erscheinung ] In
th, however, that hero is the
suffering Dionysus of the Mvstenes,
that
god experiencing in itself the suffering of
individuation, of whom
wonderf ul myths tell how he, as a boy, had been
torn to pieces by the
Ijtans and now in
this state is worshiped as Zagreus.
Thus it is indicated
that this dismemberment, the properly
Dionysian suffering is like a
transformation into air, water, earth, and fire; that
we would therefore have
U CO
er tb c state
mdlvld uation as the source and pnmordial ground of
n
rr
all suffenng, as something
objectionable in itself. (§10)
118

I ffghtin^^^^T
h
Were

wJS

S™r, ^

’

m

’

«

[.

,

.

,

The

tragic hero, as the exemplification of the truly

human,

is

the

Apollmian

figuration not precisely of Dionysus but of Dionysus's
suffering. Dionysus

Apollinian figure, and

is

therefore nothing essential;

expectations— has substance/

And

it

is

the suffering

which

is

an

— against

tragedy, as an art form, consists in nothing

all

more than

the presentation of this the Dionysian state of suffering:
"The essence of tragedy can only

be interpreted as a manifestation and visualizing of the Dionysian states"
(§8),

or, as

See the notes Nietzsche devoted to working out the relations between being,
becoming, time, suffering, pain, pleasure, sensation, consonance and dissonance in
Sdmtliche Werke, vol. VII, 197-209, 213-217. Among the many important sentences
contained there is the following: "Das Substantielle ist die Empfindung, das Scheinbare der
Leib, die Materie. What is substantial is sensation; the body and matter are what is merely
apparent! illusory. ]" (203). Suffering is one such sensation, or one class of sensations.
[
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Nietzsche wntes elsewhere, as
"the

Ashman sensiblizmg
|

Dionystan knowledge and effects"
(,14).
state,

Dionysus does no, appear-as

When

Versinnlichung) of the

the tragte chorus figures

its

Dionysian

Anstotehan ontology-as one
of the many ways in
the human is schematized
and analogically related to
being; Dionysus
appears as a non-logical and
non-schematic figure of the
,n

which the being of

I

inscriptive process of appearing
a
tgure in other words, of being
figured by the Apollin.an
process of individual, on by ils

dissimulatory play-, he process
of disintegration and
transformation to which the chorus
subjected under the Dionysian
effects-and resulting fragmentation,
disunity and
sul fering.»

The appearance of Dionysus

in ihe

mask of the

is

tragic hero, then, is the

appearance of the process of appearing,
of being individuated, hence
Dionysus as the god
figuring "in itsell the suffering
of individuation." Dionysus is
not a thing, only ihe

suffering which

all

ihings are. Tragedy, then,
performs a

play-the play of

"metaphor" -about play, aboul the
appearance of the being of the human as
an incessant
process of play in which the human
being is always subjected to the
process of

figuration

and disfiguration,
its

is

thus presented as nothing in

itself,

indeed,

is

played out, to the end. to

death.

Freedom and Commonality

When

Nietzsche

states, in

quasi-programmatic fashion, the "knowledge" "won"

through his investigations into the primordial
elements of Greek tragedy, he indicates
the tragedy’s cathartic effect, like

its

form,

is

inhabited by a certain dualism. After a lengthy

quotation from Schopenhauer's World as Will and
Representation, vol.

Nietzsche

is

by no means

entirely faithful, a

that

I,

to

which

summation of his research appears:

According to Schopenhauer's doctrine, we thus understand music
as the
unmediated language [unmittelbar Sprache] of the will and feel our fantasy
stimulated to figure that invisible and yet so lively world of spirits
[Geisterwelt] which speaks to us, and to embody this world in an analogical
example [analogen Beispiel]. On the other hand, image and concept, under
the eflect ol a truly corresponding music, come to an higher
significance

On

this process

ol the will, see

of disintegration and

its

distance from Schopenhauer's metaphysics

Werner Hamacher, '"Disgregation of the

Will': Nietzsche on the Individual
Autonomy, Individuality, and the
Self, ed. Thomas Heller, Morton Sosna, David Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University
1986), 106-139, esp. 114-115.

and Individuality,"

in Reconstructing Individualism:
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isrs^
w
Tote my* Shic^sSXhf

most significant cxaniDle

the

5

tragic

mUSI L

„„

I

,

myth'
h
parables [Gleichmssel,
likenesses], (516)
Tragedy's cathartic effect
consists

agam understood

to be

in not one, but

caused- following

^ mUS

Apolhman

'

MUS C appcars ® wil1 A "d 'he

C:

lvc

kinds of effects on

bml1 lo

^'
n

,llt’

myth, that

is,

“? preclscly ,hc
D,onysian
1

knowledge

two moments. The

first

in

of these effects

is

the strange process of
hermeneutic

understanding previously
encountered -by an

w"

'-

T

illogical

and unreasonable substitution
of the

'

'

"analogical example" that results
from the

iguration of the Dionysian
music's effects again represents
not music as such
bu, a lantaslic image substituted
for the ghostly echoings of
an invisible spin, world. When
this spirit

I

world

is

embodied and made

flesh, the individual is

music as the archetypal hero and
primordial form of
translated into the sphere of the
visible by

as the

medium

the will.

born from out of the

So

means of a deceptive

is

spirit

the invisible once

substitution in

of hermeneutic undcrstanding-sccms
to be merely a

means

of

more

which music

for the

illumination of appearances, thus an
instrument through which to view the
essence of
nature.

But music cannot possibly be

The

first

effect of D.onysian

will.

music on the Apollinian

art

faculty-thc creation of

music's "analogical" appearance -docs
not lake place on the basis of a theoretical
n°i

1S

lhc lanlas

Apolhman
subject.

y— the locus of the creative powers of the imagination and home

art faculty -grounded in the
transcendental

The

from every form of reasonable

ground as music suddenly makes an appearance. This
magical moment, when
is

of the

consciousness of the creative

fantastic abilities of the imagination arc
freed

and even appear,

spirits

its

limits, its arbitrary divisions, its fashions,

and

subjugation they effect.

rom every

stable

speak

a joyous experience of freedom. Not freedom
of the will, not freedom

defined as subjective causality, but freedom from the
order of the present and

f

ability,

Work

gives

way

along with the alienation,

to play in a feeling of

hostility,

freedom— the

fixed

liberation

ground and from the delimiting borders of individuation which such

ground supports. At the conclusion of

the first section of
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The Birth of Tragedy,

Nict/.schc

°

presents the process of
music’s transformation
into

Ireedom so undamental as
I

to const, tute no,
only

,

mages and with

,,

mode of liberation

an experience of

but,

il

then commonality:

more

£ r on

man and

thostl e> or s ubjugatcd-once
t*™

celebrates her festival of

ng

as a

not community.

danCing man eternalizes himself

g
memocr
meXTo^
or a higher
hmhfr commonality
o
T?
[hoheren
',

,

Ho h ^
forgotten walking and talking
and is on the way to
into the au
h a ntmCn Speaks from oul of
hls gestures. JusUs the
animals
!,
now talk,
mfk and the
h earth
gives milk and honey, so too
does something
supernatural resound from out of him:
He feels himself like a god he
Gemeinsamkeitl

nv"Xp

Xt

,

n

th^gods^w^ ki
work of art

No presentation could
philology;
elf ects

Ut

S
°
drCamS

'

^

??

and deVated ^ erhohe

18

n°

m ° re an artlSt

’

^ as ’he saw

he has become a

1)

be more fantastic or scandalous to
the scientific standards of

no presentation could do

of a force exceeding every representational
and logical standard.

man, but nature and even slaves

in

a feeling of freedom whose sign

is

It

liberates not only

the sensation of

shuddering imparted by music's vibrations,
vibrations mediating and tuning the

an attunement in which the imagination
vv

alking and speech acts, thus

modem

greater justice to the fantastic process
unleashed by the

is set

moving one

into a

listener to

motion freed from the mtentionality of

to a figuration necessarily leading

beyond the

grounds of any subjective substance and into a position
indicative of the originary
processes constitutive

ol

man.
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And

so

movement

takes over:

One dances and

participates not in a transcendental substance -what the
"Ur-Einen"

is

sings,

not- but

in

one

an

For a discussion ol freedom in The Birth of Tragedy, see Christoph Menke,
"Die
Tragodie und die Freigeister," in Nach der Postmodern ed. Andreas Steffens
(Dusseldorf:
Boll man Verlag, 1992), 235-264; see also Barbara von Reibnitz,
Ein Kommentar zu
Friedrich Nietzsche " Die Geburtder Tragodie aus dem Geiste der Musik"
(Kap.1-12), 83,
,
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ordinary

mood-what the

"Ur-Einen"

is: Suffering.
This mood is tndicative of the
process
d llbCra " n8 transcendence
tttdicative, therefore, of
betng blissfully taken apart as
.

Apolliman delimitations and
oppostttonal

host, lit.es

breakdown. Tins origtnary process,
netther arb.trary nor fashtonable
and thus freed from every norm,
law, or order of the
present, is a necessary one, the
neeesstty of a reconciling,
participatory freedom without
ground.

The reconcltatton effected by

the transform,

ng effect of Dionysian ar, ,s no, even
exhausted by the deconstitution of
the socially const, tuted
hierarchies which mclude
the

domination not only of man over man
but equally of man over
nature; whole worlds
otherwise opposed to one anolher-the
Apolliman world of fmitude and the
Dionysian
world of the infinite— are reconciled.

Freedom
natural.
result ol

results

It

leaves the order of the present
behind along with

results in neither the

anarchy nor the barbansm of the

a naturally constituted

political

all

slate

representations of the

of nature, nor

is it

a

community. Neither anarchy, barbarism, or a
polls

from the union of the Apollinian and

the Dionysian, but a free

community of equals

participating, as Nietzsche describes the
results, in "an orgiastic feeling of
freedom"

(§21).
1

II

that

lreedom

is first

of

all

undamental experience of freedom

treed from

Nietzsche,

any mimetic

who first

simply a poetic freedom,
in

which one

is

it

is

subject to a process of transformation

relation to a natural or empirical ground.

brought

this fact to light in his writings

in tragedy. In the preface to the

equally the basis for a

on

But

it

was

Schiller, not

the function of the chorus

Bride of Messina,

Schiller battles with the common concept of the
natural, against the illusion
usually demanded of dramatic poetry. Although the day
itself on the
theatrical stage is an artificial one [ein kiinstlicher
], the architecture only a

The freedom of which Nietzsche speaks here should not be confused with a
generalized, barbaric license. In the seventh section of The Birth
of Tragedy he contrasts
the "Dionysian Greeks"
those that went to the theater— with the

—

"Dionysian
Barbarians"
those who practiced an unsublimated and terrifying form of freedom.
Nietzsche s concept ol Dionysian "freedom," which is derived from Schiller, stands
in
sharp contrast to the bizarre conclusion reached by Silk and Stem in Nietzsche on
Tragedy.
They claim, on the linal page ol their study (380), that Nietzsche's valorization of the
Dionysian really points to a scene from Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain: "two gray
women, hall naked, with matted hair.. .were tearing a little child to pieces, tearing it with
their hands in savage silence.. .and devouring the pieces." Nothing in Nietzsche's book
approaches cannibalism, and his emphasis on pathos-free moderation makes his position
on such matters unambiguous. Silk and Stern's conclusion is, needless to say, indicative of
a fatal misreading of Nietzsche's work, this last one merely the most ludicrous.
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*nw still

dcal ch
a

dom 1/^^'*
wh’u7s aoLally t
P^l; y "^^
l
openly
K- y nu nuncMiy ucuarcd against every
naturalism! (§7)

^
war is

Nietzsche's investigation into
the birth of tragedy departs
from natura. expiations and
wages a war not only against artistic
naturalism but against every
form of naturalism,
particularly those of the
pre-political state of nature and
the naturalness of political
existence. When Nietzsche goes
on to write, "this is the first effect
of the Dionysian
tragedy: IT he state and society,
the chasm between humans
as such, gives way to an

overpowering feeling of unity which
leads back
paradoxical logic at work here

is

to the heart of nature"
(§7), then the

evident, for there

is

no

natural path back to nature.
Rather
than naturalism, the Greeks
presented the chorus on stage as a
"fictitious slate of nature

[ftngierten Naturzuslandes]" with
the chorus playing the roll of the
"fictitious essence of

nature [fingierte Naturwesen]"
(§7). This honest presentation- V/W/c/t,"
as Nietzsche

emphasizes- not only

rejects naturalism;

it

of art with the truthfulness of nature"the

back

to the heart of nature"

other, neither

by

its

purely

is

opposite,

art.

itself,

making

community

domination of a supposed

opposition

is

two become

of the Dionysian tragedy... leads

indissociabic:

"nature" a concept which

in cither

state

Each term depends on

is

always already inscribed

natural de- naturalizes the traditional

a fictitious state of natural innocence or

of nature. Since the

site

of the overcoming of

is

tragedy's only subject matter, tragedy

becomes

in the
this

the privileged location

an originary freedom and an originary commonality which
temporarily suspends

and

the

the translormative effect of the Dionysian upon
the Apollinian individual, and

since this process
ol

the

first effect

Such a de-naturalization of the

locations of freedom and
political

-that

so thoroughly unites the mendacious
fictionally

political hierarchies, delimits their sphere of validity,

social

and opens up another space— the

space of the other.

Shine

The

lirst

moment of the

substitution of the will for

tragic effect

music— music

is

an

illogical,

unreasonable, and free

appears as will, the will of the tragic hero as the
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nCCa " n8 lhC figUre

01 lhC

tra® ic

;
frag,c effect
allows the "analogical

of

t

S ‘ Si8nlfiCanCe '"

WHClhCr

Dionysus. The second

example” created by the

“

and capable

ol

mcreastng

,ts

shtne

its

*e tragic chorus, stngtng or

a Wagner, an mustc-drama,
mustc seems to lend

Apollintan action on the shtge:
"As

first effect ,0

moment of lhe

itself to

the Dionysian really

if

the

music

a greater comprehension
of the

,s in

the servtce of the

Apof.iman

effects, yes, as if

music were even essentially the
ar, of
present, ng [Darstellungskunst]
for an Apollinian content”
(§21). This duplicitous "as if"
Structure enables "the parabolic
,mage to step forth in the highest
significance « and so
tncrease theeffectivityof the
Apollintan
trag,c listener's
that

when

"mood [StimmungY

the tragic hero appears

is

elevated by the dithyrambic
chorus to such a degree

on stage

.mage of the god" -Dionysuswhich
transl erred,

image.- Under the tnfluence of
the D.onys.an, the

is

the spectator sees not an
actor, bu, a "trembling

"translated

[abertrugV

onto the masked actor
(§8). Not an actor,

that

is,

analogically

,n fact, not

even a "god," but a
"ghostly unreality geisterhafte
[
VnwirklichkeitV (§8) appears- born of the
Apolln
mian

dream state-from out of the

spirit

could possibly be more significant.
cllcct

upon

summit ol

the Apollinian,

all ol art

and ghost, the Geisl, of music.

A

and with

the tragic effect

moment the

realized

highest goal of art

and the

is

spectral shine of the

Apollinian "significance”-its "ghostly
unreality”- presents

A

image, of course,

second moment, however, completes
the Dionysian

this

is

No

achieved. At the

mythic

itself:

the most essential point of all that
Apollinian deception is broken through
and negated. The drama which, with the help
of music, spreads itself out
1

bclorc us with such inwardly illuminated clarity
[Deutlichkeit]

movements and figures, as if we saw the texture [Gewebe]
loom as the shuttle Hies up and down, reaches as a
whole

in all

arising

of

its

on the

an effect lying

beyond all Apollinian artistic effects. In the total effect of
tragedy the
Dionysian once more predominates; tragedy ends with
a sound which could

never ring lorth [tdnen] from the realm of Apollinian
art. And thus the
Apollinian deception proves to be that which it is the
continuous veiling
during the duration ol the tragedy of the properly
Dionysian effect; but the
lattci is so powcrl ul that in the end it forces
the Apollinian drama itself into
a sphcic where it begins to speak with Dionysian wisdom
and even denies
itself and its Apollinian visibility Sichtbarkeit
]. Thus the difficult relation of
the Apollinian and the Dionysian in tragedy would really
be symboli/cd
through the fraternal union ol both deities: Dionysus speaks the language
of

—

[,

Jean Luc Nancy has demonstrated how the "as if' structure is an inverted form
of
ontological realism. Sec "Dies Irac," in Jean-Francois Lyotard (cd.). La Faculte'
de Juger
(Pans: Minuit, 1985), 14. Nietzsche's text is as long commentary upon its structure.
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^t

Apollo; Apollo, however, finally
speaks the lammaee of
eby thC hlghest ° al of tra
g
^ cd y *" d of an as such

As an

art form

tragedy reaches

transference and translation
completes

its

"highest goal"

itself

when

is

the process of metaphorical

by

breaking apan into a disunity
indicative of a
lack of similarity, a lack of
proportionality, and a lack of
resemblance between the two

dist.net media, a lack

which

now appeared

until

adequation. Not the smooth passage
logical foundation but a distinctly

constitutive ol the Apollinian

in

as a plenitude of clarity,
visibility, and

accordance with the consonant
dictates of analogy’s

non-Apol liman dissonance

drama

is

is

heard as the unity

suspended, concluding the process
of appealing

with the disappearance of the visible.
Such fragmentation, decisively
characterized by
Nietzsche as Selbstentzweiung
(§22) -"bifurcation" as the
auto-dissociation and

auto-

discord at the center of tragedy-is a
manifestation of the unavoidable violence
which each

medium
rs

suffers ( erleidet

made by means

I

the translation

(

ubertragen from one

medium

between the media which produce

mally realized only when the deceptive

concluding the process

However, no higher

of

veil

this

effect- the Urproblem

of the Apollinian

is finally

is

appearing with the appearance of the process
of appearing

positivity is

revealed-a vain attempt

to

puncture the

veil

us:

For

this

and distinctness"

— rather the

and

The Apollinian

"visibility"

veil

-SichtbarM/-

is

not the "visibility" of something:

distinct. Instead, the possibility

of visibility

itself

No particular

appears as the

thingliness of things, the shining Schein of their appearing as the
possibility not so
of

it

Deutlich/ce/7— which allow the Dionysian to appear through the

process of Versinnlichung (sensiblizing),
visible

and effect an

appealed just as much to reveal Something as to

[Eltwas zu offenbaren als zu verhullen ]"
(§24).

is

itself.

disclosed as veil: "The brightest distinctness
[hellste Deutlichkeit] of the

image did not suffice

thing

- arc

negated by

apocalyptic appearance of Dionysus as the Din an
sich or the primordial Will
g

Apollinian veil

to the othe-

of an analogical metaphor. "As a
whole," tragedy, the tragic effect, and

the "difficult relation"
all

when

appearances as apparitions.

14

much

No illusion can remain about the reality or naturalness of

On the concept of "shine" in Nietzsche's philosophy, see Robert Rethy " Schein
Nietzsche's Philosophy," in Nietzsche and Modern German Thought ed. Keith AnscllPearson (London: Routledge, 1991), 59-87.
,

,
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in

e

ghostly unreal, ty" of the
''movements and figures" of
Dionysus. The figures of the
1Vme mhabl1 a PeCU " ar SpaC ° ° f
rrcal ^' Nei ‘»er of
this world or another,
embodied but
not exactly a body, the figures
of this space five in the
clouds, atop Mt. Olympus.
Not only
does the arch, tec, ure of the
dramattc scene
Greek tragedy appear
the font, of a
"luminous image of clouds
[leuchtendes WolkenbiU
which the indist.net, cloudy
fl"
'mag 6 ° f D,onysus a ears bal oven
PP
the figure of Apollo
appears-i„ the penultimate
paragraph of Nietzsche’s text"veiled in a cloud [in einen
Wollc gehulUy (§25), its
sunny
ladiance reduced to a shadowy
t

'

'

m

indistinctness.

The

tragic loss of presence
effected by the fundamental
heterogeneity of tragedy's

lormal elements also defines

known

its

content:

The tragic. This phenomenon has
always been

as catharsis, and Nietzsche
defines

phenomenon of the

tragic [das

it

as the essentially tragic- "the
primordial

UrpMnomendes Tragischen 1" (§22)- making

it, as
Aristotle does, the very essence of
die tragic effect. But Nietzsche,
unlike Aristotle, does

not understand the telos of tragedy's
cathartic effect as a pleasurable
purification of the

Pam* ul emoti °ns of
process"

(§22)-a

pity

and terror- referred

purification

which ought

correct emotional responses required by
the

ends of

politics,

Nietzsche

to

by Nietzsche as a "pathological-moral

to habituate the citizens of the
polis in the
state.

35

Rather than subordinating tragedy

insists that tragedy's cathartic effect
acts as a

to the

suspension of

those dictates, in the process delimiting
the validity of the Apollinian world of
politics by

holding

open.

it

aesthetic

As

the precise analog to the

phenomenon,"

the tragic effect

"

stellvertretendes Bild " of the "primordial

"

is

a stellvertretendes Wirkung ," a "place-holding

effect" (§22). Tragedy's place-holding,
supplementing effect— for art

is

a "supplement

[Supplement]" (§24) to nature-is an addition which, by
taking away, paradoxically adds
something: The thought ol the other.
Apollinian, the second
ellecting a

breakdown

A

moment of the
in the

supplement

to the

supplementary image of the

tragic effect negates the "stellvertretendes Bild:'

passage from the unrepresentable to

its

"metaphorical"

supplement, thereby disclosing the supplement as supplement— as the not-natural,
the
See Poetics, 49b25-28; Politics, VIII, 5. 1339b42-1340a27 and 7. 1341b321342al8. Nietzsche does not wholly reject the Aristotelian concern with pity and terror, but
he coniines them to the sphere ol the Apollinian elements of tragedy. So delimited, they
are
irrelevant to and negated by tragedy's specifically Dionysian clement and Dionysian
effects
with which it concludes.
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and the

unrealistic,

ant,-

m m e„c. The metaphor, the vicarious
,

appear ,n the Apo, liman figure
of the hero,
disfigures

its

to the Apoll,

thus holding the place of
the other-, he nalural,
the real, the true-open
representation and with it
Apollmian dictates of total
politicization. The

man- "that delicate line...that measured

structure of tragedy as

it

The

denies

Operatic

its

limit

limitation"-is inscribed ,n the
formal

content, the tragic, and as
tha, limit

tragic myth leads the world
of appearances to

its

makes

itself

known, presence

limits [an die Grenze]

where

itself" (§22).

Work

The

Socratic founding of theoretical
philosophy, with

Mmits and concomitant inauguration
of metaphysics, also
const. tutively incapable of

comprehending the

modernity the same form of

imPerium Wllh
rests

to

finally speaks agains,
itself, denies itself
and

itself,

suspending

IS lost.

image allowing Dionysus

lts

discovered

its

own

a political form

enterprise. In

analogous manifestation of the

illusion of

politicized. Nietzsche discovers the

and aestheticized

its

barbarous form of nationalism. But
precisely because

on an aesthetic illusion- the beautiful

forms are also

disregard for theory's

laid the basis for

tragic limits of

politics appears as an

its

Roman

this political

fonn

Apolliman measure- its aesthetic

exemplary form of politicized

politics in modernity's first unique art

aesthetics

form-opera. But he had already

characteristic alterations of tragedy and their
consequences for the tragic

eilect in the "tragedies" ol Euripides.

While the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles de-

instrumentalize music by liberating

from the ends of the drama, a liberation which

suspends the action and
scenes

its

(§ 1— ), Euripides

it

epic tension during the "pathos" of the "great
rhetorical-lyrical

dramas

eilect a

'

revolution in public language

[Umschwung der

offentlichen Sprache ]" (§11) which subjects language's Bights into
music to the everyday
criterion ol instrumental

communication with

short, tragedy's art is theorized

and

its

its

canon of immediate comprehensibility.

In

effect Intel lectuali zed. "Cool, paradoxical thoughts "

replace the Apollinian intuition ol appearances as appearances, Dionysian ecstasy
gives

way

to "liery affects ,"

and the

tragic effect

is

transformed from an affirmation of the loss of

presence and suspension of the present into a "stimulating uncertainty" as the
desires "to

know what

is to

happen now and afterward" (§12). Euripides'

44

intellect

rationalist

me, od creates a des.re

know, confuses

to

ar, with discursive
communicator, and
suspend the meehamcal flow
of lime between “now and
afterward." When

fails to

the results turn

be "thoughts" and
‘affects’ which are "imitated
as reahstically as possible"
(§12)
the con, us, on between ar,
and nature, between the
art, lie, al and the
historically given
occurs, I he ground is set now
for the confusion of
poltties-of the nature of its
pailicipunts and the nature of the si iir
,;tu
me slJ te Uwith
art-a means olc representation
which is just
<>u, to

that: Art, arliliec,

m

In the
IS

New

"° l ° nly

[

"revolution

and

artificial.

Attic

"

Sli

effect - lhc consequences are
even

UmschwungY

|

m modern opera, Eurip.des' "linguistic

Duhyramband

more pronounced.

revolution"

Euripides'

turns the music of hts
predecessors' "great rhetorical-lyrical

scenes" into an instrument for
reprcsent.ng the everyday and the
"natural," effectively
presenting the historically specific
as the universal, in the
process enslaving his audience to
the particular form of the real
and the natural with which they arc
presented. Just as

Euripides sets out to secure his "political
hopes" (§11) through innovations
appealing
popular desire or immediate
comprehensibility, so arc the effects of the
New Attic

to the

I

Dithyramb and modern opera inescapably
linked
instrumcntalizcs music and makes
poeticized

epic- so

too

is

it

to politics.

And just as

a means for presenting a

the relation

strictly

Eur.p.dcs

Apollmian drama-a

between music and image, between the
Dionysian

and the Apollmian, fundamentally reconfigured
by the

New

Attic

Duhyramband modern

opera. 1 he alteration necessarily effects the
basic structure of tragedy which Nietzsche
had

so painstakingly analyzed. Rather than music
being translated into an image only for

image
i

to be destroyed in the

educed

to a

means

end as

its

inadequacy to music

lor presenting images.

as image, as a tone painting, a

With the

is

presented, music

is

that

now

reversal of the analogy music appears

mere copy of appearances— as a

battle or

a stormy

sea.

The

process ol mimetic duplication "bridging" the inherent
untranslatability of music and image

now

altered, the tragic effect

is

no longer

analogy, the reformulation of the

liberating. In

accordance with the reversal of the

mode of mimesis, and

the repairing of the unbridgeable

disjunction picviously inhabiting them, the liberating cllcct of music, of tragedy,
and of the

music-drama
In this

is itself

New

reversed and enslavement to the given results:

Dithyramb, music

is,

in

an outrageous manner, made into an

45

V

our understanding ism he
sahslied bv^hekn

T'?''

T

ds of music

11

-

SSSses^^^sss?
Contrary to the

mood of moderation effected

particular attuncmcnt effected

Music

is

by the

by Aeschylian and Sophoelean
tragedy the

New Attic Dithyramb is neither creative

reduced to miming appearances.

No transcendence of the given

activity occurs, only the
incapacitating confusion of

universality, the prcctse opposite
of the liberatory

past.

It

repetitive instantiation of an arbitrary
configuration of cloudy appcranccs

to the "analogical" correlation
of

"Our lanlasy

is

music

Sklavin der Erscheinungen

that

|

(§17).

"

however, with the

birth

is

even denies

and asserts

its

itself

mrd\ by

the fantasy under arrest:

these |analogical|

"reduced to being a slave to appearances
\znr

So enslaved,

the illusion

becomes

of modernity and particularly

its

total.

unique aesthetic form

Nietzsche inds the effects of tragedy's decline most
evident. With the
I

the 1600s in Italy, a

development taking place under

(neck culture and Greek tragedy,
ilsell

and

The "understanding" achieved thanks

mere appearances holds

arrested \Phanlasie...feslgehaUen

superficialities" (§17). Music, finally,

It is,

to

truth

no

of the tragic effect. The fantasy

blankly registers the given, duplicates
the natural, and repeats the

as a positivistic "understanding"
and "knowledge."

takes plaee,

Apollmian shine with

mood

nor receptive

new genre— their work

as an authentic recreation and renaissance of
ancient tragedy

Dithyramb.
cxcmplui

music

In the

ol Palestrina (§ 19). In

Palestrina's

work

in

asserting

— transformed,

Euripides and the

process they rejected the principles of church music and

the "incllably sublime

of opera

its

New Attic
great

and sacred [unaussprechbar erfui.be tie und'heilige]"

sharp contrast to the "unspeakably" sublime character of

Dionysian harmonics— his music's " un aus sprech bar" character— the

advocates of opera demanded

that

music

be,

above
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in

the influence of the revived interest in

the advocates of the

radicalized, and formalized the principles already at

birth

all,

speakable, "sprech

**

COmprehensiblc communicative,
-

express, on were fotmulated.

77“-

di

The opus of opera
ct pie

p

,s the

lorms

recites, repeating

To

this

~

end new means of musical

The resulting principles-,
he recitative and

For opera, contrary to the
play

ord.

al

servile.

a, the

work of narration

ol narrative.

The

sMo

communication which speech should

center of tragedy,

laboring to

recitative

the

is

work-dmmattc work

commumcate

and the

means

itself. Its

stilo rappresentativo.

The

are the

recitative

aloud what has been
memorized, intending

it to be understood
Not the
sublime, bu, the stay „ne of the
drama-its epic mytkos-ts
communicated, and „ is no,
sung, but declaimed, using
every available rhetorical
means to excite an effect. Its

style— the

stilo

rappresentativo— is, then, representational,
rappresentativo.* These
pnnciples of narration-an impure
and contradictory mixture of epic
and lyric modes of
delivery— are a form of a protest
against the church. In contrast
to the church's polyphonic
and non-communicative music, the
principles of opera must be seen as
an attempt to enable

communication of an image of man. Not just
any image of
originary image of the human is to be
put on stage
the

the

and narrated.

understood.
these

same

The formal pnnciples of opera should make
such

distinctly.

However little such

an

art

logos

is

to be

representation possible, and

representational style has to

cttect— the very breakdown of communication

incommunicable- such inadequacies
is

Its

will do; the

principles should insure that the originary
and good nature of man's speech

heard— clearly and
tragic

human

form whose origin

aesthetic, indeed, political

lies

in the

are not perceived

by

do with

is

the

expression of the

the advocates of opera, for opera

not in ancient Greece, but in the fulfillment of
an extra-

end specific

to modernity:

Bui

this was not the opinion of the inventors
of the recitative They
themselves believed, and with them their age, that the secret
of antique
music had been solved with the stilo rappresentativo, from out
of which
alone the monstrous effect of an Orpheus, an Amphion,
and even of Greek
tragedy is explained. The new style was accepted as the
reawakening
:

of the

most effective music [wirkungsvollsten Musik\, of ancient Greek music:
Indeed, in accordance with the universal and popular conception
of the

Homeric world as the primordial world [Urwelt], one could abandon
oneself to the dream ol having descended once more into the paradisiacal
beginnings of humanity where music necessarily also must have had
,

On stile rappresentativo,

see

Theodor Adorno's

brief but suggestive

that

remark on

relationship to music, language, and intentionality in Quasi una Fantasia, trans.
Livingstone (Verso: New York, 1994), 3.
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its

Rodney

development of

this rcillv

for itself an art but

,^_e fatth

,

I

And

yet,

oddly,

the

a

thc
scc nl °

llte

'

innermost

pi,wcrful nccd forcibly gains

?'

^ ““

lhc

singlTth^

"l ull

the art

it is

oL

s

uc

hc

feelings, immediately

Opera presents

m'T

r> .

Clt

^

vo.ee" of an original,
primordial, and prehistoric humanity.

form most proper

to modernity; indeed,

it has only existed
in
modernity. But w.th the rediscovery
of thc primordial logos of the
primordial man at the
primordial and prehistoric origin
of humanity what appears on thc
operatic stage is not a
I

ull,

idyllic

and

idle voice, but a laborious
process of narration in

purity— "music necessarily also must have
had
technical procedures which not only
put

which lead

it

it

to

that

work

directly back to an authoritative
text

confusion: In thc stilo rappresentativo
"thc music
master, where music

compared w.th

is

the ghostly appearance of a hero

which music's

unsurpassed pur.ly"-is subjected to

in

the service of historical narration,
but

whose authority
is

rests

on a profound

regarded as thc servant, the text thc

the body, thc text with the soul"
(§19). Rather than

from out of

the spirit of music, an appearance

which

leaves the illusion ol presence behind, the
enslavement of music to thc quite visible and
substantial materiality ol the written text
reinforces thc authority of thc visible word. Since

the stilo rappresentativo
but,

I

a style of representing appearances, nothing else

h' s

in thc

to

music

play ol lines and proportions rouse an external delight"
(§19).

"most effective music," then,

humanity by abandoning one
its "I ull

"an

is left

as a slave to appearances [Sklavin der
Erscheinungen\, to imitate thc formal essence

appcaianccs and

ol

is

voice,"

empty and

making

its

to thc

as

its

slavish and effects slavery:

"dream"

It

serves thc ends of

ol thc primordial origin

of thc good logos with

effect, in sharp contrast to the tragic effect, pacific: Art

distracting trend in

Opera has

is

amusement"

be, they

here

(§ 19).

ends the fulfillment of extra-aesthetic— " unasthetischer"

However, "good" these ends may

is

remain external

to

— needs.

and distinct from thc ends

ol

ar

mdeed, they have .her origin

in

a "half-moral sphere
[einerhalb moralised
SphareY

Cann °' POS t,Vdy rCpresent
thc be '"g °f humanity;
'

cannot represent an original
past and an ongtnal
place:

rather,

i,

fabneates

Art

,,

time and space are the present
its
representattons sheerarttf.ee.
Representations of an ongtnal
human, ty, ,n an ongtnal place
at the paradtstacal ong.n
of the world
Its

inevitably/uM/y-a*

when

tts arttstry is

dented, mendacious. Opera

is

one such

constitutive instrumentalism:
Opera, and particularly

extra-aesthette needs. Art

no longer an end

In itself,

representational ends of an extra-aesthetic
need.
ethical

— the "good" in humanity

is

the ethical

its

it

,s artifice

art

fomt.

and artifical-and

Its

mendacity

lies in ,ts

mustcal element, serves the end
of

becomes a means

Not only

to the

are these ends said to be "half

am also highly politicized. Art
serves the ends of opposing
religious authority by assertingputting on stage-thc
issue-they

image

ol the

"good" human born anew by the

spirit

of Renaissance humanism:

aU< r °f l " d| fference to us that
the humanists of the time
combated
ni,7„
;
old ecclesiastical
representation of man as corrupt and
lost with this
newly created picture [Bild\ of the
paradisiacal artist: So that opera is to
be
understood as the opposition dogma of
the

'.‘he
thc

“

good man, with which at
lmc ' a mea ls o f consolation was found
against that pessimism
!
which owing to the
frightful uncertainties of all
circumstances,

y allraclcd precisely

ihc

mo™

most serious minded of that time. It suffices
us to have recognized how the
proper magic and therewith the genesis of
his new ar lorm lies in the satisfaction
of an entirely
the

unaeslhetic need in
he optimistic glorification of the human
in itself [< les Menschen mi sick
in
1
he conception of thc primordial human
Urmensch as
[

the

human which

is
good and artistic by nature: A principle of the
opera that has gradually
changed into a threatening and upsetting demand
which, in the face of the
socialist movements of the present, we
cannot ignore any longer. The
good primordial human [Der gate Urmensch]" wants

What

To

]

his rights \RechteV

paradisiacal prospects! (§19)

the church's enthusiastic assertion of one
particular representation of man,

opposes another image of the human being: More precisely,
an image of

human,

the

scholastic

on

Menschen an

sich."

Thus do

the artistic image, the Bild.

The

alteration of the

piesent age's misunderstanding of presence.
edifices begin to crumble and with
uncertainties" arise in their place,

them

the being of the

the operatic humanists give up the

argumentation— the concept giving representations

As

medium of

significance-and

medium of knowledge

settle

reflects the

the scholastics' towering intellectual

their attempts to

prove god's existence,

awakening a desire most
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their

humanism

"frightful

readily fulfilled by transposing

8

’

8

t

:r

Und arUSlry

achieved by the

in ‘° ' hC

rcattily avatlablc

”

means of an.

'

0l lHC hl

A new

""™

p, elute

** most easily

bc "'^ a

was drawn

up. a drama!, e lex,

en and staged, and the
oppost.ton suddenly had
something to stand upon: A
reborn
human betng
itseif" good and artistic,
freely creattng its good
future. It ought not he
suipnsing when thts luture turns
out to be "socialistkind, for the very principle
from
Whtch opera originates- "the
satisfaction of an ent.rely
unaestheftc need ,n the opt,
m, Stic
vvr,

glortftcatton ol the

be

sat, si

human

ted by the very

in itself"-, s

found

a, the center

of the sexual, s, project only

same means: Like the opus of
opera,

work, indeed, perhaps nothing

is

more valued by

social, sm also puls itself to

"the socialist

movements of

Nietzsche writes, than the "dignity
of work" (§18). In opera, no
doctrine,

human

work

means

is the

,n ilscll."

But just

for

realizmg-on

less than in socialist

stage and in society- the

when

the conceptual

movements are forced to

media of cognition

politics turn into aesthetics

future's "paradisiacal prospects"

turn to artistic

politics. In

is

,s

the same:

The work and

itsell

is

inscribed within the structure of

to

doubt god's authority,
is

and

fully with the

the ritualistic and ineffectual character of

its

to repetition of

divine

to be solid,

its

"dogma"

its

adequation to the

on an epistemological foundation no more
art

it

is

its

doctrinal

already

doctrine: Its artifice arose out of an ontological need and

an oppositional politics which asserted

this rightness rests

loundation

itself finally

with a peculiarly mechanical regularity, the only thing

"dogma." Indeed, the opposition's tendency

Since

labor of self-narration and sclf-

work here- by means of a repeatable mechanics,

established by such repetitions

rise to

both cases- the aesthetics of

effected -insures a happy telos to the end of
history's drama, and while this

same end reproduces

gave

media and them art, lice

Euripidcan " deus ex machina" (§12,
§14, §18). While the

industrialization of culture at

intervention

a confused form of

- the instrument of opposition and the means to the

dramatization ,n which the good appears to realize
ol the

in

and

turn out to be lacking or insufficient.
In this way,

and aesthetics into

opera and the politics of socialism

mechanical regularity

same end: "The

that is utterly inaccessible.
Socialism's ontological

epistemological (oundations rest on
a confusion of media resulting
cognition. Oppositional

the present,"

must provide the ground for

real:

It

was

stable than the ability

the missing foundation. If the

cannot, of course, be filled with fissures and chasms.
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right.

It

can

)

t r;

°n

f°

m: THC

; CX,Sl Withl
° alrCUdy
" thC

«** * ^e. harmonious, an, f„U of prcscncc
hUm ™

-d require only hard work for Us future

rc\c alion through hard
work. Here, as always,
being nght and having
righls (,Rechte
mean only one thing: Being
beautiful, being able to
ereate a whole, harmonious
good
artwork, and, ,n the end, being
one.

Opera and

its naturalist,

pixxxss in motion; socialism
and socialist realism finished

But the dignity of humanism
and

socialist

it.

humanism cannot be confined

lorn, ol representation, for
the principle itself
-dramatic

employed as a means

ereaturely aesthetic set the

to very different ends.
Indeed,

,1

one

to

self-narration-can be readily

socialism represents the

undamcnlal possibility of a reunion
of the species through collective
possibility is found in the division
of the
I

labor, the other basic

species into individualized
unites with self-

generating narrative.

The two structural

narraltve possibiltties of epic

hand, that of collective society,
on the other, that of the collected,
united, however, by the
recitative ol these
ritualized

two

same rhythmic chant: Rights

political

"lull voice," ellccts the

dream

And

,n

same

restful passivity

one

individual-are

both cases the

to identical effect:

glowing and seductive beauty of the word

the

in its

Rather than the

"right,"

spoken with

with which one abandons oneself "to the

having descended once more into the
paradisiacal beginnings of humanity." Such

ol

origins,

liberal

movements' manlra-distinctly anti-Dionysian

rhythms and consonant harmonies-concludes

tragic loss of prcscncc, the

a

dignify.

my, has- on

no longer overtly

which insures
'dignity of the

However

theological, refer not to a lost past, but to an
inner prcscncc

dignity. In modernity the "beautifully
seductive and calming words of the

human' and the dignity of work"'

"beautiful” their slogans

may

(§ 18) arise as a

be, both liberalism

means of consolation.

— the "dignity of the

human" — and socialism-’lhe dignity of work" -remain
aconluscd aestheticization of the
political

"The

which ends by calming everyone down.

Law

of Eternal Justice"

Everything

in

The Birth of Tragedy moves toward

more evident than when Nietzsche

characterizes the

primordial relationship between the thing

in itself

51

the middle.

most basic

Nowhere

relation of

all

is this

— "the

and appearance": "Just as tragedy, with

'

ltS

metaph ^' cal cons °lation [Tros
te] points towards

the eternal life of this
kerne, of
extstence through the
conttnuous founder,
ng of appearances, so does the symbolism
of the
satyr chorus already speak
of this pnmordta,
relattonshtp between the
thing in itself and
,

appearance [Urverhahnis zmschen
Ding an sich and ErscheinungV
(§8)." The emphasis
ought not be placed on "the thing
itself
or "appearance," for neither,
as Nietzsche

emphasizes,
.s so, it is

is

primordial. Rather, the
"relationship between" them

because the "thing

Birth of Tragedy the

in itself" ,s no, a, all
"in itself,- le, alone

thing in itself" has a

<§ 10>

'

AgainSt a "

“Potions,

a "thing

name- Dionysus- "the god

the suffering of individuation
in itself” [die

°o "

originate.

is

is

outside of

itself"

to suffering,

it is,

as

myth has

individuation rather than

its

it,

it

be thought substantial

From out of that space

other hand, suspends the individuated
subject and with

medium

is itself

Kaufmann badly

only possible by

the

the sufferings of Dionysus.

And

mistranslates

its

individual

Medium through which the
this sentence when he makes "bei dem
[

cr

is

medium between them, on
it

it ,s

the achievement of justice:

1

Wal

subjected as

individuation arises, and

In so far as the subject is an artist, it is
already released from
u
an(^ 1as become, a s it were, a medium

_

itself" is

Dismembered by

source, overcoming this state of suffering

the sufferings of Dionysus. Passing
through the

the experience of the

for,

"torn to pieces by the Titans"
(§10).

entering into the space "between” them.

with

it

insenbed by

like

— the substantial Will-Nietzsche's "thing in

thoroughly passive suffering. Nor then,
can

The

erfahrende

itself,

and suffering from indivtduatton.
Rather than being a source of
causality
Schopenhauer's "thing in

-

if this

which experiences

Uiden der Individual ion an sich

the "thing in itself”

And

]

r ^
|
lortwahrenden
Untergange der Erscheinungen" say "which abides through
the perpetual
destrucUon of appearances." Nietzsche writes the
opposite: "abiding" appears nowhere in
he text. One cannot go on, as Kautmann does, to then
claim that "Here
...

to

Schopenhauer s perspective,"

Nietzsche returns

tor, as will

become

rejection of Schopenhauer's hyposticization of an

and The Case of Wagner,

trans.

clear, Nietzsche's statement is a
eternal will (see The Birth of Tragedy

Walter Kaufmann [New York: Vintage, 1967], 62, note

#2).

The same must be said of Nietzsche's "metaphysics," for it is thoroughly
contaminated by its figurative opposite: "metaphor." First of all, Nietzsche's
"metaphysics"
is not even demonstrated: it is an " Annahme ," an
"assumption," neither deduced nor
demonstrated, its value consisting in its descriptive, not demonstrative, character. For a
thorough interpretation of this problem, see Michel Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics,
trans. Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York,
1996); see also Lutz
Ellrich, "Rhetonk und Metaphysik," in Nietzsche-Studien, no. 23
(1994), 241-272.
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dcni pllo 1 m shine For
must beclcar fo^for our
above all it
hum^liati ^
J
0 " [Er edri un and
Erhohung], that the entire
"!.
8 8
comedv of aruf nm1 DeH'
Pcrlormc ^ for us, perhaps
for our betterment or
education
r

-

.

,

-

creators of that art world
are even images and

To

wc arc J ust as

l

litlle

the proper

SUppose of ourselves that we
artistic Droiechon^r "oh.
lal SUmC creator and
our highest dignity hochste
we have
f
WiinhA
ii!^
meanm 8 [Bedeutung] of art
works- for
m n S existcnce and the world
eternally justified [denn
nur ah Lhol°
t,sches°nu
Phanomen ist Dasein und die
Welt ewig gerechtfertietl
while
C f COU1 c OUr con
sciousness about our
meani ng is scarce! vdilTeren'Tf^
?
,HC S ° ld,CrS Pam,Cd
have

KaSS

.so

lar as the subject is

f

an arus.-and everyone

dluston ol the "individual

"indmdual" and

>

is

—

l

IX™

In

f

who

is

an artist-.he

overcome, and an experience of
the medium between

the "one truly being
subject" results.

lorms of modernity

attends a tragedy

While

the

the bas.c political and
artistic

on an amphibole whtch transposes
elements of
the regton of the D.onystan
in order to make the
rest

the

Apollmian into

essence of the human being appear,
tragedy discloses the appearance
of the mdtvtdual to be
inessential and derivative. And
the individual

granted dignity and rights by

is

modem

political

movements on

if

the basis of a

Socratic theoria which attributes
and, lifeless, and enslaving
"conceptual hallucinations
I

Begrijfs-Halluzinationen

elevating

to

"

I

its

essence, then tragedy grants dignity
to the subject by

over such hallucinations: "Dignity
can only be spoken of there where the

it

individual completely transcends itself

[vMg iibersich hinaus geht]." x The dignity

achieved under the confused gaze of theoria,
on the other hand,
dignified. Rather,

it

ol this subreptitious

Doric

state,

of

first

a confusion: Schein has not been

confusion-in contrast

Roman

take place in the

The

rellects

neither right nor

clarified as shine.

to the tragic effect-

is

The effect

the barbarism of the

nationalism, and, to be sure, of certain developments
which would

"German"

state long after Nietzsche’s death.

moment of

justice

shine-performs

is

— the

trail of

the "aesthetic

phenomenon," of

the process of critical clarification. Its effect
lowers the human: Dignity

is

not located in the conceptual cloak veiling the
deceptive character of shine which seems to
insure the

human

cloak— the

being’s significance.

tragic hero's attempt to

"Dcr griechische

The exposure of

become

the veil with the lifting of the

"the one essence of the world" ends

Staat," 765.
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up only

in

sulfenng (§9)-effects a feelmg
of hum, Hat, on (Erniedrigung).
Anyth, „g else ends up
seduced by Hus, on. The
cathartic purification of
illusion-seeing shine as sh, no -del,
nuts
the validity ol the sphere
of Apollmian appearances,
sharply distinguishing it from
any
,

possible "in

itself." In

the process,

destroys the beautiful

,t

produced by opera's work of self-natraUon.
Bu,

human being ends up

in

Erhdhung, an exalted

in the

state

its

ends "for

,n the
us."

While Eurip.dcan drama and
in

is

of elevation. With the overcoming
of

open-ended.

As

is

modem opera return

to the origin

and

concerned exclusively with the medium
between

end. Neither or, gin nor end, those

means, their origin inaccessible and
l

their

who experiencing the tragic become a

instrumentalism and projects of self-narration
-the good purposes of

a medial experience: "The tragic myth leads
the world of appearances to
it

denies

its

the indi\ idual will

is

this

process

may

be, the catharsis

it

effects- the very

Apollo

first

moment

subjected to a suffering which figures death, presenting
the hubris of

and a

radical

lorm of humiliation.

strange, cathartic pleasure arises and a

moment

to

limits [an die

presentation and experience of justice— shows no
traces of resignation. In the

hero

way

itself" (§22).

However horrifying

ot justice the

pure

end not simply withdrawn, but suspended
and

"betterment or education" "for us" -are
suspended, the illusion of immediacy gives

Greuze] where

the

order to transparently communicate
the essence of that appearance,

the process ol aesthetic justification

Icl

moment of just, Heat, on

elevated above ,t. In so far as
world, "we" are ne.ther the
"proper creators" of that appearance,
nor arc

tnstrumentahze music

ongm and

mages" mechanically

second

the illusion of the individual's
substantial, ty, the subject

"we" appear

",

finally speaks the

tragedy and of art as such

is

reached"

command

language

ol

In the

second moment, however, a

prescribes a

mode of action. This

Dionysus, whereby the highest goal of

— gives an imperative which results when the "law of

eternal justice" (§25) speaks:

The metaphysical joy

in the tragic is a translation of the instinctive,
unconscious Dionysian wisdom into the language of images: The hero, the
highest appearance ol the will, is negated for our pleasure, because he is
only appearance, and the eternal life of the will is not touched by his

"We believe in eternal life," cries tragedy; while music is the
immediate idea of this life. Plastic art has an entirely different aim: Here
Apollo overcomes the suffering of the individual through the radiant
annihilation.

glorification of the eternity of appearances here beauty triumphs over the
;
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Crk

S

^S^rf^ture'l'nSwiill a
nature ca„ s to us

^

vT^d.^,

^

th
r

^l

The categorical imperative concluding
the
(voice), unlike the "full voice"
of opera,

being nor disclosing a presence.
The

suspending the illusion of

totality,

Other [ Anderes ]
the other, to a reborn

’

r

WkcT“

8e ° f

tragic effect commands

bangs tragedy

result, then,

and

to a close

justice.

This Stinrne

by nether

reveal, ng a

breaks open the present order,

Nietzsche

this,

bes from

",

eSS " h

et

SenSe climinatcd

|
|

insists, is just.

For what

it

opens up

(§23) and "another world [anderenWelt]"
(§17). Opening up to

Dionysus

who

has not yet arrived, to the
possibility that there

is

something more beyond the present
order-each of these

possibilities brings one into
accordance with the law, not simply
the Apolliman law, but the law
of the law, the
measureless law of justice which delimits
the Apollinian sphere of the
individual lest it

become

unjust and "petrify into an Egyptian
rigidity and coldness"

Nietzsche's text turns upon this moment,
variously describing

it

(§9)3 Again and again

as "negation."

"annihilation," "foundering," "breaking-up,"
"bifurcation," "disharmony," and

dissonance.” In every case
[stellvertretendes

WirkmgY

alter this existence,

anderes Sein

The

]

"

it

signals tragic catharsis with

(§22), and each time

it

its

"place-holding effect

"redeems us from the greedy impulse

and with an admonishing hand reminds us of
another being

[ein

(§21).

purifying imperative of justice

is

the voice

which

finally effects the

mood

specific to the tragic effect and a tragic culture.
Tragedy's cathartic effect limits the world of

phenomenality, opening up, rather than reinforcing, the world
of appearances, for they
only Schein, only a

veil,

only a myth. The limit

pathologically, failing which the shine

is

and brings about the hero 's downfall. And

On

the relationship

between

illusion—

would deceive us

extremes, delimiting them by indicating what
fatal

to

"lest

it

effect us

as crude reality"

— moderates the

extreme, what oversteps, thus, what

that effect also has

are,

is

an effect on the drive to

and the Apollinian, see Dennis King Keenen,
"Moving in the Margin of Justice: Nietzsche's Reading of Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound,"
in The Fate of the New Nietzsche ed. Keith A nsell- Pearson and
Howard Caygill
(Averbury: Aldershot Press, 1993), 251-263. See also Peter Sloterdijk, Thinker on Stage:
Nietzsche's Materialism 80-85.
"justice"

,

,
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politics.

Nietzsche contends that
Greece-seen as the analog to
post-war
"Gernrany " provtdes the very
mode, of a moderation legated
between the extremes. Even
a er the bloody war w„h

-

Persta, indeed, prectsely
after

it, the Greeks
netthcr sunk into
apathettc, mhtltsttc res, gnat,
on in the face of the war's
horrifying abyss of suffering
nor
did they fall prey to the
pathologtcal nattonalism

embodied

in

Roman

tmpenal polittc,

beschaulich stimmender Wein],
so must

we be mindful of the tremendous
Stlmulates P unfies and discharges
the whole life

oftheD^nle^f^ungeheuren
ot the people [der

’

^

das gauze Volksleben errevenden
emigenden undentladenden Gewalt der
Tragodie] we wifi first intimate
lghest \alue when it confronts
us, as it
,

;

its

did the Greeks, as the quintessence
p °Ph ylactlc P owers ot healing, as the mediator ruling
Uvaltende
th£ Str° n§eSt
themselves mos t fatfl qualities of a

^m

Tragedy
absolute

is

a highest value because

immanence and

its

cathartic violence mediates

between the extremes of

absolute transcendence, effecting an
attunement indicative of a

lorm of existence and corresponding

politics

which

lie

between the excesses of Roman

imperial politics and the ecstatic fatalism
of Indian Buddhism. Lying between the
extremes,
this is the

justice"
their

mood oi

the middle effected by "the mediator
[Mittlerin]"

which insures

powers

that the

two extremes of the Apollinian and

drunk— results

the

mood of moderation— simultaneously sober and

as the tragic effect acting as a

These extremes are

political

the Dionysian "unfold

in rigorous, reciprocal proportion
[strenger wechselseitiger Proportion]
(§ 25 ).

The corresponding attunement,

Dionysian.

— "the law of eternal

means

to health that rules

all

extremes.

the logical extension of the pure forms of the
Apollinian and the

When the effect specific to either of these

dn\es

over

is

unchecked and allowed

"drives"

to manifest

its

— the "Dionysian and

pure, extreme form, the political

results are either the utter suspension of the political in
"ecstatic brooding" or the

measureless extension ot the political in a destructive "chase after worldly power and

worldly honor." The particular attunement of

this "splendid
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mixture" of sober ecstasy -its

Slimmung— is an

effect of the imperative,
ihc Slinune (voice)

self-overcoming. Such critical
clarification
path open to

"Germany

is,

apparent. For the tragic effect

is

process of

then, the very essence
of justice

V future. Why the "aesthetic problem" of

catharsis

and

the only
'

would he as
'

Nietzsche wrote in the "Foreword,"
"right

places

commanding u

the middle of

the passageway, the

"way

German hopes"

is

'

now

to health [HeilmittelV

which

onc-an

individual, a people, a nation,
a cullure-in "the middle,"
effecting that
plest political feeling
(§21 ) which lies between the
extremes of the purely Apollinian

and purely Dionysian. This
middling, but by no means
ordinaiy,
characicnze the non-nationalist nation
as well as the particular

politics

would

community which was

nevertheless, mpanial. Conforming
to neither the particularity
of all things Apollinian nor
to the strict universality of
the Dionysian, "Germany"
would be a particular nation whose
particularity

was not

its

own

but the effect of

Dionysos— would be msenbed
lorm

ol existence, its

way

of

in the

life, its

its

body of

other,

its

least this is

how

it is

passions themselves.

often referred

that

other- the

universal,

this singular nation as its
cultural idiom,

open-ended altuncmcnt would be the sure
sign of a

course-at

and

Its

that tragedy

The

s

tragedy, of

never was reborn. In

place the aestheticized politics so carefully
analyzed by Nietzsche triumphed.
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dissonant, discordant, and

rebirth of tragedy.

to- was

,

CHAPTER

III

LEGISLATING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT:

NIETZSCHE'S "ON TRUTH

LIE IN THE EXTRA-MORAL

AND

SENSE"

SSrMttmasssx

1

— Nietzsche,

'Presentation of Ancient Rhetoric"

Legislating Truth
1

n a letter to his friend

Wr,h of Tragedy,

Erwin Rhode, written shortly

Ptulosophenbiich {Philosopher's Hook).'
llirih

It

ulh

after the publication

of The

N,el/.schc describes his plans
for a second book, the so-called
It

will be,

he says, a "companion piece* to The

!

of Tragedy. Although Nietzsche wrote only two
sections of

and Lie

in the

Extra-Moral Sense" and Philosophy

Greeks- each develops

the

themes articulated

confirmation of his statement

to

in the

in his first

the

cotnpanion-'On

Tragic Age of the

book, and both can be read as

Rhode.’ Like their predecessor, each intervenes

,n the

struggle characterized by The llirih
of Tragedy as an "eternal conflict [ewigen KampJ]

between the

theoretical

and the representatives

The

*

s

which he intended
the tenth

volume

and the tragic view of the world" (§17), a contest
ol Platonic

pilling Socrates

philosophy against the rhetorician and the

artist to

no ^ Nietzsche s own. It was given to the collection of notes and writings
book by Ernst Holzer and August Horncffcr, the editors of

to turn into a

ol

Nietzsche's

first collected works, the so-called Grofioktavausgabe. For
Nicf/.sehc considered, sec Daniel Brcazcalc's usefull introduction
to his translation ol these notes and writings in Philosophy
and Truth: Selections from
Nietzsche s Notebooks of the Early / H7()'s (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press
1992)

a discussion ol the

titles

xviii-xxiii.

Sdmtliche Briefe, Kritische Studienausgabe,

Monti nari (Berlin: Walter dc Gruytcr, 1986),

cd.

Giorgio Colli and Mazzino

vol. 4, 132.

On the history ol the text sec Brcazcalc, Philosophy and Truth xviii-xxii for an
interpretation ol Nietzsche's reason's for lailing to complete the book sec xlviii-xlix.
,
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<

ctermine

who w,„

Just as Nletzsche

hrlosophenbuch
nation.

legislate the linguistic

had done

in

yet,

and

devQ(es hjs efforts

politico, effects

though there can be no
question

indeed a "companion piece"

to

The Birth of Tragedy,

common,*
•

ne mh ofrmsedy ^

to clarifying the
ethical

And

conventions govern,
ng the poll,leal

^^

of these conventions on
the

that the

Phibsophenbuch

,s

compamonship is marked by an
important and unm.stakable
difference. For The Birth
of Tragedy never addresses the'
problem of leg, slat, on directly,
focus, ng instead on its
effects, and no, until
Nietzsche
wntes the essay which was to scve
as the analytic core of the
Phibsophenbuch does he
devote himself exclusively to
the task of disclosing the
logic and structure of legislative
ac,
producing those effects.
That essay- "On Truth and Lie

,n the

thus

Extra-Moral Sense" -has emerged
as one of

Nietzsche's most important and
influential texts.'

It

has been read and reread in
recent

years, resulting ,n a powerful
senes of interpretations centering
the "eternal conflict"

between p hilosophy and

rhetoric.

6

between Philosophy and Literature"
(185-210).

the essay's insights into

These readings have come

^T*

Lawrenif

on

°SModernit? < trans
*

meuenre

-

at

a cost,

Derick

Distinction

Ltige lm ausserm °ralischen Sinne"
("On Truth and Lie in the
Samtliche
Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe KSA
J
(
), ed. Giorgio
r
and Mazzino Montinan (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1980), I, 875-890. Translations
rom the German are my own. Citations of the essay
will be given in the body of the text,
German page number first, followed by the corresponding
page in Breazeale’s
Philosophy and Truth, 79-94. A translation of
tteesLy also
in
K, N' e che ° n Rhetoric and Language (New York:
Oxford
\
University
Press,
!y
from
1989) e^ted, translated, and introduced by Sander L.
Gilman, Carole Blair, David J.
rarent, 24o-257.

P

"

M?l^

Sense

)

in

ap^s

See a C( UeS ernda s " Whlte Mythology: Metaphor in
the Text of Philosophy," in
?
? trans. Allen
Margins of Philosophy,
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982) 207zjlp Sarah Ko man "Metaphorical Architectures, in Looking After Nietzsche, trans. Peter
}
I
Conner and xMira Kamdar (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1990), 89-1 12;
Paul de Man, "Rhetoric of Tropes (Nietzsche)" in Allegories
of Reading (New Haven- Yale
Azf

•

2

’

,

’

.

University Press, 1979), 103-118; J. Hillis Miller, "Dismembering
and Disremembering in
Nietzsche s 'On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense'" in boundary
2, 9 (Spring/Fall 1981),
41-54. Alexander Nehamas's description of the text as "immensely
overestimated" appears
to have more to do with his effort to valorize Nietzsche's
late work than with any real
objection to the essay, lor he offers none (see Nietzsche, Life as Literature
[Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard, 1985], 246, note 6). This evaluation is particularly odd given
Nehamas's
interest in the literary character of Nietzsche's writing.
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.

howexer, for while they have
done much lo illuminate

mt°

rhet° nC S rClal, ° n to
Ph " OS °P h Cal
’

'

essay's second fundamental
theme:

W

The

the essay's indispensable
tnsighls

'hey have deflected
attenhon

role of rhetor, e in moral

and

away from

political life

’

the

To

be
Extra-Mora, Sense"
polemizes again* "Socrattsm" by
demonstrating the tmposstbthty
of freetng phtlosophtcal
"truth” and liteta, speech
from then
cntitnglement in rhetonc's tropes
and ftgures, bu, its polemte
does not stop there. Nietzsche
extends ,t- tnto the spheres
of moral, ty and politicsby tnvestiga.ing the effects of the
sure,

"On Truth and Lie

in the

philosopher’s "truth" on moral,
ty and politics. His demonstration of
the impossibility of
purifying phtlosophteal "truth"
from its entanglement with rhetor,
c, then, is by no

means

the end of the story, rather,
legislative ability

much

political

which

this

serves as the foundation
needed to illuminate a peculiar

rhetoric alone possesses, an
ability, moreover,

whose effects are as
and moral as they are epistemological.
Rhetoric, Nietzsche argues, has

power, even the power to

and

it

power, he

legislate

insists, is

laws and imperatives prescribing
what

operative in both political and moral

already hinted at in the essay's

title; its political

life. Its

is

to

be done,

moral character

import, on the other hand, emerges
as

Nietzsche’s investigation into this
strange legislative ability finds

itself

drawn

into a debate

with the political philosophers over
one of the most difficult and persistent
issues in

modern

political philosophy:

political

community.

It is

no accident

On Truth and

Lie

The

legislation of the social contract

that Nietzsche turns to the

in the

Extra- Moral Sense."

He

of

problems of legislation and foundings
dictated the essay to

von Gersdorff

in the

But the essay shares none of the optimism

for the Reichsgriindung so apparent in

The

all

and the founding of the

atmosphere permeated by the hopes raised

°! lra 8 e dy-

is

wake of the German founding of

in

in

an

1871

The Birth

philological community's hostile response to the
book, the absence of any

Even those authors interested in Nietzsche's political thought
have neglected to
investigate the essay. Keith Ansell-Pearson's An
Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political
Hunker_(New York: Cambridge University, 1994) makes no mention
of it. The same is
true of Peter Bergmann's fine work, Nietzsche "the
Last Antipolitical German"
,

(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987). Mark Warren,
on the
other hand, recognizes the coexistence ot two distinct themes in the
essay and contemplates
the different account" which would result if one were to
focus on the role of rhetoric in
"human relations" (see Nietzsche and Political Thought [Cambridge: MIT, 1988], 76). The
present essay is an attempt to provide such an account.
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Ce sttcks ,0

a8ainSt a "

its

iS

And
1

this

-o.nls

own

la-pes expressed in

is

neither Che

first

is

broU * hl to *»
is

paace

I

las, to

employ

it."

Cells

a Cable

Bu, he

tells

,s

estabhshed and a pohtica,
eonnnnndy

preserved-bu, as he develops these
themes, he

not only directed at Ihe

clearly a contribution lo

participants include

N,e lZsehe, fim, book

major themes-, fabulous
moment of legislation takes place

German

by joining a discussion winch
extends back
is

War and

Ex.ra-Moml Sense"

nor the

m order to comment on Ihe successes and

commentary

essay

ihe

I

founded, and the lifeof the
tndividual

employs them

**

"° n Tlalh and
Jo in

a well-known Cable, and
NieCsche

,hc -drive to

«* wake of Ihe Franco-Pruss.an

'> ">

«

lhCSC deVCl °Pmente
-

l

»

its

failures of the

RMxX rtMu

nii

.

founding. Nietzsche develops his

to ihe beginnings of
modernity.

I

Ms

long and contentious history.
The discussion's

lobbes, Locke, Rousseau,
Kant, Benjamin Constant, and

7< ’ <2

Ja ary ' IK72 >- N ‘" alc "« comments
nune la'vonible ,n h,I
no,r
T" nhere Nietzsche
? describes
books.
the modern nation slate as "a barbaric
crudilv in
comparison with the city-state \Slatlt ®aat\'
because it rests on the "laughable”
"to
see the nation as a visible mechanical
unity, equipped with a glorious
governmental
apparatus and military pomp." See K S
VII,
I

\7

T

'

Sre

147, 174.

() " Ul

L

,

/^

c a y' s bibulous character, see Andrzej
Warminski, "Towards a -abulous
f
Nl l/,SCh
(
Ulh and ,JC 1,1 lhe Extra-Moral Sense',"
’#
Graduate Faculty
#
13.2 (1991). Bonnie Ionig draws attention to
the purposes ol the
table in / optical theory and the Displacement
Politics

ln8

7

7

I

'

Mc ?

,

I

essriy s

nivcrsily, 1003 ), 43.

of

Ol course, Nietzsche

will again

employ

(Ithaca: Cornell

the genic ol the lablc lo

discuss the problem ol "truth" in his famous
genealogy of metaphysics entitled "I low the
lie Wood Finally Became a
Fable (The I Iistory of an Error)" (sec KSA VI 80-8
1) On
the role ol fables in Nietzsche's work with
reference to this fable in particular, see Philippe
Laeoue-I .abarthc, " lie Fable," trails. high Silverman, in
The Subject of Philosophy
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota), 1-13. On the structure of the
fable in general, see
Jacques Derrida's reading ol Francis Pongc's Fable in "Psyche:
Inventions ol the Other" in
1

1

I

I

Man Reading cd. .mdsay Waters and Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: Jnivcrsity
Minnesota, 1989), 25-65. On the role of fables in foundings, sec Derrida's
"Declaration
ol Independence," New Political Science
15(1986). For the origin ol Nietzsche's own
able, sec another brief essay composed for the Philosophenlmch
"On the Pathos ol
ruth," translated in Philosophy and Truth, 61-66.
Reading de

,

I

t

ol

I

,

I

61

S^Ohen*1111161^ a n d ° ne
and character ol the
Nietzsche's

^ tHe Ce„

social

tra '

P ro b

l

ems ° f modern

political

philosophy— ihc

origin

contract- lies at the center
of Ihetr debate.

own contnbutron

to the

debate consists

m his efforts to think the

Ph osophtca, problem of "truth"
and the poliucal and moral
problem of Ration together
than m opposthon to one
another. In
order to carry ou, the task,
he transposes

chopenhauer's theory of legislation
into the sphere of "truth."
Just as, accord,
ng to
Schopenhauer, an act of legation
founds the state by establishing
the dutres and nghts
of
,cs members, so too
does the leg.sla.ive act
establishrng "truth" found
socrety by rnstituhng
certain

duties- telling the

benefits— membership
banishment. "
d, mens, on

"truth"

in the

community and freedom from

And just as Schopenhauer had

of the

leg, slat, ve act at the
basts

by the contract, so too does the
its

and keeprng one's prom,se-as
well as certtun

mendacious counterpart

the pain of

punishment and

demonstrated the unavoidable
moral

of political

life

by pointing

to the duties

imposed

leg.slative act distingurshing
a "true" use of language

establish, as the title of
Nietzsche's essay calls

it,

from

a society's

"moral sense”-the .mperative
commanding a "truthful" use of language.
The fable which
results from this displacement
of the logic of leg.slation

into the sphere of "truth" revolves

around the original moment of
lawlessness and the onginal act of
lawmaking
the socral contract.

As Nietzsch e

tells

it,

this

moment,

the primordial political

at the basis

of

moment

Nietzsche lust approaches the problem
through Kant's polemical essav "IJbpr pm
aus Menschenhebe zu ltigen" ("On a
Supposed Right to Lie Based on
Philanthropy ). There Kant argues against
the liberal French political philosopher
Beniamin
Constant over the role of "truth" and lying
in social life. Against ConstaTs claim"rI
takes ^e duty to speak the truth singly
and unconditionally, it would make every
society
S deS
h K
and mak6S le '" n « the lru,h the necessTOdLn
A§
h a SSlgnS an entirel new value and function
to
y
?
"truth"
p m
th and -mfthlra b S'r
telling. For
Nietzsche s comments on Kant and Constant see
J
KSA
VII
Klaus-Uwe FischeFs discussion of Nietzsche's reading of
their debate in
Vom Grundsatz der Pflicht: ein Zitat" in Nietzsche-Studien #14, 426-427.

PhSropvN^
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'
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™

,

’

,
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’

Schopenhauer's doctrine of the state synthesizes the competing
theories of the
art culated b Hobbes and Kant. Accordingly,
y
the state is a product, as
Hobbes had argued, of a "common contract [genieinsainen Vertrag]"
‘

while the "doctrine
a matter of law.
Schopenhauer, however, rejects Kant's attempt to bring that law into
accordance with the
moral law, though he does, to be sure, acknowledge its moral
dimension. Politics,
according to Schopenhauer, or the "doctrine of state," is nothing more
or less than the
doctrine ol lawmaking— the "doctrine of legislation [Lehre von
der Gesetzgebung ]" ( Die
Welt a Is Wide und Vorstellung [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1993] I, §62).
ot state [Stcuitslehre],

as

Kant had argued against Hobbes,
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is

marking the transmon front
war
act founding the

German

to peace,

from the Franeo-Prnssian

War to the

legislative

state,

achieves the .same end which
has always motived the
legislation of social contractspreserving the individual.
Bu, ,n his account the
peace
treaty!hat resu, .and the
duties ,t es, ab, -shes^e
less a matterof
determining specific nghts
and obligations than of
establishing collective
control ov er the power of
language— through
the legislation of truth

world

:

a, leas, the

crudes'

St”

and theJegisiation of language also
gives the ffrst
un% ( er sP rac he giebt auch die
ersten Gesetze der WahrheitV
For
he contrast between truth and lie
arises here for the first time
the ^l^ uses
V
d deSlg atl0ns the words ln
order to make the unreal’appear
r^| j!h Sa S r( cxam
e
^
am n ch," when the proper designation for
P*
U Kbe precisely "poor." He misuses
this state would

la3“thtti’

’

>

’

fixed conventions through
arbitrary substitutions or even
reversals of names. If he does this
in a selftsh
and nioreover harmful manner, society
will cease to trust him and

wdl

thereby shut him out. (877-878,
81)

Nietzsche's presentation transforms the
logic of the social contract by displacing

foundational

moment

into the sphere of language.

12

its

In h.s account, language and legislation

are so thoroughly united that the act of
law-giving producing the social contract

is

translormed into an act of legislation which
establishes the linguistic conventions governing

On

the displacement of the contract into the
sphere of language, see H. A. Revburn

W U H E He nderks and 1 G Ta >'lor, Nietzsche (London: MacMillan and
Comnanrfg^
Q^ R
Company, 1948) 190.
Bernard Pautrat describes the character of this displaced
contract
w ith precision when he writes, "ce contrat social est un
'

-

.

i

contrat de langue" (Versions du
soled: figures et systeme de Nietzsche [Pans: Seuil,
1971], 221). See also Henning
Ottmann, Pfulosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1987) 1 14H? llke Nietzsche's Tragic Regime: Culture Aesthetics, and Political Education
(Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 144-146.
Nietzsche's displacement of the social contract into the sphere of
language can
easily be seen as a response to the first systematic text on
the relationship between language
’

,

and contracts:

Each of the topics Nietzsche's essay takes up— language,
and contractual agreements has its origins there, and each of
Nietzsche's treatments of these topics ought to be seen in the context of his critique
of
Plato's Cratylus.

—

linguistic legislation,

"Socratism."

63

y

S S'

8m,yme

b "ld1

.

-Placed and

^ Powcr

<>f

CKO social contract
is accord, ngly
'

Geminated

throughout socety's linguistic
conventions, endowing the
language of convention with
the authonty and
power associated with every
contract Ye,
1
c contractual character
of language's "fixed
conventions" is by no means
out
the

open— lar from
Once

it,

for

derived from nothing written

it is

the social contract

unacknowledged, and unconscious
form.
existence

w

down or consciously

displaced into the sphere
of language,

is

It is

neither

it

adopted

assumes an unwritten

drawn up nor

signed, yet

its

demonstrated whenever the
violators of convention are
subjected to the power
tch contracts have always
employed to insure their preservationpunishment. Whoever
is

violates the rules governing
the use of language

out" ol society. Expuls, on

is

is

expelled from the community
and "shut

necessary because "liars”this

is

these rule breakers- pose a
threat to the maintenance
of social

preservation of the "peace agreement."

suspending the war of all against

all,

When

the conventional term for

harmony and

the

they he, they break the peace
treaty

violate the contract a,

its

basis,

and endanger

life

itself.

The

real threat to life,

however, comes not from

liars.

Nietzsche points to a more

serious problem lodged within the
structure of social convention, and

becomes

the central task of the essay.

The difficulties involved

in

its

resolution

such a resolution arc

hardly betrayed by the simplicity with
which the problem can be staled: Social
convention
coni bets with the life of the individual,
and conventional language violates the
singularity
ol that hie.

Nietzsche locates the origin

the peculiar structure of legislation

structure

no act of

is

ol the conflict

which ends

and the contradictions

the helium

can do without:

A

legislator.

To

that

"something"

is

it

lacks something

be sure, a "peace agreement"

achieved, "but" the agreement "brings something
with

aberetwasmitsich ],” and

produces in

omnium contra mimes. That

unique, even unparalleled, for according to
his presentation,

legislation

it

it

is

[Dieser Friendesschluss bring!

neither willed nor legislated nor agreed

The
which it
pioblcm

significance ol this transformation is perhaps best measured
by the extent to
and hopelessly entangled chain of influence, placed the
ol society" and its practices at the center of
contemporary debates

has, through a vast

philosophy. To cite one of

in political

many

possible example, sec Claude Lefort's essay "The
Question ol Democracy" in Democracy and Political Theory, trans. David Maccy
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 9-20, esp. 11-12.
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leg, slated

tertns, ye, the

terms are no, thetr own them, and ye, legation
took place-",he legislatton
of language

ZSebU "g

truth [Gesetze

the language of
na
8 lions." At the origin of society,
then, there is
Everyone agrees to the

,d desi

'

"' 5

]

^

In ‘ h,S

- sovereign:

der Wahrheit]* and the
members of society

sovereignty. Yet the lack
of

human

It

gives the "laws of

accordingly lose their claim
to

legtslators

and absence of integral
individuals does no,
e law from achieving
the desired end of
preserving the life of the
individual Its
conventions are present, ve
through and through, for
the language of
convention is indeed
p event

t

contractual.

Although no one

everyone remains bound
so,

however,

at

to

legislated

its

laws,

its

everyone

it,

is

bound by

it.”'

And

as long as

preservative effects continue
to operate.

They do
a grave cost, for they
imprison man within a thoroughly
contingent and

accidental linguistic convention.
Indeed, they differ from the
"walls of prison

[GefOngnissvandenY (883, 86)
convention

form bu, not

However much

effect.

the language of

may appear to offer shelter to the individual

and respite from the threats of
others, its laws inevitably violate
the specificity of the individual,
imprison without charges
or

trail,

and render

the "peace agreement"
self-defeating.

"A Mobile Army"
anything characterizes social

II

life

according to Nietzsche's fable more than
the

peculiar structure of the legislative act
establishing

everyone

14

is

Nl

a party to the convention, no one

ZS
d
fz o?o ’ !^

its

linguistic

legislates

it;

conventions- though

though everyone agrees to

the

commented u Pon

this strange situation in "On the
Origin of
V6lker ^ are Sllent about the origin of language: they
could
noahmkVth
/
\
mai wlthout *•" See F^drich Nietzsche on Rhetoric
8
and
l
L^neuat ?-10.
0 For
F the
th original,
Language,
see Gesammelte Werke (Musarionausgabe), vol.
5, 469.
t

,
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Na

IOnS
’

F° r aa

altc ui P t lo

this

thinking see Daniel Breazeale's

XXX

of

passage to the role of language

comments

in his introduction to

in general in Nietzsche's

Philosophy and Truth

,

n On the Origin ol Language," "all earlier naive standpoints
[concerning the origin
language] are rejected" (210, 468). Among them Nietzsche

language

is

includes the theses that
the product of a "contract" or a "consensus"
(210, 468).
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v

ten™

of the convent, on, the

nevertheless bindtng-it

is

ten™ ate

not their own; though no,
a contract

,t

ls

the collect, ve forgetting
of each of these paradoxes.

ease, the pecul.ar role
of language in social
„fe

each

forgotten. The effects
of th,s forge,
ng
syrup, ontanc of the v.ctory
of "Socratism" ,„
Nietzsche's "eternal conn,
cl," nnpnson
an
w„h,n language's art.fices and
socety's convent.ons and
,s

m

reduce the .ntellect

the

same

state effected

by Eunp.des' rationalized
traged.es

in

to pree.se,

The Birth of Tragedy

"Slavery" (888, 90). Far
from setting one free, "truth,"
at leas, accord,
ng to N.etzsche,
lamously metaphor, cal description
of it, is more like an occupy,
ng force govenung a

conquered

territory.

17

The majority of N.etzsche's essay
°l thlS

"

trUth ’"

and

11

doeS 80

expectations, capable of
territory ruled

two operations

to

^ 'Eliminating how the

demonstrating the order,
ng ab.lity

leg, station

command, ng and organizmg society,

is

turning

mdmdual from

its

enslavement to

in an effort to realize this end:

this

new lorm of

"truth,"

all

into an occupied

more

press, ng task:

hand, his investigation into the

new mode of legislation and an

both essential to the resolution of the
social contract's

new can emerge until

legislation is laid bare along with
"truth’s" ability to
its

aga.ns,

occupying force. N.etzsche performs

On the one

contradictory structure; on the other hand,
nothmg

second task reaches

it

is,

the peace. This

carried out for the sake of
another, far

structure ol legislation leads to
the articulation of an entirely
entirely

of "truth"

by a mobile army which maintains
order and keeps

demonstration, however,
L, berating the

devoted

is

decisive

command and

moment when, having

the structure of

organize society. This

thoroughly reinscribed the problem

of legislation within a linguistic context
dominated by the question of

"truth’s" relationship

to rhetoric, Nietzsche gives a highly
rhetorical definition of "truth":

What then is truth? A mobile army [bewegliches Heer of
metaphors,
]
metonymies, and anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of
human relations
which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified,
transferred and
embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a nation
[Volk] to be
canonical and binding. Truths are illusions which we have
forgotten are
illusions; they are me taphors which have become
worn out and have been

A

politics ol truth"

set in

motion

Michel Foucault pursues this line of
by referring to "the importance of Nietzsche."
See Truth and Power" in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings
1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mcpham, and Kate Soper
(New
York: Pantheon, 1980), 133.
thinking, calling lor "a

new

is

here.

politics of truth"
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"Truth," Nietzsche tnsists,
ex.s,

is

rhetor, cal.

A

proper,

which can be contrasted with
an improper,

literal,

and "true" language docs
not

figurative,

and fictional language
constructed on Us foundation*
for these foundations
are themselves figurative/'
And thus
figurative foundation,
N.etzsche writes, exerts an
mfiuence over the nation. Its
metaphors
an metonymies become
"canonical and binding.”
"Tmth'-a mobile army of metaphors
of
metonymies— binds the nation together
with its figures. In the wake
of a total war, then,
language mobilizes its forces,
passing from one thing to
another, conquering the
territory

between them and establishing
martial law wherever
Ihc nation,

on the other hand,

is in

it

gc*s.

The peace

treaty at the basis of

turn dictated by the "laws
of truth." This agreement

binding, canonical, and contractual,
and

it

makes

is

rhetoric the foundation of the
nation."

yieizscne diuaien, 17 (1988) and
Anthoine Meijers and Martin Stineelin
"Konkordm/
den worthchen Abschriften und Ubemahmen
von Beispielen und Zitaten aus Gustav
e SP raCh A 1S KunSl Brombcr 1871
*" Nietzsches
g
in
rfber'w hhlh
H t Undf tLugC Im
aussei™oralisehen Sinne’," Nietzsche
-Studien 17 0988)
tt
K
Despite the obvious importance of Gerber's
work for Nietzsche, it is by no means clear that
is investigation into
rhetoric ought to be described as a decisive
"detour" from the issues
addressed in his earlier work. The problem of
rhetoric was already at the center of The
Birth of tragedy (see §8 on the role of
metaphor in tragedy) before Nietzsche had

Rh^vZesTln6

W

.

C

C

De touoTn 77^

e b

S

detour see Lacoue-Labarthe's influential essay
"The
7°?™?
of 1 hilosophy, 4-36. For a careful attempt

s
r-'
S object

"

"

the

"

;

to demonstrate how
N.r.,;/
Nietzsche
s adoption of Gerber s tropological
model of language is less a break or detour
han an extension of his earlier investigations into
the nature, origin, and development of
language, see Claudia Crawford's important work,
The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Theory
ofLanguage (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 199-220. Unfortunately,
Crawford
nowhere accounts lor Nietzsche's use of metaphor and analogy
in The Birth of Tragedy.
When these figures appear again in the Philosophenbuch and lectures on
rhetoric,
Crawford claims that Nietzsche has adopted them from Gerber's
tropological model of
language (215) in order to explain insights which he had arrived
at long ago.
1

For a discussion of the role of rhetoric in political theorists' presentations
of the
original contract F. R. Ankersmit's Aesthetic Politics. Political
Philosophy Beyond Pad
and Value (Stanlord: Stanford University Press, 1996). See particularly chapter

and Metaphor" (254-293) on the

role of rhetoric in Plato,
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5 "Politics
Hobbes, Rawls and others

Unde, these conditions,
rhetoric

power

is

of u mobile army.

Nietzsche

is

not,

however, the

1CClUrC C<>UrSC

dun
unnym

severe, gn, rhetoric
leg, slates, and
rhetoric retains

first to

°" anC

'

Cm rhCt° nC

c winter semester of
1872-73, he indieated

upon the sphere of
rhetorics power,

is,

its

a, the

P

’

how

,he

life

In

* the University of Basel

the

problem of rhetoric impinges
by reminding his students
of Anstotle,
acknowledgement of
dynamis "The cower
UCmrn u,
c
power [Kraft]
to discover and to make
operative that

polit.es

:

and impresses, with respect
rhetor, c,

“

recognize rhetoric's power
in politic*

all

same

to

each thing, a power which
Aristotle

time, the essence of
language.''”

very possibility of political

life

Of course, language

calls

also the

is

for Aristotle, yet he never
ela.ms that rhetor, e

is the essence
language, and he consistently
subordinates rhetoric to logic
and eth.es, even making it
<hc,r "offshoot" ,„ an
effort to render

<»l

it

insists

on the

rhetorical character ol

all

activity of the well-educated
political

known

useless to

demagogues.* Nietzsche, by

man."” But while

centrality of rhetoric to
political

life,

his lectures allude to the well-

and while they unite

fundamental determinations of the
essence of the human bcmg

g0n

l°

broach the possibility

,nto a peculiar species of
military troops.
<>f

"truth"

absolute.

might

Only

in

"On Truth and Lie

expansive claims. Indeed,

demagogues,

Aristotle's

that rhetor, c's tropes

Nor do they ever intimate

in this

in the

two

- zoo„ poUlikon and zoor,
might metamorphose

that the rhetorical core

more likea mobile army governing society

in fact be

contrast.

language and elevates rhetoric
to "the highest

than a philosophical

Extra-Moral Sense" docs Nietzsche make
these

essay he no longer attributes rhetoric's
power to

sophists, or well-educated political

men, figuring

it

instead as a political force

"Presentation of Ancient Rhetoric," 21.
Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1 Chapter 2 On
urr °nnding the dating of the course sec
the editor's introduction to
^
he
,< wUmc ‘md language, ix-xi.
For an account of the lecture course
hv
hl two
,
ic ol the
>
students who attended, sec Begegnungen mil
Nietzsche, Sander L
Gilman (Bonn: Bouvicr Vcrlag Herbert Grundmann,
1-1 12.
1985),

lt i

1

Rhetoric

,

Book

1,

Chapters

8, 2; Politics

"Presentation of Ancient Rhetoric," 3.
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a.

1

'

n

° Wn nght:

forgotten,

A m ° b,le a

and the moment

™ y ” Rhetonc

,t

is

'

s

*

to

mobilize

forces the

moment i, is

forgotten, language's
persuasive force beg, ns to
act „ kc an

army, secnnng the space
between words and

th.ngs,

legislating their proper
re, at, on and
or nr, her enforc,ng_a
peaceful, ordenng, and
finally deaden,
„g ,„fi ue „ce over

oxer ,ng
society.

Nietzsche's definit.on of "truth"
says as

metaphor and metonymy

to the

much when

problem of human

relations [menschlichen
Reiationen]

transferred

curiously links the themes
of

"What then
,„ short,

a

ts truth?

after long usage,

seem

A

mob.le

sum of human

which have teen poetically and
rhetoncally

and embellished, and wh.ch,

and binding." The human

,t

relations:

army of metaphors, metonymies,
and anthropomorphisms,

relations

its

intensified

to a nation to be canon,
cal

relations N.etzsehe spea
k s of here are not, a, leas, not
at firs, the

between human beings. Rather,
the problem of

"truth" is a

problem of human

relations because the quest,
on of "hath” has typically been
posed ,n temrs of the relation of
humans to things. That relation has
always involved a structure of
adequation or

correspondence between subjects and
objects, between words and the
world, between
thought and what ,s thought, or
between a perception and the perceived.
Yet each of these
relations

because

is,

its

Nietzsche claims, also inescapably
rhetorical. "Truth" cannot escape
rhetoric

structure of adequation or
correspondence depends

transference— from an object

to

upon the

possibility of a

a subject-and that possibility invariably
leads bade

to the

sphere ol rhetoric. For rhetonc's tropes
are created precisely through
transference-the
transference ol words from one object to
another in the creation a new, figurative
meaning.
Nietzsche's decisive innovation

lies in his

displacement of rhetonc's structure of

translerence into the sphere of "truth" where
the question
to

one another than

ol relating,

as in the other major section of the

Paul de

less

one of relating two objects

through the creation of a structure of correspondence
or

adequation, an object and a subject. In "On Truth
and Lie

,

is

in the

Extra-Moral Sense" as well

Philosophenbuch— Philosophy

in the Tragic

Age of the

Man offers an interpretation of the power of this "mobile army" in

Anthropomorphism and T rope

Columbia, 1984), 242-3.

On

in the Lyric,” in The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New
York:
Nietzsche's affinity with and return to sophism, see Reihard

Low, Nietzsche : Sophist und Erzieher. Philosophische Untersuchungen zutn
systematisehen Ort von Friedrich Nietzsches Denken (Weinheim: Acta
humaniora 1984)
esp. 34-40.
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C ASC 1C lnS SlS ‘ hal lhC
rhet0riCia" rC atCS thlngS
*°
than to other
Ob,
bjects:
L ”Th'
The sculptor of language
[SprachbiUnerV he writes, "designates
only the
relation of things to
man" (879, 82) .» And according
to his definition of
-truth
-,nob„e
army ol metaphors, metonymies,
and
'

'

,

-a

anthropomorphisms- -that relation

is first

of all

structured according to the
logic of metaphor: "The
sculptor of language designates
only the
relation ol things to man,
and for
'

expressing their relations he
lays hold of the boldest

metaphors."

No trope is better suited

to relate things to

man

than metaphor, for its
meaning
P CUSCly lhUl °‘ lranslcrc "“- Metaphors
transfer (meta-phora)
meaning from one place
to another; they ferry
(phora) meaning over (mem)
the space
‘

S

'

separating

unities.

But even here Nietzsche expands
the function

lor he lads to restrict the use
of

metaphor

the structure of metaphor across
the whole of
insists,

human

linguistic

traditionally attributed to
metaphor,

to simple transferences

His displacement of rhetoric
into the sphere of "truth"

two

between

linguistic unities.

results, then, in the
generalization of

experience. All experience, Nietzsche

involves a transference, an
Obenragung (879, 82), whether

in the

form of an

intuition, a perception, or a
25
cognition.

Nietzsche's definition of "truth”
does not, however, stop by identifying

metaphor: "What then
has
*

its

origin in

is

truth?

metaphor- the

he metaphor into a

A

i,

with

mobile army of metaphors |and| metonymies."
"Truth"

effect of a transference- but only
with the conversion of

metonymy-a source of transcendent causalily-is the

process of

See also Philosophy in the Tragic Age
of the Greeks, §11, and Nietzsche's
discussion in Presentation ol Ancient Rhetoric,"
23. Lacoue-Labarthc provides an
illuminating interpretation of this relation in "The
Detour," 23-4.
th s allciyti°n,

sec Alan Sehril t, Nietzsche and the Question
of Interpretation
Roullcdgc, 1990), 125-6. When Anne Tebertz- van Elst
claims that this
alteration violates the structure of metaphor as it has
been traditionally conceived, she is
cntnciy concct, but when she claims that it has no validity
by referring to the definition of
metaphor articulated by Max Black's Models and Metaphors: Studies
in language and
Philosophy she demonstrates an unwillingness to read
Nietzsche's text and the challenges
it poses to the Aristotelian concept
ol metaphor. Her insistent reliance upon the criteria of
Paul Ricoeur to explicate Nietzsche's text docs little to help
matters, because Nietzsche
docs not employ those criteria himscll. Sec Asthetik der Metaphor:
zurn Streit zwischen
Philosophie and Rhetorik bei Friedrich Nietzsche (Frciburg/Munchcn: Vcrlag Karl
Albcr
1994), 144.

M York:
(New
,

J,

’

,
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r

origination completed.”

CSSd '

"

m0de ° f

The clarity of this two

preSental,on that

~

,

11

step process has been
so obscured by the

has gone entirely
unnoticed, for while Nietzsche
gives

°rdS hiCh haVe teen C ° nVerted
,r
-

lnl °

*«-• -cepts by means
of

° f meta Phor a "d metonymy
in his
0 structural lln ui stics,
partieularlv
8
Roman Jakobson on the foundallonal
fo^m'S
role ^ of metaphor and
metonymy in language See "Two a
of t
Two Types of Aphasie
Disturbances,"
°f
Hague: Mouton, 1956). Paul de
(The
Man hts^so draw^atmm^T^
a attentl on to Nietzsche's
twentieth-century linguistics bv nointino to r
anticipation
of
)
definition of "true" language^
the innuential work of

'

i

anticipation of Saussure's lineuNrirc
language: "the insistent

C
in

^

M.ft

thaS^oe e»

110

forward to Saussure's principle that iano.?
Life [New York: Oxford Unnersut
discussion of metaphor and metonvmv
,n

u

L ^ nc

2 T0). Ronald

Hayman

sees an

P res entatlon of lhe structure of
u
co nnect tbe
subject to the object
S

points

,

TSf'l^He
«

’

-

>'

,

which Saussunan
of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson -^mhh Vr^h h

n “"
A Critical
"°!
r
n Lefebvre
desenbes Nietzsche's
tW ° flgurcs of s eech
P
f
alan ua « e < see Lite Production
su b

f
^
T?

T,

W^che:

|

S

ssure s view of language as a
self-contained system or structure"
StmCtUre " a mere conven tion" he is
certainly cometfbut to in er from
ti ?K?
u
ny system or structure..., mposes stability upon
8 " 1 ”! 111
115 constitutive elements
7.
its'^tati^fementeV
( 141) overlooks the decisive
role which he attributes to metaphor
P
metonymy in structuring a society's linguistic
conventions and forms of thinking
sl "ll ‘ ar')' "'gnored the positive
aspects of the rale of
rastom imdlaw"
d law ( 41 iff
n so far as they— like Saussunan linguistics—
l
)
stabilize isolated
\
and tm hS by re ating them to one ano ther, he
forgets that Nietzsche always rejects
tm COntm ° mnes in faVOr of the stablllt offered by
social and cultural life,
y
etzsche neithei rejects custom nor law, only
their petrification into something like
U CtU a
or the naive attem Pt to avoid them altogether.
In "Nietzsche and
[ ^, f
ff fl
t
he Idea ol
Metaphor,
after giving an elucidation of the role of
language in "On Truth and
Lie in the Extra- Moral Sense," Stern again asserts
that Nietzsche is fundamentally hostile
to and uninterested in the stabilizing effect
of rules, laws, and institutions, and then
generalizes these phenomena under " the sphere
of association" (72). As ought to be clear
by now, "On Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense" is nothing
if not an extended
investigation into how people associate with one another
once war is brought to an end and
a peace agreement formulated. Finally, since Stem is unable
to see the relationship between
Nietzsche's investigations into rhetoric and twentieth-century
linguistics, it ought to be
noted that he is not helped by his inability to read Nietzsche's
definition of "truth."
Although he quotes it in "Nietzsche and the Idea of Metaphor"
(70) and in his Nietzsche
( 136), as well as in his book with M. S. Silk,
Nietzsche on Tragedy ([New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1984], 339), in each case that definition- "a mobile army of
metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms"— is truncated to one and the same
,

unib

^

,

Uing

th

?

1

^d

nan

•

^

?

f

,

-

nIwIJT °"T

m

element— metaphor. The
comment.

role of

metonymy simply drops out without explanation or
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metonymy— ihc "leaf,"

"ho„e st y"- h ,,s antipathy
towards

abstract, theoretical

argumentation prevents him from
tdentifying those examp,
es as presentations
of the
metonymic production of "truth."
He simply gives a definition
of "truth" and proceeds
g. vc examples. It ,s a
strategy which has led
inteipreters of the essay to
fad to

between

to

differentiate

the various

moments involved

in the creation of
"truth," and this failure
has in turn
resulted in a simple conllation
of "truth" with figurative
discourse. The effect has
been a
la, lure to recognize
Nietzsche's efforts to think
the problem of "truth"
and the organization
ol a society's discursive
practices together, and this
failure has led to a concomitant

depohttdzation of the essay.
in h,s lectures

examples of
exemplify

If,

however, one refers to Nietzsche's
definition of metonymy

on ancient rhelonc-"the

substitution of cause and effect"-,
hen the essay's

the production of "true"
concepts

the production of a causal

is

become

perfectly clear. 21

power which, Nietzsche

will

And what

go on

they

to argue, exerts

i^elf at the very core of social
relations:

e"i?“

pl a rise ® f rom lhe “paling
of the non-equatable [Gleichselzen
,
,
<ks Nicht-Gleichen],
Just as it is certain that one leaf
is never totally the
same as another, so it is certain that the
concept "leaf" is fomal by
arbitrarily discarding these
individual differences and by
forgetting the
distinguishing aspects. This awakens
the
.

idea

to the eaves, there exists in
nature the "leaf":

|

W

Vorstellu

The

\

tha t in addition

prim3foL wfoZ
^

VeS WCrC pCrlla S woven
“ 1’'
P
mcaTurrd colored, curled,
i^
measured,
and painted-but by incompetent hands
so that
no specimen has turned out to be a
correct, trustworthy, and faithful
likeness of the primordial form. We
call a person "honest," and then
ask
why has this person behaved so honestly today?"
Our usual answer is, "on
account of his honesty." Honesty! This in turn
means that the leaf is the
Ca s ®
the lea e We
nothing whatsoever about an essential quality
!J
called
honesty y J;
But we do know of countless individualized and
consequently unequal actions which we equate by
omitting the aspects in
u hich they are unequal and which we now designate
bezeichnen as

^'7

l

?

.

^hed,

:

[

]

honest" actions. Finally we formulate from them
a qualitas occulta which
has the name "honesty." ( 880 83
)
,

No trope

better demonstrates the similarity

between the rhetorical core of

and a mobile army than metonymy, because none invents
power so
rhetoric mobilizes

its

easily as

it

"truth"

does.

When

forces individual differences are arbitrarily discarded, things
which

Piesentation ol Ancient Rhetoric," 59 For a useful attempt to interpret
Nietzsche's
examples by referring them back to his "Presentation of Ancient Rhetoric" sec Wayne
Klein's Nietzsche ami the Promise of Philosophy (Albany: State University
of New York
1997 ), 56 - 95
.

"
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are noc

"

equate with one another are equated

m8 “

8 SSPeCLS ° f enl " ICS arC entire
*

h brings things
wh,ch
into being

work

in

and subsumed under the
same concept

gotten, and

like a divine legisiator.

So powerfu,

such creations, so easily are
"we" persuaded by

ai together

lad to notice our

own

role

a transcendent
,s

power ,s

the nrobiie

ul

created

army

a,

impressive forces, that "we"

its

m this annihilation of difference.

If "truth's"

army secures
peacel

the

mobile

the space between
concepts and things and
legislates the laws which
intercourse of society possible,
then this achievement is

make

Ihe

accomplished through the

total

mobilization of every

member of society ,n a military campaign

which absolutely

eliminates difference. Under
the influence of rhetoric's
power, then, "we" equate things
which are not equal, "we" eliminate
the space of difference lying
between things, and "we"
produce the powerful abstractions
attributed with the power of
causality -the "honesty"
Which causes one to be honest, "the
leaf" which

cremes individual leaves.

which expresses

then,

abstractions,

and

it is

itself in the relations

of exchange involved

the activity of this "we"
-unconscious and

I, is

this

in the creation

"we"

of these

unacknowledged-which

causes Nietzsche to in turn eharactenze
these relations as "human relations"
in his definition
ol "truth”- "human relations
which have

been poetically and rhetorically

transferred

and embellished."

in the creation ol abstract

Intensification, transference,

powers which humans

intensified,

and embellishment, then,

result

relate to as esoteric objects with a
qualitas

occulta (occult quality). These esoteric
powers are concepts which have been elevated
by

means of

rhetoric to a primordial form -Nietzsche's
target here, as always,

Platonism— whose power
being.
itself

It is

even

at

work

rests solely

in Kant's

on the

rhetorical operation

is

which brought them

"mysterious X" (879, 83), the unfathomable thing

beyond human understanding, figured as an

into
in

abstract source of causality behind the

world of appearances.

Once Nietzsche
is in

has tracked

a position to begin tracing

locate.

its

Kant s mysterious X," no

down

effects

the origin of this powerful source of causality, he

on

social

life.

And

less than the qualitas occulta,

society with certain mystery' rites and ritualistic practices.

may

be around which they are organized, those

calls social "convention"

these effects are not difficult to

rites

form the basis of a

However

secretive the

secret

power

and practices- what Nietzsche simple

— have been under constant discussion throughout modernity.
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They origmate

r

P
,,

7aan

tru t

.

its

in the conclusion of
the

N etZSChe S genea '°
'

'

^

8y th£Se dlSCUrS,VC

iC,n

spells out,

‘

he rUeS ° f

!

“ng .he

'

eeping ones prom,
se-consist

I: 7
Uth

ing t0

bellum omnium contra
omnes and the establishment

in

using the "valid

delations" (877-878

themselves, as Nietzsche,
definition

canonical and binding"—
a matter of law, indeed, of
canon law and

relig.ous authority. Concepts
then, despite, or rather,
because of their anthropomorphic

ongm, achieve

a heavenly authonty
winch no people can do without
"Jus, as the Romans
and Etruscans cut up the heavens
with ng,d mathematical
tines and confined a
god within
each ol the spaces thereby
delimited, as within a templum,
so too does every people have
a
similarly mathematically
d.v.ded conceptual heaven
above themselves and henceforth
understands by the demand of
"truth” that each conceptual
god be sough, only in Us
sphere (882, 85). Just as the
Romans and Etruscans turned the heavens
into a petrified
series of divis.ons, each serving
as a temple for the worsh.p
of a divine power, so too does
every people live under a transcendent
system of conceptual div.sions whose
divine
authority insures that those divisions
are respected, maintained, and
reinforced by
practices.

Metonymic

substitutions produce a conceptual
heaven of abstractions

its

whose

universality and transcendental validity
guide rational action with the force of
an imperative

within a highly differentiated hierarchy
of social relations. "As a

Nietzsche writes,

'rational' being,"

man

places his acting under the domination
of abstractions [Herrschaft of
Abstractionen ]: He no longer tolerates being
carried away by sudden
impressions, by intuitions [Anschauungen he
universalizes
] ;
[verallgenieinert] all these impressions first
into less colored, cooler
concepts, in order to bind the course of his life
and acting to them.

Everything which makes

man

stand out against the animal depends upon
metaphor into a schema, thus, to
dissolve an image into a concept; something is
possible, namely, in the
legion ol those schemata which would never succeed
under
this ability to volatilize the intuitive

the intuitive

lirst

impressions:

The

constructing [aujzubauen] of a pyramidal order
according to castes and degrees [Kasten und Graden], the creating
of a
world ol laws, privileges, subordinations, boundary determinations
[Gran z best immungen J which now confronts that other intuitive

new

world of
impressions as the more solid, more universal, better known, more
human, and therefore as regulating and imperative \Festere, Allgemeinere,
Bekanntere, Meuschlichere und daher als das Regulirende und
Imperativische], (881-2, 84)
,

lirst
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Just as Nietzsche had
argued in The liirih

V6d

a

l

".

71

‘

'

";

°

8

'

lbrmali0n

;,C

'° 81Cal

hC

<0

Schcmatism

he

’

Age of the Greeks that

-was prtxiuccd

..II

ofira^iy that

*

"the

the dead, ol tragedy

metaphors ,„to the ralmna,

writ

again argue ,n Philosophy
in ,!„
'

ing"

<,emp

by Parmenides's

summation of the imagination ,0 the task
ol
sehcmttU/.ing reality, so ,00
does he insist in "On Truth
and
in the :xtra-Moral Sense"
on the dectsive importance
ol the shift from a
metaphoric and intuitive mode of
cogni,
to
,

one which

is

entirely schematic.*

metonymic concept,

10

by means

ol

is

a

slut

metonymy. Tins

,

I

The movement from metaphor

from the singular and concrete

sa me shin characterizes the

.nchv, duals to the peace of
society.

The structure ol

,0

schema,

,0 the universal

movement

that society

front

is

I

ron, the

metaphor

and abstract

war of

produced by the

transformation of metaphors into
universally valid and abstract

concepts

schemata- -which guide practical

life

and

what oughl

tell

to

determine, in other words, a socicly's
"moral sense," lor they provide
iinperulives governing

its

practices.

social structure,

it

will, the

Following these imperatives and using the
valid

designations for things- the concepts
demanded
tin-

be done. They

Ivy

the

law-insures

the reproduction ol

and just as those concepts impose
themselves from on high thanks to

Ihc hierarchical relationship

which Ihcy have

so too

one of hierarchical relations- "a pyramidal
order according

,s

ll,

at social structure

will,

ll,

c world of the individual and concrete,
to

caslcs and degrees,” a "world of laws,
privileges, subordinations, boundary

determinations."

The unspoken

contract al die basis of society exemplifies

one’s sense of duly to Ihc "laws of truth"

mu.

law', ol

being passionate about

il

lx-

a feeling,

and passive towards

ihc pathological eorcol Ihc moral law
governing society.

nothing

oilier than its

We still

do

then, in

feeling the law’s imperatives and carrying ihcm

In Ihc end. Nietzsche's essay discloses
'Truth' lo

Icclmg the

itself,

it,

and the

possibility of

finally brings lo light

The pathos of a society's ethos

"moral sense":

not

know where the drive to truth Trieh zur Wahr licit] comes
we have only heard about the duty Verpflichtwig\ to be
|

Irom: For so far

|

which society poses in order lo exist; that is, to use the usual
metaphors or expressed morally: he duly lo lie aeeording to lixcd
truthful

I

Ihc

Kirill

oj tragedy, § 14; Philosophy in the Tragic

Marianne Cowan (Chicago, Gateway: 1962), §11.
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Wahrheit]. Being
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utility of the truth.
(881,
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as

Whlch

Gefiihl
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From

out of the
exc
lude,
mankind
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^ l ^ c x cncrability, reliability, and

a
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\/i

84)

Once

,

|

therefo
*ereforl
ore
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oWiLd tothe^T^
fee lng fa
[An dem
rf
l

verpflichtet zu sein 1 to des Pn.t,
as "cold," a third as
"mute ^ a mira
[eine moralische auf
Wahrheit sich
contrast with the

all

Hc

the rhetorical origins
of "truth" are forgotten, so
too

is the sensuous,
persuasive power of rhetoric's
figures. But neither that
power nor the pathos it produces
cease to exist. Rather, "truth's"
pathos makes itself felt in
duty-the duty to "truth » to
designate one thing as "red" and
another as "cold," yet another
as "mute." Without
anyone's conscious knowledge,
then, "truth's" rhetorical
core exerts a persuasive power
in
the lorm of * feeling
the feeling which arises
from contrasting oneself with the
liar "who

—

no one

trusts,

who

all

exclude.- Feeling

"moral" sense, making

it

constitutes the sensuous nature
of Nietzsche's

a serous communis, a commonality
of sense, and a contractual

agreement of sense. And the overriding
sense of

membership within

society and therefore one's

this feeling is

self. It

makes

fear- fear of losing one's

telling the "truth"

imperative and reduces the creative
capacities of the imagination to a
yet precisely because self-preservation

members simultaneously

amounts

sacnfice themselves to

state

an

of passivity.

to preserving a "fixed convention,"
it.

it

of any relation to the singularity of the lives

preserve. Preservation, then, ends up preserving
what

once

it is

reduced to an abstract universal, and the

its

Telling the "truth," then, or lying "in the

designated manner," preserves convention,
but the fixity of that convention and
universal validity punfies

And

total

is left

it

ought

its

to

over of the individual's

life

elimination of the individual, the

unequal, and the absolutely different produces only
one thing— ashes. Just as Nietzsche

had attacked

Roman culture in The Birth of Tragedy for the

so too does he cite

its

burial practices for the

leveling effects

exemplary way

in

it

had on

life,

which they demonstrate

On the pathos ol rhetoric and the persuasiveness of all language see "Presentation
Ancient Rhetoric" ( 13 1, 21-2) and the short essav written for the
Philosophenbuch "On
the Pathos of Truth," (in Philosophy and Truth, 61-66).
ol
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Pyram
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an

oundary determinations

dal ord -" °f wastes,
privileges, subordinations

produced by fixing the
conceptual relations govern,
ng social
anons: -The great structure
lBm] of concept d, splays the
ng,d regular, of a Ronran
ty
columbarium" (882, 85). The
stntcture of society may
take the form of a
pyram.d, but what
PreSen,eS d0es n °‘ even atta,n
the suhstantiality
re

of the mumm.fied corpse.
Rather, the

ashes of the dead are

all that is

trace ol individuality has

stored in the

been destroyed.

Roman columbanum,

ashes from whieh every

30

The True Lie
Nietzsche's investigation into
the linguistic structure of
social convention d.splaces
Ihe logic ol the social contract
into the sphere of language.
By investigating the unspoken,
unwritten, and unconscious
contract wh,ch results from this
d.splacement, he cuts the

Gordian knot responsible

for the nation's aporetic
character-the structure of leg, slat, on at

the basis of a soaety's linguistic
conventions.
this

problem by demonstrating how socal

While

life fails to

the first section of the essay
discloses

preserve the

l.fe

of the individual and

even promotes a form of living death,
the essay's second section
attempts to resolve, or at
least respond to, the social
contract's contradictory and aporetic
structure. For that
contract- unspoken, unwritten, and entirely
unconscious- is aporetic, and the effects of
that

apona reverberate throughout

peace agreement
the

is

required to preserve the

war of all against

governing

its

the totality of social

all,

life

life.

An

impasse anses because a

of the individual from the threats posed by

yet the terms stipulated by that agreement
and the practices

conventions expunge every trace of individuality
from individual expenence.

This apona, an apona which no society, no contract,
and no convention can avoid, always
places the social totality and
the specificity

universally valid linguistic practices in violent conflict
with

its

and singularity of everything

practices ought to comprehend.

It is itself

that society

ought to preserve and

all that

those

a manifestation of the eternal conflict between the

advocates of reason and "truth" and the practitioners of a rhetoric
no longer governed by

philosophy

On

s theories.

So long

as that conflict

the metaphors of the

and Metaphor,

trans.

is

decided

in

favor of the rule of reason, a

pyramid and columbanum, see Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche

Duncan Large

(Stanford: Stanford University, 1993
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),

66-7.

legislative structure is
preserved

which insures the predictable,
continuous, and mechanical
SU •sumption of particular
subjects and objects
under a universally valid social

convention— a

national "style" "binding
for

all."

Resolving, or at least
responding to tins contradictory
state of affairs
possible ,1 a middle ground
can be found, a space lying
between pure

mdiv, duality.

A

is

only

universality and pure

middle ground would

between them, then

at least the

.serve as, if not the

mediator ending the conflict

medium

bringing them into contact
with one another Only
on th,s condition would the
inadequacy, incotrectness, and
lack of correspondence
between
these two poles be resolved,
and only then would the
contract and the convention
,t
SUPP° nS U " '" ' hCir PU P0SC: Prcscrv
'"« th c individual. But ,n order to
achieve that end
'

'

the inadequacy, incorrectness,
linguistic
I

and lack of correspondence between
the socially sanctioned

conventions and the objects they
attempt to grasp must

ndeed, Nietzsche places

all

first

be remembered.

of his hopes on the possibility
of remembering what has been

forgotten, insisting that the only
thing needed for the discoveiy
of a passage way through
the aporctic impasse is an act
of remembering-remembering the
inadequacy,

incorrectness, and lack of correspondence
between the socially sanctioned linguistic

conventions and the objects they attempt

remember

that "truth" is

to grasp. All that is needed, in
other

words,

is

to

a matter of adequacy, correctness, and
correspondence, an

adequacy, correctness, and correspondence
between a subject and an object, between
thought and the world, between a concept
and what it designates, between a perception
and
the perceived.

Remembering

"truth"

then- what

its

structure

demands and

requires— recalls something forgotten: The space
between each of these

which thwarts
to the other, a
its

the certainly of every attempt to pass
correctly

relations, a space

from one side of

the relation

space which only rhetoric— a rhetoric no longer
governed by philosophy and

values— is able

11

to cross.

And

passing from one side to the other

passing a law, lor the laws

ol "truth" arc

between words and

Remembering

things.

is

tantamount

to

established by securing and colonizing the space
this space,

remembering

the space

between

he problem ol anamnesis had already been broached in a letter to Paul
Dcusscn
several years earlier. There Nietzsche insists that anamnesis is the only
basis of "the correct
philosophy ol every singular being \I)ie rechte Philosophie jedes Einzelnen\."
Sec Briefe
III, SI (December 19, 1869).
I
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su Jects and objects,
between though, and the
world, between a concept
and wha, „
estgnates between a
perception and the perce,
ved-rcmembenng each of these spaces
each of w ,ch must be crossed
ade q ua,e, y and co„ec, ly
,f a "true"
correspondence
,s

"shed between them,

o

c eg, slat, ve act. Just
as the

m,

m

recalls a certatn

‘

mnelveuy

e

middle sphere, and

this

to

'be

sphere „es at the center

whole of The Birth of Tragedy
turned upon a "world of

the

(§24, §8, wherejust.ee ruled, so
too does N.etzschc recall
a certain
° SPhCre ln "° n TrUlh and
Lie ln the Extra-Moral
Sense"
order to resolve the

m

inadequacy

and the lnjustice-of the

social contract-

eaUn sub ect

l

fkUnstlerisch schlfendls
^
J
‘l" security,
doTmanlhJeT^v
llve in an repose,
y
and consistency.

If but for an instant
uld escape lrom the prison
walls [Gefdngnisswdnden] of
this faith his
self consciousness" would
be immediately destroyed. It is
even
adiTtoU
thing [or him to admit to himself
that the insect or the bird
perceives an
enurely different world from the
one that man does, and thm the
question of
w hich of these perceptions of the world
is the more correct
[richdgen] one is
quite senseless, f or this would
have to have been decided previously
y in
accordance with the criterion of the
correct perception, which means in
accordance with a criterion which is not
available But in any case it seems
to me that "correct perception"which would
.

cc

,

.

mean

"the adequate
expression of an object in the subject"
-is a contradictory impossibility For
between two absolutely different spheres
such as subject and object there is
( OI rCC n
S no ex re ssion, but at most
an aesthetic relation
P
!
u° i /
[asthetisches Verhalten
]: I mean a suggestive transference,
a stammering
translation into a completely foreign
language [eine andeutende
Ubertragung, eine nachstammelnde Ubersetzung
in eine ganz fremde
prac he] .To that end, in any case, a freely

f

’

.

poeticizing and freely inventive
middle sphere and middle power [einerfrei dichtende
und frei erfmdenden

Mittel-Sphdre und Mittelkraft]

No passage
contract

s

in Nietzsche's

is

required. (884, 86) 32

essay more clearly presents the origin of the social

contradictory and aporetic structure, and no passage
identifies the source of the

contract's failure so precisely: "Contradictory
impossibility."

It is

impossible, indeed,

Michel Foucault, working from somewhat different premises, makes
this middle
sphere the object ol his research in The Order
of Things (trans. unidentified collective
[New York: Vintage, 1973]). The text ends by returning to Nietzsche and the problem
of
language (382-387), and it begins by announcing the object of study: a
"middle region
which liberates order itself" (xxi)— the much discussed episterne investigated by
"archaeology."
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contradictory to

and object for

aUempf to overcoming

,Hc space

that space, Nietzsche
insists, is

which „cs between the spheres
of su bj ee,
,

of abso lu ,e differed

"be.wee

absolutely dtlferent spheres
[zwe i absolu, versckieUenen
SpUdren] snch as subject and

O tject
‘

"

k ICntC

no causality, no correctness,
no expression." And

yet,

even

if

absolute

'

place

am

there is

Unbridgeable

throu 8h

'

the lime. Nietzsche even
has a

all

,1 ,s

,S

nevertheless takes place.
Indeed

It

name

takes

lor the ability capable
of bridging the spheres

by no means an unconventional
one. Following a

tradition at leasl as old as

Aristotle's thcoiy of the
imagination (,*,«„,,») as an
intermediary

world

it

between the sensible

ol

perception and the -supersensible
world of thought, the same
tradition Kant takes
tip when he places the
imagination Wnbildungskraft) a,
the center of his critical
philosophy
as the I acuity mediating
between sensibility and understanding,
Nietzsche locates the ability
to bridge absolute difference
in something not unlike
the imagination. And like
that
trad, 1, on,

he places

the middle, as a "middle

it

power” capable of bridging the gap

between the empirical, sensuous
world of objects and

the subjective

understanding, and concepts.” But he
radically breaks with tradition

world of thought,

when he frees

tins

middle power" Irom ihc production and
reproduction of abstract

concepts— schemata— created

in

order to subsume the world of objects
under universally

binding categories. Indeed, once he has
broken with tradition, he no longer uses the
name
he inherited from Kanl-thc imaginationto designate this "primordial faculty."
Instead

Nietzsche returns
the "imagination"

Kants universally

that faculty to its "primordial"
status as "fantasy [Pfumtasie]”
is

demoted

valid

to the level of "fantasy,"

schemata nor docs

it

subsume

it

and once

neither functions as a producer of

particular objects under those

11
Nietzsche and the Idea ol Metaphor," J. P. Stern draws attention
to this
intermediary between two modes of thinking"
(79), one oriented towards the abstract and
general, the other towards the individual and particular,
but he fails to sec its affinities with
the Kantian imagination (sec also Stern's similar
comments in Nietzsche, 145), le goes on
to praise it as Nietzsche's "greatest achievement" (SO)
and a much needed challenge to "the
absurd dichotomy ol 'scientific versus 'imaginative,' or again the
antithesis between
*

H

.

I

'concept'

and 'metaphor',

Nietzsche ailed to link
I

'abstract'

this greatest

and 'concrete'" (80-81). But when he suggests that
of achievements to the "the sphere of association" out

°f h' s "disdain" lor that sphere, he fails to

from an investigation

ol the role

remember

that Nietzsche derives these insights

which language plays

80

in social

convention (80).

schemata.""

Once absolute difference

between the spheres
entue y

tfferent

is

recalled

and a correct and adequate
passageway

no longer guaranteed
by

is

mode

ol relation

the law.

subsumption g.vcs way

an

to

and a new form of
legislation. That relation

is no longer
correctness or adequation
of the relation between
different spheres for the
question can no longer be
answered with any certain,,
„ cannot, Nietzsche wr,,, be
ectded, because the
"criterion" needed to
decide the correctness or
incorrectness of the
re anon between the
spheres does no, exist. The
mere existence of a convention,
on the
ca er hand, "guarantees
absolutely nothtng about
its necessity and
exelusivejustificahon

Huesuon

o, the

•

'

'

and he so thoroughly
problematized, "On Truth and
Lie

in the Extra-Moral Sense"
iurns
tnto an essay not supply
"on" (Uber) the d, stine,
ion I*, ween "truth" and
"he" and the act of
legislation establishing it In
the end, the essay winds
up in the space between them
or as
the first word
the essay's title indicates,
"over" (Uher) them. And the

moment that

opposition

,s

transcended, the essay

the moral .operative
,

Nietzsche finds a

it

no longer bound to the law which

is

imposes. A, this moment, the
most decisive

way of eluding

the law

moment

Whereas

legislated in that fabulous

it

and

,n the essay,

and entering into the sphere of the
"extra-moral

With the discovery of this undecidable,
"extra-moral" sphere, an
ol legislation takes over.

legislated

entirely

"

new form

the "true" terms of the social
convention had been

moment after the

war, a

moment dunng which

language alone
spoke, and while "truth's” laws
dictated from then on the continuous
repetition of that act
ol legislation

whenever language was

used, every use of language which
takes place after

Nietzsche’s discovery of an "extra-moral"
sphere
inability to insure

is

forced to respond to the absolute

a correspondence between words and
things. From now on, every use of

34

d
hat Niet che s essa transforms Kantian
P
y
philosophy by
h rc f?u
ph
the tianscendental and translating it into
g
the
terms
of rhetoric,
Ph
\
T
J
hilippe Laeoue-Labarthe
("The Detour," 25) and, to a lesser extent, Arthur
Dan to
Nietzsche as I hilosopher [New York: MacMillan,
1967], 4()) both point to this
ransf ormation. But neither ol them
notices Nietzsche's engagement with the lynch
pin of
the Kantian system— the imagination.
This turn to imagination anticipates the work of two
ol Kant s best readers, Martin Heidegger
and Jean-Luc Nancy, both of whom discover a
certain rcedom in the space it occupies. See
Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press 1990) and
Nancy's The Experience of Freedom trans. Bridget McDonald
(Stanford:’sianlord
University Press, 1993)

f

histnnt-iy.no .ho
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,

anguagc a lmc d

a,

a thing must

itself

invoke a certain legislative
power, a power which

Played no conseious role in
the legislative ac,
founding society. That

poct'cm 8 and
faculty"

an

Ircely inventive"-, ies

once the absolute

coat, on

o,

the creative abilit.es
of the fantasy.

recognized as the means for
br.dg.ng the

,s

d.f lercnce

between them

is

ty ol

each and every experience,

original experience [einmalige

d, stance

way

Once

th.s

between subjects and objects

acknowledged, then

a relat.onsh.p of
correspondence g.ves

o the singular.

power- "freely

the mechanical

to the creat.ve attempt
to correspond

to "the singular

and entirely individual

gam und gar Mividualmrle Vrerkbniss ]"

(879 83) of
every intuition. Rather than
imposing a universal concept
on a particular intuition in order
1° disclose „s significance,
leg, slat, on now proceeds
from the pan.cular to the
universal,
and proceeding in this direction,
,1 is now "guided
by intuitions rather than concepts"

W). Lacking

(888.
the certainly of adequation
and unable to appeal to convention
with any sort of

"justification,"

one now "speaks

in

nothing but forbidden [verbotenen]
metaphors and

unheard-of combinations of concepts
BegriffifUgungen ]
[,

in order at least to

in

correspond

creatively [schopferisch zu
entsprechen] to the impression of the
powerful present intuition
through the shattering and mocking
[Zertriimmern and Verhohnen] of the old
conceptual
limits [Begrijfsschmnkenr
(889, 90).“ Such shattering and mocking
brings the

correspondence theory of

truth to

an end. Nietzsche replaces

it

with a

call "to

correspond

creatively" to the singular and
incomparable character of every experience
by using

language

in

new,

fantastic,

ways. Using language anew, using language
creatively,

requires the powers ol the fantasy to be
brought into play and the irreducible space
of

freedom between words and things

With
capable

of

this recollection,

however, comes something frightening- legislative
powers

opposing the rule of an

laws of an untruthful

mode

reeallcd.

irrational

form of reason just as

easily as they

mock

the

of "truth." Having already discovered the "frightful powers

J. Hillis Miller rightly identifies
these "forbidden metaphors and unheard-of
combinations of concepts" as examples of the "abusive" rhetorical figure
known as
catachresis. See "Dismembering and Disrcmcmbcring in
Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lie in a
Nonmoral Sense 45, 47, 49. For the signilieanec of catachresis in relationship
to
philosophical theories of rhetoric sec the essay by Jacques Derrida which lakes
"On Truth
and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" as its point of departure— "White Mythology
Metaphor
in the Text of Philosophy," in Margins
of Philosophy.
1
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„

\furchlbareMdchte}' of ihc fantasy
and the ungovernable
sphere of absolute difference
PULS ' hCm nl°
P ay
"«>PP- scientific tnith with completely other

"

ypes ol

T

'

truths'

'

[ganzandersgeanete WahrheUenT
(886.
'

under the

command of "truth's”

mobile army, these

occupy, g forces, in order
to accomplish
'

° r,C and SPCak

ln

"

88). Rather than

working

'"truths'" free society
front its

this liberating end,
ihey

reinvoke the power of

f0rb ddCn meta hors
*>d uaheard of combinations
P
of concepts
'

"

Whereas

the origi na^ act of
legislation led to an agreement
over "truth" wh.ch no one
leg, slated but all agreed
to, Nietzsche's
discovery, or better, h,s
recollection, of those

Inghilul powers capable of
opposing the conventional
understand, ng of "truth
leg, slat, vc

power back

into the hands of society's

"

puts the

members, enabling them, indeed
forcing

them, to rewnte Ihc contract
on their own. Far from being
an act of willful and subjective
nominalism, such legislation is a
unique and necessary attempt to
correspond creatively

to

the singularity of experience

the unique

decsion-not

doing justice to

w„h a freely enacted decision. Only the
creative response and

the use of hardened

that singularity.

And farfrom

and congealed metaphors-has any
chance of
simply replacing one convention with

another, the '"truths'" produced by
Nietzsche's legislators are entirely
unconventional. For
they arc nether simply "true" nor
simply "lies." They arc, rather, true lies,
what Nietzsche
variously rclcrs to throughout the

Philosophenbuch as the "necessary-lie" Noth-LUge ]
[.

and the

"frcc-lic

[f>«-tage]"»These

artistic character.

And

and affirm

their

to the extent that they arc artful,
Nietzsche insists, they are a unique

and unprecedented lorm of

KSA

lies call attention to their artifice

"truthful illusion," for "art treats illusion

VII, 622. See also Brcazcalc, 96-7.
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as

illusion: therefore

it

docs not wish to deceive;
,S

because

,t

it

« true

.

" '7

If this

form of

remembers absolute difference
and

contract and social convent,
on. indeed,

enurely md.vtdual," and

it

remembers

,«

'"truth"'

does justice to singularity
'

al, that

remembers

it

remains foreign to any social

the fore.gner, "the
singular and

that sueh singularity

always speaks

in

language" (884, 86).

a "foreign

Nietzsche's essay ends by
opening up a passageway for
a "completely foreign
language" and for everyth, ng
that remains fote.gn to
a contract. By ending
here, he can',
help but introduce a certain
disorder into the "peace" of
soe.al life, for every
opening of the
socal contract breaks with its
conventions by refusing to be
governed by the deaden,
ng
power of „s laws. And ye. this
opening cannot do without those
conventions and laws
ether. Just as there is no pure,
unmediated access to the Dionysian
in The Birth of
Tragedy, there is no unmediated
access to the "completely
foreign" either. The language
of
convent,,,,, may not be a "true"
language, but it is the only
language ava.lable. If ,hat

convenuon

be opened up and held open, then
the aporetic disjunct, on
between the
absolutely foreign and the utterly
conventional, between the singular
individual and the
is

to

social totality, requires resolution.

While the language of convention stands

such a resolution, an opening ex, sis
essay

is

in the rules

govern, ng

its

nothing other than an extended meditation
on those

demonstrates above

all

how

in the

way of

use. Indeed, Nietzsche’s

rules, a

meditation which

they preclude every mediation between
convention and the

unconventional by subordinating the

latter to the

former through Ihc petrification of various

rhetorical formations. But Nietzsche's
essay also demonstrates the possibility
of speaking
in

"forbidden metaphors,”

in

metaphors which break with the rules of convention
and put

37

Philosophy and Truth, 96-7. This positive form
of "truth" could just as easily be
C knov" lcd
of error " Sec Paul dc Man's "Anthropomorphism
and Trope
?oSw
vri
(242)
Sl
a charactcrization. It cannot be claimed, however,
as dc Man docs,
,
IZ
!S
that this or mol truth is an attempt
to "stop the turn towards error," for Nietzsche's essay
makes no such claim. Sec his "Rhetoric of Tropes (Nietzsche)"
in Allegories of Reading,
lid. Like dc Man s attempt to show how the
essay deconstructs itself by falling into
contradictions Nietzsche is supposedly unaware of, J.
Hillis Miller's efforts to demonstrate
at it is lncohcicnt and "sell-dismantling"
("Dismembering and Disremembcring in
Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense',"
51) can only succeed by claiming
that Nietzsche somehow overlooked the rhetorical
dimension of his own text. Since
Nietzsche everywhere couches his presentation in explicitly rhetorical
terms— nowhere
C

a

..

Zul

f

moic so than in his definition
unconvincing.

ol "truth" as a

"mobile army"

84

— such claims remain

hose rule .o use in the
service of the unconventionai.
One cun, for instance, as
Ntetzsche
aentons, rates, "destgnate
the streanr as the
ntov,n g path whtch
eatrtes ntan where he
would
otherwise walk" ,888,
90). Thts destgnatton
does no, obey the rule
of "truth.- Rather "i,
,nt ° COnfUS ‘° n
d S P' aces
lx’ undar -ones
of abstractions" ,888
y
"
y
8 S °' tChangeS thC
leS ° f the
Those rules govern the tnte.lce,
ens ; av e to the drtve for
truth," tnsurtng that
i, obeys convention
by handling concepts
‘
6
USmg eVe °' d ‘ e aS 11 15 des na
ted, count,
*8
ng its spots accurately, formtng the
ngh, rubrics and never violating
the order of castes and
sequence of class rank" (8885)
Ntetzsche, by contrast, alters
the rules of the game
and opens „ up to the free
play of the
fantasy: "Thts drtve conttnuously
confuses the rubrtes and cells
of the concepts due to the

^

“T"

'

™

'

’

lact that

it

scLs lorth

new

translercnces, metaphors,
metonymies;

destre to form the present
world of the

waking man so

and coherence, charming, and
eternally new as
lorth

eternally

new

dictates against, yet

transferences, metaphors,
it is

the only possible

the

continually shows the

colorful, irregular, lacking
,n results

world of dreams" (887, 89). Setting

metonymies

res^nse

it

is

precisely

what convention

to the absolutely foreign

and new whtch

can be justified. While following
the law repeats convention

to the point of reducing the
individual to ashes, passing through
the sphere of absolute dtfference
responds to the

advent ol the loreigner by simultaneously
repeating and transforming convention
through
the invention of new transferences,
metaphors, and metonymies. The terms
remain the
same, but them meaning is transformed
by altering their syntactical and rhetorical
relationship to one another. Nietzsche's
ability to "designate the stream as
the moving path

which

carries

man where

and the simple

he would otherwise walk" puts an end to
solid ground of reason

intentionality of walking. Indeed,

by respecting the rules of convention that

thiough with security. But

first

legislates the

meaning of "man" anew

created a rational world to be strolled

form of singular

this

it

legislation respects those rules

demonstrating the Iragile structure of the world they
create, just as
condition to which
then, this

mode ol

A

it

creates the very

stream W'hich carries

man through

life.

legislation creates the conditions

which justify

its

it

refers:

by

Most

peculiar of all,

creations, leaving

everything dillerent and nothing the same. The new, the different,
and the excluded

suddenly entet into social

life,

not in order to be assimilated by

85

its

conventions, but to

]

change those conventions
ns oner
once nnH
and

“

“°

^

f S ° mClhln8

mSUlnCC

'

for on
all,
r,x,-

.

.

,

and to do so ,n a manner
which justifies the

****
WhiCh CUrnCS ma " lhr
™* h

a„ d was previously
ouUawed: A
of legislation

convenhon agatnst themselves
and opens them up to
exclude, and thts freedom
creates

the

freedom

i,

slrc a„, '

u.ses the rules

was destgned

of

to

new conceptual

relahons and new designations
which
.ogether dcm,>nstrate the
intellect's liberation
through a playful performance:
"That

monstrous framework [GaMtt]
and planking of concepts
throughout his life in order to
save himself

is

to

which the needy man clings

nothing but a scaffolding
Geriisl] and play
|

8 [SP ' elZeUg] k>r lhC b ° ldCSl feats
intellect:

And when

ironically puts

he smashes

this

n sWUcke of the

framework

1,

berated

to p,cccs, throws

,,

\freigey,ordenen\

into confusion,

back together, pairing the most
alien things and separating
the
revealed that n docs not need these
makeshifts
it

closest,

i,

is

of neediness" (888, 90).

The
legislates

anew,

.1

liberated intellect, the intellect
wh.eh passes through the sphere
of freedom and

anew, deciding on

its

own, no longer needs convention

to guide

38
it.

Legislating

perpetually reinvents convention,
and only this incessant inventing,

this always
deciding anew, suffices to resolve
the contradictory structure
of that convention. For only

then

is

the universality of the contract
at

singularity of the individuals
legislators

and

participants,

who agree

its

to

basis sufficiently brought into
play with the
it.

Only then are those individuals

really

and only then arc these

legislators liberated enough to freely
respond to the singularity of experience
and the sphere of absolute difference. So
long as

the process of legislation continues,

life is

no longer measured against a nonexistent

measure with transcendent validity-convention,
"truth"-and so
to the "distortion

[Verzemmg]* (888, 90) which every

it

is

no longer subjected

fixed convention invariably effects.

Rather than sul lenng the distorting and deadening
effects of a fixed and sedentary
these legislators revel in play and "dissimulation
[Verstellung]" (888, 90)

necessary lies— and

this

mode

of being, this form of

life,

life,

— in free and

constitutes for Nietzsche the only

But nor is it guided by its own pure autonomy. Rather, the intellect is
subjected to
the play of the sphere of freedom, what Paul dc Man,
following Roland Barthes, aptly
characterizes as "la liberation du signifiant." Sec his comments in
Allegories
of Reading

114-115.
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possible

good life. Once

petrified convention,

Copying

i,

the ,nte,lec. i. freed
front the d.storting
and deaden effects of

"cop.es

human

hfe, reproducing

hfe, but takes

it

for a

good dung" (888 90)

creative, y, or dissimulating

it

each o these acts amounts
to the same thing,
and each
Phere which knows nothing
but

,t

.cs

'

the

good

life.

untruth! ul,

and

can, indeed,

evil.

must

life

And knowing nothing of this

live a life

of tme

lies,

but

from an extnt-mora,

free speech acts

knows

would appear wanting, imperfect

higher sphere of "truth," the
individual

a hfe in which the mendacity
of convention

acknowledged, affirmed, even
embraced. No, only
life,

legislates

Each of these

nothing of a transcendent
"truth" in whose light

with free and necessaiy

,s

such honesty a condition of
the good

is

an absolute requirement for
living together with
foreigners and making peace
with everything that remains
foreign to conventionality.
For the good life, the life of
,t

,s

free

and necessary
and responds
response,
truly

lies,

recognizes the limits of convention,
opens up to a "foreign language,"

to its call. If

a certain mendacity and
deceptiveness inevitably marks

involve a certain deceptiveness, but
90).

No longer deceiving

itself

it

"deceives without injuring [ohne zu
schaden," (888,

about the difficulty of responding,

genuinely respects the foreignness of the
foreigner.
the

this

an acknowledgement of the
impossibility of a truly adequate
response and a
adequate decision. So long as this
impossibility is acknowledged, the
response may
it is

bounds of convention and outside

the reach of

And

any

this

form of response

the foreigner lies not only

social contract;

beyond

something of the

foreigner persists at the very center of
every social contract and every social
convention.

No language

is

can guarantee

capable of grasping the individual at the
heart of society, and no language

that

it

is

adequate to "the singular and entirely individual."
Making peace with

foreigners, then, not only
in

means

that the social contract

an endless effort to accommodate the foreigner.

It

must be perpetually

also

legislated

anew

means making peace with

ourselves, with the inability to grasp the self
perfectly and put ourselves on stable ground

once and tor

all. It

means accepting

something no more
A1 firming

this

stable,

absence

short, ol "truth,"

that the

human being

is

carried through

unchanging, or solid than a stream

ol transcendentals, this lack ol eternal

means affirming

the foreigner

within society and without. Only then

is

the

who always

good
87

life

life

on

— the stream of time.
foundations, this want, in

haunts the individual, both

possible, only then

is

the promise of

llV1 "

—

8 l °8ether n °

.»»

‘° nger

empty and
'

««. as in a dream, evening
posstble in
,s

<*,.

e S oc,al contract

w. This „„„

and ,n evety attempt

intrav
to formulate a

form of assoc, at, on and
mode of

being-together worthy of pohttca,
phtlosophy's ortgtna,
goal-thc good hfe. Ntcbtsche
was
certatnly never an orthodox
pohttca,

phhosopher, bu,

e ucatton tn rhetonc.

can avoid

„ was a

lesson in, ended for the

it.

88

this is the lesson

German

whtch concludes

natton, bu,

no

hts

"free" society
J

CHAPTER IV
NIETZSCHE'S PRACTICE OF
WARFARE

DAVID STRAUSS THE
CONFESSOR AND THE WRITER
:

— Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
"Great Politics"
In

Ecce

Homo

,

Nietzsche

Confessor and the Writer," the
hostile reception
earlier, this first

which greeted

insists

first

upon

the importance of "David
Strauss the

of hts four Untimely Meditations.
In contras, to the

the publication of

The Birth of Tragedy a year and a
half
attempt a, cultural criticism
was, from the vantage point
of a man

concluding hts authorship, an
"extraordinary success.Htllcbrand's judgement that

does

in the

was

storm of protest which

to be "offensive"
(§11), to

icndcrcd

it

its

judgement on

Its

"success”

lies

the "best polemical text ever
wntten in
elicited

as

much

in Karl

German"

as

it

upon publication.’ For the essay was
intended

provoke a public which had already
made up

its

mind and

the cultural significance of a
military victory. If the essay's

polemical style had an "indescribable impact"
on public opinion,

where there had been none,

if it

if it

provoked debate

resulted in a series of "insanely hostile"
newspaper

reviews, then these responses were sure
signs of success and guarantors of the essay's

c,

,.

1V8U)

David Strauss der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller," in
Sdmtliche Werke Kritische
G,orgl ° Colh and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter,
,

1, 157-^42. All references to Nietzsche's
writings will be to this edition.
ranslations from the German are my own. Citations
will be given in the body of the text in
accordance with the essay's numbered divisions. A translation
of the text printed in the
Kritische Studienausgabe may be found in Unfashionable
Observations, trans Richard T
Grey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
I

Ecce

Homo

,

"The Untimely Ones,"

§2.

Ibid.

89

4

significance— the polemic had
nation,"

it

hit its target,

had moved the public

it

"had touched the sore spot
of a vtctonous

.

But Nietzsche also gives
another reason
ess to

do with

its

for the essay's importance,

one which has

reception than the evolution
of h,s

own concept of politics. In this brief
polemic, he says, something
unheard-of finds a voice and
makes itself known for the firs,
Ume:

"

A " en

irely

'

Bew mode of fre

spiritedness [erne ganz neue
ArtFreigeisterei]."*

<=

Nietzsche attributes the newness
of

this free spirit to its
wtllingness,

David Strauss the Confessor and
the Writer,"

to use language freely, to

polemics, to write in an "offensive"
style and make use, as he
puts

Ireedom of speech
[unbedingtenRedefreiheii]."* And
this
is

freedom to draw the sword,

not just

new

to enter into a duel

,n its spiritedness;

,t

,s

also the

everywhere evident

it,

engage

in

in

of an "unconditional

this conditionless

freedom of speech,

and attack with the pen-this freedom
sign in Nietzsche's oeuvre of
a

first

new

"concept of politics [.Begriff Politik]":
"Great politics [grosse Politik ].' 7
In contrast to the sickly "petty
politics [kleinen Politik]" of
European nationalism or
the Realpoluik that dominated the
German Reich in the postwar period, "great
politics" is a

Friedrich Nietzsche, Samtliche Briefe, Kritiscfie Studienausgabe,
ed. Giorgio Colli
Homo "The

and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1986), vol. 4, 157; Ecce
Untimely Ones," §2. For a discussion of the letter, see Richard T. Grey's

"Translator's

Afterword, " Unfashionable Observations, 399-400.

Ecce Homo, "The Untimely Ones,"

§2.

6

Ibid.

Ibid.,

"Why am
I

Destiny," §1.

90

spirits

eschews

[

Geislerkrieg]," a "battle

positivistic definitions

[Kampf] against the

of politics as

lies

of the millennia

<u

d«

much as it
s power politics,
waging
struggles outside of the
institutions of parliament
and independently of
established

its

political

parties

and entrenched

language.

It

politicizes

political positions.
"Great politics” carries on,
,ts offensives ,n
its

prose and makes

it

"offensive."

and puts into practice a theory
of polern.es and
other writer, Nietzsche
employs a style which
antagonistic.
is

10

in

an "offensive"

linguistic warfare." Perhaps

style

more than any

polemical, offensive, oppositional
and

is

in hi sla ter writings,
its highly

bctween^Ss'C^^^^:

1

wntes

Although the new mexie of
spintual warfare embodied

only conceptualized

JahrhuLrl

It

,n this

combative style

sublimated form of struggle can

fi

.

P °"

relationship

neunzehmen
,

oh tikerund Soziologe (Essen: Die Blau Eule,

1994), 74-151; Bruce Detwiler Niet-Jhe
the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1990)
54-58. Excepting Lowith 's brief comments,
none of these discussions take Nietzsche's
comments in Ecce Homo seriously, and each overlooks
the importance of the first
Untimely Meditation for the development of
Nietzsche's concept of ''great politics."
’

° n t tie relatlon of style to "great politics," see Alan Schrift, Nietzsche and
the
Question of, Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics
and Deconstruction (New YorkKentledge), 159- 160. For a discussion of style in
Nietzsche's final polemics which departs
liom his earliest investigations into the Greeks, see
Claudia Crawford's fine essay
Nietzsche s Psychology and Rhetoric of Redemption:
Dionysus versus the Crucified " in
Nietzsche and Depth Psychology, ed. Jacob Golomb, Weaver
Santaniello, Ronald Lehrer
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 271-294.
*

The titles of Nietzsche's books are instructive: The Genealogy Morals- A
of
Polemic [Eine Streitschriftf Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with
a Hammer,
The Anti-Christ Nietzsche Contra Wagner. The polemical character of many of
his other
texts is implicit in their titles: Untimely Meditations-, Human,
All Too Human: A Book for
Free Spirits', Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudice of Morality, Beyond Good and Evil:
Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future.
,

,
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:

be seen

-

,rm

7m

seen al work

work

a,

0l '" e WOr,d ’
hts attack

<»l

e,

« lhC

[ewig en Kampfi between
the

™

<

it is

only

in the

warhke

the Utle Vnttmely
Meditations that Nietzsche

N

‘

’

'"

'

titeoretica,

« .7), Jusl as

of "truth”

in

i,

and

can be

"On Truth and .Lie

111

series of essays gathered
together

makes the polem.c and

conduct his primary mode
of pohlica, struggle."
JV d StraUSS bl "

°f Tragedy

on certain mendacious concepts

the Extra-Mora! Sense.”
But

un

—

in Che "eternal
battle

first

its

agonistic code

essay wages war on a
book by

nSistS lhal hls atla<*
has less to

do with personal animosity
or an aggress, ve resseminten,
than wtth a "prac.tcc
of warfare Kriegs-PraxisT
winch
attacks problems rather than
n pci
personssons, "I never
nrvor attack
i
persons; I merely avail myself
of the
person as of a strong magnifying
glass that allows one to
make visible a general but
creep, ng and elustve calamity.
Thus I attacked David Strauss-more
precisely, the success
ol a senile book w„h the
'cultured' pet, pie of Germany:
caught this culture in the act.'"’
|

i

I

And what

Nietzsche caught

ol barbarism

whose

it

in the act

of was

signs are magnified as

book's success with the

German

its

own decline and

much by

Strauss's

book as they

politics"— and everything

On.the
mi

in

are by the

public.

Nietzsche's attack on Strauss really
does represent his

II

degeneration into a form

Fc ce Homo

use ol polemics and

its

indicates that

affinity with the

R

J

-

it

first

docs-it

is

attempt at "great

not difficult to

agon seel P Stern
>^ lc (Cambridge: Cambridge

Hollin

univeisity Press, JX9), x-xiv. For
Nietzsche's own discussion of the aoon's
politie-tl
import, sec Homers Wcttkampl,"
Sdmtliche Werke 1, 783-792. Sec also Robert
John
C
N,elzsc
: 4 Frenzied Look
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts 1990)
>ff
07 4-,
4 Bcr gmann, Nietzsche,
~
the Ixist Antipolitical German " -5;
Waller Kaufmann
Antichrist (Cleveland: Meridian Books,
1964) ’l 131(
schc s use of polemics, sec Ronald Hayman,
g n
Nietzsche:
A
rvw°//
7 :M
v ^ Oxlord University,
(
ritual Life
(New York:
1980), 161. For Nietzsche's own
ol the success! ul polemic, sec his
letter of 25 October, 1872, in Sdmtliche
.'

I

,

™rT'

,

I

7

'

Homo "Why I am so Wise," 7. This statement finds support in Nietzsche's
Gersdorff, written 1 February, 1874, six months
after the publication of his
essay He writes there: "Yesterday al Ludwigsburg
they buried David Strauss. very much
hope that did not sadden his last months, and that he died
without knowing anything
about me. It's rather on my mind." Sec Sdmtliche
Iiriefe, vol. 4, 200. It should be recalled
that Strauss's Life of Jesus (1835) profoundly
influenced Nietzsche as a student in Bonn
and contributed to his rejection of Christianity. Sec Curt Paul Janz,
Nietzsche (Munich:
Carl Hanscr, 1978), I, 146; Werner Ross, Der dngstliche
Adler. Friedrich Nietzsches
I rehen (Munich: Dcutschcr Taschcnbuch Vcrlag,
1994), 156; Horst Althaus Friedrich
Nietzsche (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstcin, 1993), 76.
Fcce

letter to

,

1

I

I

92

why

nderstand

he turns to a new
concept of pohtics

at precisely this
moment. A year and a‘
carhcr, Ntetzsche could
s,i„ hope that
Wagner's revo.uttonary
mus.c dramas would
ba he the ears of Germany
wtth

a

tragedy, cathan.c dtthyramh,
g.vmg b,n h to a form of
Pt.ht.cs that would signal
a recovery from the
mode™ stckness of nationalism
and the
rccmcrgence of the great political
contest, familiar to the
Greeks. But in the wake
of the
hostile reception THe
BinH ofTragedy received, to
say nothtng of the jingo,
sm and Hagwav, ng that followed Germany,
victory
the Franeo-Prusstan
War, the ba„s

young phtlologist, hopes
foundered
hrs,

book

for the

as the nation, passion
for politics-wha,
Ntetzsche,

calls "the pel, t, cal
"-grew to measureless proportions as

i,

succumbed toa

pathological form of nationalist
self-glorification.
N.ct/sche's

attempt to resolve this problem
appears in the essay written
contemporaneously with the first
Untimely Meditation-'' On Truth
and Lie in the ExtraMoral Sense." The essay investigates
the ReichsgrUndung through
a consideration of the

mechanisms

at

first

work

in the legislation of

any

social contract,

showing how the act of

founding a nation always depends
upon a prior

linguistic contract which endows
the
language of convention with an
authority and a power so persuasive
that social life takes on
qualities conventionally reserved
for the description of prison
life. When Nietzsche ends
the essay by speculating on the
role which a genuine culture
might play in reversing this

process, he raises a topic which will
be central to every one of his uture
writings.
f

Indeed, "David Strauss the Confessor
and the Writer" picks up where these
brief
speculations on culture leave off. But rather
than simply speculating on the role which
culture might play in reversing the
authoritarian tendencies of political foundings,
Nietzsche

now attempts

to understand the

postwar Reich.

To

power of a peculiar form of

this extent his

between culture and

polemic

is

politics at a particular

"culture" in the

newly founded,

an extended meditation on the relationship

moment

in history,

and as

his meditation

progresses, as he looks closer and closer at the role
of "culture" in the newly founded

Reich, he notices something peculiar: These two

and Reich

,

spirit

and state— appear ever more

phenomena— culture and

difficult to differentiate.

politics, Geist

Their concepts

become ever

less distinct,

culture

— disappears altogether and the two begin to merge. What they merge into

'

(§ 1)

ever less clear,

until finally
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one of them

— the "concept of
is

a

7

" f0m °f CUHUra

ililliciili

(o ld

whichever

it

a " d m,X " ,S

I

^

°r

'

• new form of politicized
cullure— „

which once thc distinctions
between these two spheres
begin

is-a„d they may vciy

well bc the

is

to blur Bu,

same- this merging togeU,e,

this

blending

'

°' PI CV <,,ISly diSlincl
'

lnS1SlS CharaClCr,ZCS
'

na and previous distmc, sp
Kcre s -a„ of

deVel °P me

^

thi ,

which arc by no means
confined to , hc
postwar Retch. Indeed, these
developments are characteristic
of something so new so
all
pervasive and so characteristically
modem, that they signal the
emergence of "die 'modern
as such' \das

Muderne an

„W,'|«

«

).

The "modern

as such": The loss of
distinctions the
conluston of qualities, the mixing
of styles, the obliteration
of individual differences, the
emergence ol chaos-each of these
developments characterizes modem
Germany, each is
id levied
the distinctly "modern
idea" of the "'culture-state'
I'Ortar Sum']," and each
signals thc collapse of thc
distinction between
|

culture and the state, the

(spirtt)

and the German Reich. » This

age, and

il

makes

is

the

German

dels,

"new phenomenon" which characterizes

the

"thc stale the guiding star
of cultivation \midung\." H

Whereas everything about

thc age tends towards a
certain nihilism, towards the

annihilation of differences and even
"diversity" (§2), Nietzsche's
polemic attempts to

clan

I

y,

conceptualize, and correctly

name

these

new developments.

It

attempts to counter

the drive towards systematicity,
uniformity, and meaninglessness by
driving a

between culture and the
concepts

/

it

state,

by wrenching

wedge

thc "Kidturstaaf apart in order
to clarify the

unites under the mantle of thc
imperious nation-state. This process of conceptual

wi light

the Idols,

of
"What the Germans .aek," §4. Nietzsche had already
rciccted
elevation ol the "modern slate" to thc
"'culture-state' {'Kullurstaaf]" in his 1872
ec iiics ( n the uturc ol our Educational
Institutions" by disclosing its legclian
premise
"his hird lecture he stales, "it would perhaps be no
exaggeration .0 say that, in the
subordination ol all strivings for cultivation
\llildungsbeslrebungen\ to the ends ol state,
IUSM.I has appropriated, with success,
the principle and useful heirloom ol thc legclian
philosophy whose apotheosis of the stale \Apotheose
ties Status certainly reaches its
summn ", , 1, 1 s subordination." Sec "Uberdic Zukunrt unserc
Bildungsanslaltcn" in
Stiinlliclic Werlce Krilisclie SUuUentnsgabe,
1, 706, 70S. A translation of the lectures may
l>c on nd 111 On the h Mure
of our Educational Institutions; llomer and Classical Philoloev
I

ic

I

1

I

I

|

I

M. Kennedy (New York: MacMillan Company, 19 I). On the new
Reich' s
kidlurslaat and Kullurkampf, see Bergmann, Nietzsche,
"the Last Antipolitical German "
Gordon Craig, Germany 1866 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University
69tians. J.

1

Press, 1978),

/O.

"Ober die Zukunft unserc Bildungsanslaltcn," 710
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(trails.

90).

clarification

already underway
yin
in me
the esxiv’c
essays opening pages. ...
There Nietzsche describes
bClW n “ PeCU " ar f° rm
”
° f Germa " CUllUrC " and
lhC
viconous Helen
;
cr to distinguish
as clearly as possible
between those qualities whieh

,

is

“

,

7
r

.

the Franco- Prussian

War and

led to victory i„
’

those wh.eh serve

German

iSS&sss
Squ^S' ^

culture and the

German

spirit

rsevc rance ’
u
ln short,
qualities

of
nothing to do with culture—
that have
brought
V,C
OTW enemies wh « lacked the
most important of
J
cs,
one
ean
only wonder
^
that what now calls
itself "mltiirp" in n
8

r

cd

’

“

sSSS3sS?aa.
The

militarization of "culture,"

its

reduction to a

warfare, for disciplining the body
and training

Icader-none of

this

has anything to

military victory have anything in
the

Macedonians'

victor, es

obedience- moral

do with

common

it

to

means

obey commands and follow

And

,f

Germany's victory

the analogy Nietzsche goes

on

to

,s

the

with his notion of cultural supenority. 15
Just as
stricter discipline

and greater

virtues-so loo does Germany's victory over

France demonstrate only the supenority
of their officers and armies
warfare.

demands of

Nietzsche's concept of culture, nor
does a

over the Greeks demonstrated only

qualities, not cultural

for realizing the

analogous

make— then

in

in the

conducting of

importance to the Macedonians'- this

,s

the confusion of superior military might
with

cultural superiority discloses not the triumph
of

German culture over French

culture but a

blurring of spheres which ought to remain
distinct and a mixing of values which are in
reality

opposed

to

one another. When

this blurring

and mixing manifests

itself in the

"subservience" of the sphere of culture to the demands
of military leaders, when the sphere
'

S

9" the relat 'on of culture to militarism in Nietzsche's thinking and its uselessness to
.
National Socialism, see Georges Bataille, "Nietzsche and
National Socialism," in On
Nietzsche, trans. Bruce Boone (New York: Paragon House,
1992), 171. On the confusion
0
Reich s military ambitions with Germany's cultural achievements, see
R. J.
Hollmgdale, Nietzsche (Boston: Routledge
Kegan Paul, 1973), 19-20. For an analysis
01 the military victory which concludes with a
discussion of Nietzsche's insights sec*
Gordon Craig, Germany 1866-1945 34-37. See also Nicholas Martin, Nietzsche

&

and

,

Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996), 7-8.
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o' "culture"

'

rZ^'T'

2

'

:

“
"I
lh °

!'

*
nil urc

^—

bcg,„ s to value values
which have nothtng in
Cn C StriCt d,SC1PlmC
tranSf° rmCd lnt°
“

Cn<,S

^ CmPlrC

common with its
or "something that

»a

campaign an, an

instr,

CUSe ’ CUlture ’ or Something
that calls

'

itself

reduced to an instrument
of politics, the military,
and the Reich. And once
the
cultural sphere becomes
a space where political
power can be exercised, mihtary
virtues
nculcated, and the objectives
of the Reich realized,
then "cu,ture”-or
"someth, ng that calls
CU,tUre
emergeS US a S P hcrc wh
a distinctly modem form
of power can be
exercised and a distinctly
modern form
is

i

^

of politics pul into practice.

Nietzsche locates the distinctiveness
of
negativity, a negativity

dclmc power:

which shares nothing

Ability, capabihty,

in

th.s

form of power

common w„h

and possibdity.

,n its ineluctable

the qualil.es so often taken
to

1„ contra,, to positive,
productive

manifestations of power, the form
of power which manifests

itself in the cultural

sphere of

the post-war Reich tends
towards the very opposite:

A militaristic aggression ending ,n
negation, abolition, and annihilation,
each of which Nietzsche captures
with the word
"extirpation." This "thing that calls
itself culture," "if one allows
proliferate, if one

pampers

it

with the flattering delusion that

has the power," Nietzsche says, "to
extirpate the
spirit (deist)

and onset of mindless

(geistlos) national,

of the distinction between culture and

And

German

il

,1

to flourish

and

has been victorious, then

spirit."

it

Extirpation-the death of

sm- would result from the abolition

deist and Reich, freedom and militarism.

polities,

these distinctions arc abolished, Nietzsche
insists, then Germany’s military
victory

il

will be

transformed into "a

German

total defeat: Into

the defeat-nuked, the extirpalion-oflhe

deist in favor of the •German Reich"
(§1). Confusing empire with

spirit,

rendering politics indissociable Irom the ends
of the imperious nation-state, subordinating
the spirit ol the nation to the ends of
nationalism and

modern Reich nor
origin

is

"modern"

its

its

culture to the Reich

— neither the

military forces arc capable of resolving these
problems, for their

politics itself.

No wonder,

then, that Nietzsche turns to a

9ft

new "concept

^

° f fK1 "" CS " and “
necessitated

PraCt,Ce

° f CUUural

-rf- in the firs, Un,imely MeCUatio,

by the times themselves. 16

„ is

***
Nietzsche puts his new,
untimely form of warfare
into practice

.David Strauss
he Confessor and the
Writer.- The essay
wages war, hut the ballle it
fights ,s not against a
n UltUre ° r a f° re *
gn arnt y This "batt'e [Kampjy
is waged against
an "inner cncmv"
'
(§u^ ^ ,heo
t
hc
c
*^l«=*«
enterofithe conn.ct is the
concept of culture itself.
"Culture"
becomes a locus of conn, c, and
a field of battle the
moment it is
.

and pu,

politicized, nationalized

in service of

ends unrelated to

own.

Whether this process takes the
form of the
militarization of "culture" or
is subordination to the
ends of a
matte, little- the same
results ensue, and the
identical problems emerges:
Distinctions break down,
confusion sets
its

***

3nd m,sundersla " dl
"S! hikes over. And no more
tn the

significant

misunderstanding emerges
postwar Reich than the confusion
of a military victory with a
cultural triumph. It

threatens spirit with

whenever power
the problems

it

,s

its

annihilation and the nation with
the mindlessness that takes
over

accumulated for power's sake.
Clarifying

this confusion and resolving
poses requires drawing distinctions,
demarcating spheres, and

differentiating concepts.

The

first

step in this process has already
been seen: Nietzsche

distinguishes as sharply as possible
between military virtues and genuine
culture, between
the

German Reich and German

spirit.

Once

this distinction is in place,

examine the relationship between French
culture and German
relationship, he says, appears
persists. Indeed, not

upon

it

as ever.

Nietzsche
the

no different than

only does

Not only do

insists, that the

c opy

persist, but

did before the war: French culture

German

"Germans have

still

"culture" remains as dependent
it is

from them,

hitherto copied everything" (§1).

Not only did

culture with their military superiority, not only
does

lack a genuine culture, but the Germans, to the
extent that they posses a culture at

11

On

from

their

neighbor s-and poorly

the problems

at that.

which modernity poses

And

if

German

An Introduction

Political Theory

to Nietzsche as

culture did not defeat

to politics for Nietzsche, see Daniel

Conway, Nietzsche and the Political (New' York: Routledge,
Pearson,

"culture" at war's end. That

the French "have a genuine culture,"
but

Germans not defeat French

Germany

it still

it

he proceeds to

1997), 43-47; Keith Ansell-

a Political Thinker 83-97; Bonnie Flonig
,

and the Displacement of Politics

97

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press

1993 )

'

nch culture,

Germany

.f

lacks a culture of

why, despite the unorigmality
of

thts

German

round

its

own and

even borrows from the
French

’

copytng, imitatmg, and
reproducing, does the

publtc perstst in confustng
a military victory
with a cultural tnumph^
More than anyth, else, the
d, spate between
ng
Nietzsche and hts enemtes
revolves

this quest, on

*

ttself

opinionators

and the mtsunderstandtng

much

as

who

tell

the public's

the public

wha,

at its source.

optmons about

it

wants

its

That mtsunderstandtng

"cultural" superiority as

it

does

,n

to hear.

Counter, ng confusion,
mtsunderstandtng, and opinion,
on the other hand, requires
not only a certain free
sptr, tedness and freedom
of speech capable of ustng
language without regard to
the
imperatives dictating, command,
and
ordenng opinion and convention.
ng,
Free
spirttcdness and free speech
are insufficient to the
extent tha, they subst.tute
one opmion for
another, one convent, on with
another. As always, N,et
Z sche a, ms for more than
jus,
opinion and convention, and
in the first Untimely
Meditation nothing short of the
proper

name

will do.

One must names names, one must
draw

between concepts
publtc.

And

the

conceptual, zed,

if

first

is,

nennende Bwas]’

a successful campatgn

thing to be named, the

firs,

(§1).

For

and differentiates

be waged agatns, a htghly
milttanzed
"thing" to be identified,
unmasked, and

Ntetzsche writes, "this thing that
calls

itself

culture [dieses Kultur sich

this "thing that calls itself
culture" is "culture"

nominal sense of the word. Indeed,
o!

is to

distinctions

it is

the

modern phenomenon of nominal, sm,

proper names, correct concepts, and
meaningful words, which

misunderstanding. Resolving

it

and winning the war against

lies at the origin

it

does upon naming the

rulers

the loss

of the

this "thing," this "inner

enemy,” depends as much upon disclosing
the mechanisms working
identity as

only in the most

whose power is at work

Nietzsche pens the problem and names the
power responsible for

to conceal its true

in its

it

concealment.

at the

opening of the

essay’s second section:

How

is it

yet possible that

among

the cultivated

Germans

the greatest

contentment prevails, a contentment that, since that last
war, has shown
itself ready to break out in arrogant
jubilation and to wax tnumphant? We
live under the illusion of having a genuine
culture: The monstrous contrast
between this contented, indeed, triumphant faith and the obvious
defect it
conceals appears to be noticed by only the rare few. For all
those who opine
with public opinion [mit der djfentlichen Meinung meint]
have bound their
eyes and plugged their ears— that contrast simply ought not to be
there.
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]

ls

prescribe such arC'ou^^^
Which species of

Germany

soff

*

OWerful

\m&htig] that it can
„!P^
S° U nichr ^uschreiben\l
C ° m to mle zur Her
^
™chaft in

hummteJ lift*

that

it

can forbid, omit

and simple feelings'? I will
name
being, by its name
[beTZZn

least h'in
this

£ e expression of

HC

n

|t\

4

such strong
of hu

nlnnfrZl c y are the cultivated

IBildungsphilister],

In this paradoxical
portrau of postwar

Germany,

™n

lh,S SpCC,CS

philistines

not the politicians

it is

who ate

in

power, nor do they gu.de
public op.nion. The
"power" whteh rules Germany
in the wake
o the mc^runauns,
Nietzsche says, is a species
of human betng whose
proper name ,<
the cultivated phtl, stine.
Th.sd.st.netly

modern phenomenon

is no. simply a matter
of
philistinism, of an indifference,
disdain, or even opposition
to culture. The "cultivated

Philistine"

must be

differentiated

hide opposed to culture
cultivated philistine

what culture
use language

is,

„ takes

itself to

knows what culture

the cultivated philistine

is it will,

not: "Culture."

that

from the phi I, stine, for

and

this

means

be the only one

and

is,

this species

of

human being

who possesses

And knowing

assumes a certain power-, he power

the

power

This power, Nietzsche discovers,

to "call itself [sic/,
is

so

The

it.

certain in itsjudgemen,.

it is

is

to

name,

to

something u

is

exercised in ethical prescriptions
that

take the lorm of an imperative.
Just as everything in

"On Truth and Lie

in the

Extra-Moral

Sense" turns upon a certain "moral
sense"

at the heart of society which
makes itself felt ,n
an imperative commanding the "truthful"
use of language, and just as this
imperative exerts

a power over society which

is

in truth neither ethical nor truthful,
so too

David Strauss the Confessor and
heart of the post-war Reich

which lacks an

termath ol the war, public opinion and

°f lhe

ethical basis but nevertheless functions
as a

its

not" feel, think, or say

opimonators dictate

mo nstrous incongruity between the illusion of culture and
Wheieas

in

"On Truth and Lie

the origin ol a similar lorm of

power

in the

to a mythical,

who control

that

17
.

In the

one "ought not" speak

the real thing.

Extra-Moral Sense," Nietzsche had referred

even unconscious, social contract, he

now' locates this distinctly modern form of power, this
power to
into existence, with those

in

the Writer" revolve around an ethical
imperative at the

lorm of power capable of dictating what one
"ought
al

does everything

name

the real

and bring

language and the dissemination of opinion

in the

See "Uber Wahrheit und Liige im aussermoralischcn Sinnc," Samtliche
Werke
Kritische Sludienausgabe, I, 881 - 2
.
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it

sphere— ihc

,C

"journalists, the ’fabricate*
iFabrikanten of novels,
traged.es
Indeed, these opmionators
appear so united in their
beliefs
|

an

htstor.es-

(«).

control of language
appears so

unavoidable.

And

their

centred, that the question of

no, only docs Nietzsche

homogeneous group- wh.eh "seems
he modern
c goes on

poems

to

conspiracy becomes

^se th.s poss.bd.ty and

speak of a

have conspired to take
control

bmaMgat] of

human

being's hours of idleness
and meditation-his 'cultural
moments'
identify the method

employed

"

but

to aeh.eve this control:

They "anesthehze him
pnnted page [durch Mruck.es
Papier Z u bemubenY
(§1). The power of
.he word, of language, and
power over the word and language,
the power to control
its
use, to print wha, one
wants-, his is the power of any
"homogeneous group" wh.eh
controls the printing presses,
and this same power is required
for any attempt "to controlby means

ol the

public opinion.

Nietzsche discovers a form of
control and power ,n the
mechanisms of
the modern media, if he
sees the potential to "anesthetize
[beUuben]" the individual by
means of the printed page, i, is because
the incessant How of printed
pages does not simply
s.un, deafen, numb, and stupefy
the modern human bemg-it
is even capable of deadening
the spirit and ktlhng off life.
Each of these possibilities ,s inscribed
,n the word "beUmben,"
and each of these meanings emerges
in the course of Nietzsche's
essay as he examines h,s
If

conspirators. Indeed, not only

do they emerge,

conspirators themselves. For their
conspiracy
writers,

and publishers only "seem

but they

is

[scheint]" to

lubricate their narrative of cultural
triumph in

one

in

emerge

to conspire against the

appearance only. These journalists,

have formed a conspiracy. In actuality they

good

faith, in

a "tnumphant faith" which

renders them just as anesthetized to feeling
the monstrous contrast between
genuine culture

and

its

labricated imitation as anyone else.
It is

not enough, then, simply to

triumphant laith" into conceptual
laith

name names. Nietzsche must also

clarity.

For the power of the cultivated

alone, and so long as that "laith" persists, so
long as

it

comprehension and conceptual elucidation, the power of this
exercise

power over

its

believers.

So long

as that

bring this

philistine rests

on

resists rational

"faith" will continue to

power persists,

the cultivated philistine

will continue to have "laith" — "faith" in his
judgements, "faith" in his ability to judge, and,

above

all, "laith" in

the

supremacy of these judgements. For so firmly and
100

fanatically

do

the cultivated
Philistines
believe
nesbel,
P
eve

m
D r
m th
the,
power to

just an entirely
trustworthy court of

judge, that they feel
themselves to be not
judgement
but ev
g ment, but
even a supreme
court.

The

"cultivated

philistine
,,
-hne, " Mipt
P
Nietzsche
says, has become
"the supremejudge
Voters,en Richters^ of all
German cultural problems"
(§2), The cultivated
philistine holds court
and adjudicates over

a ju tcators, of these
judges,
ju gements. In

eve^

case,

lies

and

in

the parttcular effect

whtch them

fatth has

on

thetr

good, even tnumphant,

fatth, these judges err
in the.r
ectsion. Indeed, they err
because of their "fatth,"
because of their eonfuston
of fatth

genutne knowledge,

wtth

real

concepts, and rational
thought.

and reason are renounced
says.

in favor of faith,
judgement ,s

Judgtng judgement, judging

judgement-each of these

the judges,

just, lied

bound

assuming a

still

to err.

’

Or so Ntetzsche

more supreme

post,, on of

tasks is fraught with
diffieult.es, for each requires
the tnvoeation

° “ meaSUr6 3 Cnten °n ° r a conce
P‘
'

Whenever knowledge concepts

its

'

own judgements and

m turn. Every attempt to provtde such

mto endless quest, ons about

the cr, tenon

decisions are to be

guarantors, however, invartably
regresses

employed

to

guarantee their correctness whtle
avoiding the question of cr, tenon,
on the other hand, only leaves the
problem unresolved
and open to the whims of public
opinion and its opinionators. This
problem, the
stmultamous need for and absence of
a entenon by wh.ch one might
adjudicate over
problems of culture, forms the nnpasse
haunting every sentence of Nietzsche's
essay.

Every sentence

is

an attempt to come to terms with

it,

and nowhere more so than w hen

Nietzsche mourns the loss of the one
concept which could bring the confusion

at war's

end

to a close through the clarification
of the judges' errors in judgement. That
confusion

derives "Irani the fact that in
Kiillnr] has

been

lost” (§1).

Germany

the pure concept of culture [der reine
Begriffder

Nietzsche never says where that concept might
be found, but

the definition he discovers locked
within

"Culture"

expressed

it

leaves

little

doubt about

- this is the definition Nietzsche gives- "is above
in all the manifestations

of a people's

101

life

all

[Kulture

isl

its

Greek

origins.

the unity of artistic style

vor alien, Einheil des

unstlertschen Sales

m alien Lebensdusserungen ernes

Volkes ]"

(§ l).'« when he ihcn
rontrasts this definition
of genuine culture with
"barbarism," it becomes
clear that it is the
reeks, ,he people who
first contrasted
themselves with the barbanans,
who prov.de .he
enter, on aga.nst wh.ch

Germany, afitsttc accomp.ishments

against th.s or, ter, on, what
passes for culture ,„

genume culture. Measured
,n

Germany

of style

,s

Germany

against th.s entenon, the
real

must be measured. Measured

looks like the very
opposite of

name

for what calls itself
"culture"

"barbansm." "Barbar,sm"-,he
very oppos.te of "culture"-,
s the "absence

[SBMsWn or the chaot.c confusion of

al, styles"

( § .).

And once

style

becomes

the enter, on for d.stmgu.sh.ng
between culture and barbarism,
the problem of style
to the forefront of
Nietzsche's essay.

moves

The Problem of Style
Everything

in the first

Untimely Meditation revolves around
the problem of

and no topic has received more
attention
this

one."

It

comes

d.rect, extensive,

received as

little

in recent years

among

style,

Nietzsche's readers than

as someth,
ng of a surpnse, then, to discover that Nietzsche's
most

and wide rangmg d.scussion of the
topic occurs

in

a text wh.ch has

attention as "David Strauss the
Confessor and the Writer." 20

The

unfashionableness of the essay's treatment
of the topic- its relentless critique of
cultural
philistinism

— may have something to do with

this,

but whatever the reasons, the essay

n Daniel Breazeale's "Introduction" to
his translation of Nietzsche's earlv
notes
attnbutes Nie tzsche's definition of culture
to Goethe rather than the
eks. But as these notes and fragments
demonstrate, Nietzsche's various discussions of
culture constantly refer to the Greeks, and
it is the Greeks, not Goethe,
who provide the
hese d scusslons See Philosophy and Truth:
Selections from
!
S
° tebooks °f, t /le Earl 1870 s (Atlantic Highlands:
y
Humanities Press, 1992),

m

-

N

xxiii

'

xxx

^;

,<)r

cxam P lc

’

Jaccf ues Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles trans.
Barbara

it
Harlow
(Chicago. University of Chicago, 1979); Alan Schnft,
Nietzsche and the Question
oj Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and
Deconstruction Alexander Nehamas,
Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche
and Metaphor, trans. Duncan Large
(Stanford: Stanford University, 1993 ). None of these
authors provide a sustained reading
of David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer."
.

,

-,

Robert Ackermann's ground breaking work stands alone as the only sustained
A Frenzied Is)ok, 27-42.

investigation of the essay. See his Nietzsche:
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canno, easily be gnore d
or d lsm ,ssed as a
product of juvenilta. One
reason for
a ready been seen:
-'David Strauss the
Confessor and the Wnter"
,

,s

great pohttcs,- a, a
politic conftned by netther
the

thts has

Niefzsche's

first

attentpt

mpera„ves of the nat.on-state nor
the
nationalism so character^,
c of modern pohttcs.
The essay's efforts to come
to terms with
op,c of styie, on the other
hand, se, the stage for
each of his later d, sessions
of the
pro era. When, for instance,
Nietzsche takes up The Case
of Wagner in one of his last

po emics and condemns
Myle

„

IS all

effect,

the composer's decadence,
he docs so because his
music lacks

drama, and

Case of Wagner, S7-»8). By

"One thing

is

,

theater, nothing

contrast,

more than

when Nietzsche

the "chaos" of barbarism
(The

insists

the

Gay Science thatius,

needful-To

give style' to one's character,"
he defines that task as the
achievement of "One taste [Bin
Geschmack) ," emphasiztng

m turn the relative

unimportance of the distinction
between "good or bad"
takes
late

up

the topic ,n

Ecce Homo, he puts

style (§290).

And when

Nietzsche

the emphas,s-as he does
in so many other
texts-on the tempo, rhythm, and
gesture needed to achieve stylistic
unity,
all

coherence,

and communicability, again pushing
the question of good
this

time by dismissing the concept
of "good style as such

idealism

("Why

This

Wnter.

I

Write Such

last point is

Good Books,"

[

and bad

style to the side,

Oder Stil an sick:]"

as

mere

§4).

by no means absent from "David
Strauss the Confessor and

the

Indeed, the essay's distinction between
genuine culture and philistine barbarism

depends entirely upon a rejection of the
concept of "good

no means synonymous with
the distinction

alone.

style

True

the distinction

between good

between culture and barbansm

is

style."

style

For

that distinction is

and bad.

measured against

On

by

the contrary,

the criterion of style

culture," Nietzsche insists, "presupposes
only a unity of style [Einheit des

Stiles]" (§2). Style alone,

good, bad, or degenerate,

is

the defining feature of every culture,

he says, lor "even a bad and degenerate culture
cannot be conceived as anything other"
(§2)
than a stylistic unity.

It is

on the

basis of this criterion, then, that Nietzsche distinguishes

between culture and barbarism, and the success or
ability to clarify, differentiate,

and justify

distinguishing between style and

its

failure of the essay

that criterion.

And

this

depends upon

his

means more than simply

absence. For the distinction between culture and

barbarism, between style and stylessness,

is itself
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a distinction between different forms of

r:r

rC

barbanSm N,etZSChe says
arc fomis of ™*y.
They constitute iw o
di
OPPOSed Ways ° f
°f
"Hi* a. .he basis of a people,
a nation or
eommunuy. Coni using one with
the
'

T

re to distinguish

'

""S

other, judgtng barter,
sm to be culture, results from
a

between these two different
structural

possibilit.es.

Defending the

istinuion between culture
and barbarism, on the
other hand, depends upon
distinguishing
these two forms of unity
as sharply as possible.

THC
.

a

natUrC ° f lhi“ d,SUnCli0n

'

already indicated

S

unity o, style," for by making
style and

its

when Nietzsche defines culture

question of culture's definition
to a problem of its
content.
as always been defined
as the opposite of content.

cu lure and barbarism, then,

is

as

unity his criterion, he
avoids reducing the

More

than anything else, style

The problem of distinguishing
between

nol a question of evaluating
the contenl of one culture

against another in order to
determine their relative worth.

To

this extent, Nietzsche's

discussion also avoids the
problem of cultural nationalism,
of having to evaluate ihe
differences between national
cultures. And for the same
reason it avoids the perennial

problem of culture's location, for

no

limits arc placed

lilc.

a

its

culture

sphere- the

is

defined only by the criterion of

possibility of culture exists

stylistic unity,

wherever there

is

human

Clothes, rooms, houses, city streets,
fashionable shops, concerts halls,
theaters,

museums, public
ol

on

if

institutions, the

people-each of

style,

makes

a particular

to a

way of manifesting
same

is

itself,

a particular form of unily. This unity,
he

collective, to a

mass or a herd,

the stylistic unity

plural

which

and multiple, not just more of the same or the same

thing multiplied several times over. This
plurality and multiplicity

harmony

and each embodies

a matter of plurality, of multiplicity, indeed,
of a plurality and a

which are not just

by an essentially

manners and movements

thing as an identity. Far from reducing
a people, a nation, or a

homogeneous

Nietzsche insists upon
multiplicity

social intercourse, the

these, Nietzsche says, is a
manifestation of culture,

clear, is not the

community

norms of

diversity, a "diversity"

of a single style [die zur

is

characterized instead

which has been "brought together into

Harmonie Eines Stiles zusammenlaufen.de
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the

«»"

ZZ

“

**“ *-*»CVCn

1

—

»» i«». .. ... ,„„

ncccssdr> Condltlon lor
the nourishing of
diversity, multiplicity,
and

variety
unely. Diversity,
mu.Up.icUy, and vanety are
only recognizable

on the basis of a stylistic
formal unity, a shared
context, and a communal
horizon. To be sure any
COnteXl ’ OT h °nZOn ,S " CVer
°re ,ha "
many— there are always

T

cu

—*

m

lures, nev ci culture

but no people, nation,
or community, indeed, no
individual can
ever appear ,n the world,
can ever be differentiated
and become different, except
by means
a StylC f°
COntCXt ° r horiZO "- S <>
- style from being an inessential
addition a

m

'

mere ornament,

-

’

superficial

and peripheral,

that substantive differences
are only possible

on

the basis ol a stylistic context.
Indeed, so

little is it a secondary
addition to the "real” thing,
the "real" substance, or the
"real" person, that the
differences between them are
only

recognizable on Ihc basis of the
unity style affords.
than content, then,

manifests
in

,1 is

If

Nietzsche focuses on style rather

only because the content of a
culture and the style

itself are indissociable .»

And

this unity is the

in

which

very opposite of .he unity

,1

at

work

barbarism.

Barbarism -the "absence of style"
-is characterized not by a unity of style but
by a
uniformity which, lacking style, fails to
recognize difference and even remains
indifferent
towards it. And the first and most serious
form of difference to go unrecognized is
"the
dillerence between the philistine and

its

opposite" (§2). Unable to recognize difference,
the

cultivated philistine falls back on identity,
uniformity, sameness, and convention. Each
of
these contributes to the confusion of
barbarism and culture, and each contributesor

"probably" contributes— to the judgement
which manifests

this confusion:

The

_

coni usion that reigns in the deluded mind
of the cultivated philistine
probably derives from the fact that, finding everywhere
people cast from the
same mold as himself [gleichformige Geprage seiner selbst
wiederfindet],
he lnlcrs Irom this unif orm stamp gleichformigen
Geprage] of
all

[

thC Nie zsche s concept of "diversity," sec
Daniel Breazeale, Philosophy ami
•r
„
}
I ruth: Selections from Nietzsche's
Notebooks of the Early lH7()'s xxii.-xxv; Leslie Paul
1 hiele, criedrich
Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study
'

P?

,

of Heroic Individualism

62-65.

On

the inseparability of style and content, see

Look, 28-35.
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™

Sv

about
Sft™
8
This impressive nn if
unisono that though Zummone ?
seduees him into believing
religion

cultivation— in short a
,
gleiche] needs and
l
med,at ? cmb ™ed b the
bound
y
?
C PC
ltb rc ard to matters
8
of

mg bU

similar views; wherever
he goes ho
Of silent conv^nto

’

art:

^

|

esw"
k chan <sm.
'

[ ,'

?
.ha, a culmTe'S^way

So impressed
UmSOn° :
phthsttne

lh S
'

eVery ° ne

m Uniso "''

so imposing

is this

makes a mistakenjudgement-the
culttvated

impress, ve and

this

mui

the culttvated ph.iistine
by the uniformity found
everywhere, by this

,s
"

^

sameness, tha, the cultivated

philistine tnfers, in the face
of an

mtposmg homogeneity found
evetywhere around him,

Stylistic untty characteristic

of genuine culture. But

° f aC ° nluSlon: The abse "“

the divers,
ty

be evidence ol a stylistic unity.

An

this

conclusion

is

the extstenee of the

inferred on the basts

which characterizes genutne culture

is

taken to

absence of diversity, however,
const, lutes not a

uniformity of style but uniformity
plain and simple: Evetyone holds
the same views,
everyone has the same needs, everyone
believes in the same conventions,
everyone,
short,

is

like

everyone else-the same.

And once everyone is

[gleichformige Geprdge ]," dtfference as
such

falls

cast

in

from the "same mold

by the wayside. Rather than constituting

a diverse culture, then, the form
of unity characteristic of barbarism
forms a "system,"
indeed, a "systematic and ruling
philistinism systematische und zur
Herrschaft gebrachte
[,

Philisterei]" (§2).

The power of

the philistines, them ability to rule,
consists in the ability to

systematically eliminate difference by
subjecting

all

aspects of

same mold.
Everyone and everything bears the same stamp,
everyone and everything is fabricated
according to the same mold, and
carelully guarded, that they

Holding the patent to

their

this

mold,

this

are— or might as

stamp, are so zealously defended and so

well

be— "patented

is

genuinely productive

artistic

their products,

power through

the exclusion

forms and genuine demands for a true

Exclusion and negation, then, insure uniformity and constitute the unity
of the

system

its

mold

monotonously

and the "unity

ol that

and

not mechanically producible and reproducible,

the philistines are able to insure that they will
remain in
ol

[patentirten ]" (§2).

mold, the philistines insure the uniformity of

having insured that nothing will exist that

negation

life to the

mold

style.

philistine's

[Einheit des Geprages] which so

strikes us about every cultivated person in present-day
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and

Germany becomes

a

2

Ca" y pr0ductlve forms

“
This

^

—

'?'”?'
is

Md demands for a true style"

the negativity pecuhur
to the distinctly

Ph '" Sl ' nC

- ,hC

—

exclude every demand for
a true
'

l'

'

ValCd Ph "' Sl,nC

m

'

*>

style.

-ven,

(§2).

modern form of power embodied

the production

of new

artistic

Rather than possessing
culture,

let

^ what

Slakcs

forms and to

alone producing

negates it. And proceeding
systematically, the cultivated
philistine "eventually
obtains a coherent system

of such
negations, a system of
nonculture [Nichl-Kultur} to
which one nught actually be
able to

concede a certain
Sty' 1Zed

'stylistic
"

barbanSm <§2)

<o a true culture

which

cultivated philistine

Everything that
power.

unity-assuming

,s

11

it

makes any sense

" lh s nematic negation of everyth,

a. ail to

speak of

'

makes

finally

himself the

fails to

that

conform

And whenever anything

that

would contribute

the cultivated philistine
Nietzsche's "enemy," lor the

enemy of everything which would
oppose him.

to his
is

ng

"mold"

is

viewed as

encountered that

fails to

hostile

and as a

conform

threat to his

to the philistine’s

system, the cultivated philistine
"wards off, negates, wtthdraws,
plugs his ears, looks

away"

(§2).

The cultivated

philistine

can no, bear to hear of anyone else
speak, nor can the

cultivated philistine stand the
sight of anything other than
himself. Whatever and whoever
differs becomes the object of
"hate" and "enmity”
(§2), and hating h,s enemies, the
cultivated philistine spends

all his

lime crippling, numbing, and dissolving
every attempt

to

create a genuinely "diverse" culture.
Hating his enemies, the cultivated philistine
remains

confined by his

own

narrowness and limits and seeks only to
defend them and

Foi the cultivated philistine

is

correctness of his judgement
"laith"

certain that he

is

so

little

knows what culture

doubled

that

it

is,

and

his

power.

this certainly in the

constitutes an unshakable

— the "new faith."

Max

Horkhcimer and Theodor Adorno lake Nict/.sehc's definition of barbarism
as
their point ol departure for their analysis of the
"eullurc industry." Sec Dialektikder
Aujklarung: Philosophische Fragmente (Frankfurt
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am

Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1990),

The "New

Faith

>av,d Strauss the Confessor
and the Writer"

I

is

^

Ph " ,SUne,S UnShakab e

"

'

•n f

-right

-n

end-

—

Unnmely Meditation
defense

and waging an

hear

“

in

cl

leclive

Only

"what now
confession

only

in

campaign against

made,

is

if

the ruling

Germany," and

no evidence of

is

one of

something

llle

on the olhci hand,

I

polemical and "warlike"

powers

in

its

if

in its

that distinction

Germany depends

such a demonstration

"faith" is given, then perhaps

listen

is

upon

less

and to

it is

lacking,

•failh*

like "faith"

alonc-and Nietzsche does not exclude

may

be necessary for the

German

no

if

because the

no sin and has nothing to confess. Or perhaps

in

spirit.

is

il

the

Whichever

an enormously popular book by David Strauss.
David Slrauss-a

)— offers a confession

A Confession
is

(

1

in the

form of best-seller entitled

Old

Nietzsche's account ol Strauss's confession. Nietzsche listens
as

the warlike character ol the
in

I'lic

872).” "David Strauss the Confessor
and the Writer,"

attentively as possib le as Strauss confesses his
"faith." Indeed,

On

be sure, the ns,

however, the issue can only be decided on the basis
of a confession, and

typical philistine"
(§ 2

comments

of allowing

Nietzsche says, "if the cultivated
philistine "offers" a confession

calls itself 'culture' in

Nietzsche hears one

Failh mld

I, is

To

«„ r

the cultivated philistine can
demonstrate the incoherence and
stylessness of

possibility that a
be,

and conceptual incoherence.

[A

such a confession that the barbarism
of the cultivated philistine can be

because the confession

may

power

between "culture" and "barbarism."
Bu, defending

cultivated philistine has committed

II

the reigns of

a war of words and a battle
of opinions than upon an ability
to

is

,1

its stylistic

an

to

successfully listing the

to philistinism than

oppositional, even offensive.

"We must listen,"

(§2), for

heard.

is

o! the distinction

engaging

Uiie HenschendenV (§2)-and

of opposing genuine culture

philistinism to confess to

"new

the

»>*»« and the philistine, unshakable

form of power they possess-for
they "hold

less a matter

is

a polemic again*,

over matters of culture.
Bringing the rule of the
philistine*

for they are our rulers

pailteular
(i}2)

to rule

faith

"

lirst

lie

listens

so attentively

that

Untimely Meditation, sec Nietzsche's

Fcce Homo, "The Untimely Ones," §1-2.

-

I n
us( three months, (he book
The Old Faith and the New: A Confession
j
had gone into four printings. On the book's popularity, see Werner Ross Her
1872)
angstliche Adler. Friedrich Nietzsches Leben 355.
,

(

—
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he hears not just a
confession of his "faith,"
but also a confession
a
takes Strauss's confession-no,
in order to absolve
him

German

from

spirit

2

CTen ° PCnS SlraUSS

not jus. a confession, buc
a confession

’

S

atom

confesses to havtng fa.th in
his "faith."

them as more than jus,

•rcats

than just a private matter.
'

latth" ,s

"

‘

much more

stmpiy because
matter because

it

beliefs,

The

N etZSChe SayS

tel CrS -"

ofL sins, but in order to free the

b

“* hC

'

He

Co

"new

faith," Strauss

really believes his beliefs,
so

much so

more than stmpiy a matter of
personal
he

already

it

in the

new, and

a "faith"

believing in "modern ideas," and
his book

(§3)— a jumbled and

and more

faith,

a confess, on" of this
(§3). Strauss's "new

he confesses, a "faith"

makes

that he

himself make public confessions
about

lets

than a pnvate matter not
stmply because his "faith"

it

,n i,s

make a confession and

his beliefs, about hes

"fact alone that

possible in modernity. Indeed,

ideas'"

i confession lodged

is

"new

replaces the "old faith" of
ChrishanUy. Strauss's "new faith"

,t is,

Nietzsche

this "sinful" "faith."

Th OUi Fatih
,
and the Ne W: A Confession.
By choosing

llt ,e

ol certain sins.

is

in the

this

makes

it

the

»

nor
a public

is

only

"faith"

modern, for Strauss confesses

nothing other than a "catechism

'of

to

modem

incoherent cosmology based on a
mixture of Darwinism and

materialism. These "modern ideas,"
however, require neither thought nor
philosophy to be
accepted. Strauss, who was once an
important thinker, perhaps even an
important
philosopher, confesses to bang neither
a thinker nor a philosopher anymore,
and he lakes
it as an article of "faith"
that no one need think or
philosophize any longer. It is enough

simply to believe.

new

religion.

ol the
lailh

I

uture:

in its

it

is

enough simply

to believe because Strauss

This religion— this too must be taken as an

The

"philistine as the

most impressive form;

[unerhorte]

may deny

And

phenomenon

that he is the

article

of

is

the founder of

"faith"

—

is

founder of the religion of the futurc-that

the philistine turned fanatic— that

that distinguishes

Germany

founder of a religion, he

still

today” (§4).

is

a

the religion
is

the

"new

the unheard of

However much

says that his "faith"

is

Strauss

"the sole

universal avenue ol the lulure"
(§3), and with this confession out in the open, Strauss

becomes a

fanatic, a fanatic

and become

"life's

who wants to "rale

leader [Lebensfihrer]' (§4).
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the future [die Zukunft zu beherrschen]’

To Iree

hfe from this fanatical
ieader, NicCzschc
counters Strauss's "faith"
Wlth
something he ,s often thought
to oppose: "Reason."
Bringing an end to the
"fanaticism

“

h
the

°f

P—g Strauss under

tHe Ph '" St ne
'

*r VernunftY «4>.

1.

the "control of reason

re q u,res

ashing him reasonabie
questions and iistentng to
in his confession. In
"David Strauss the Confessor
and the

answers he provides

Wnter," Nietzsche poses
questions

to "the confessor"

and to "the

writer," devoting five

sections of the essay to the
confessor and five sections
to the writer. Whereas
the questions
posed to the confessor concent
what Strauss says about the
content of his "new faith," the

questions posed to the "wnter"
are concerned with

employs and
the

way

,n

his "style" of presentation.

which he says

the cultivated philistine's

it

how Strauss wntes-the logic

Both what Strauss says about
the "new

he

faith”

and

serve as confessions, and
both serve to disclose the content
of

"new

faith."

Content and form, substance and
style "the
confessor" and "the writer»-each
discloses a religion of the future
which aims at the same
thing: Reality, the real,
”la,th" ,n the reality

conforms

to these

and realism. For eveiy

fanatic, every philistine, Nietzsche
says, has

of their judgements, and every
fanatic and ph, I, stine believes

that reality

judgements. From beginning to end, the
questions Nietzsche poses

Strauss are answered

already exists, ,n the

w„h confessions which demonstrate an
real,

and

in reality.

And

to

extraordinary interest in what

the reality Strauss believes in

the

is

same as

the reality he believed in as a
young-Hegelian, a thoroughly rational reality,
indeed, a
reality

which, merely because

that is real" (§2)

this is the

it is

real,

must be considered

rational.

The

Hegelian slogan which Nietzsche hears Strauss
confess

over and over again. Rather than thinking
and philosophizing about the
critical

philosophy places on human reason and

knows no

limits.

He

precisely reason that should inform
(§6). Nietzsche,

s

irrationality

himself as real and

knowledge of

who

is

relativity of all

him how

which Kant's

reality, Strauss's reason

and fanaticism

treats his

little

knowledge and reason. Or:

own

how

results

irrational his

from the

reality as the

form of reason

is.

it

upon

The

fact that he "conceives of only

measure of reason

110

It is

reason can discern about the in-itself of

by no means simply the enemy of reason, takes

himsell to inform the philistine of precisely
philistine

its

limits

to

lacks, Nietzsche says, "the foggiest notion
of the fundamental

antinomies o( idealism and of the extreme

things

"rationality of all

in the

world" (§2).

l

T

” o,

“
apotheosis of the

matter

how

18

"“

and the evervHav
\a/k
everyday. Whatever
has sueeccdcd, whatever

banal or trivial
iat,

OUgh '

«

is justified
iustifipri

by

its

mere

is

Va, tonal,' whatever

remain unassatled" §2 So
).
(
long as the
is

no

is real

cx.stcnec, and whatever
exists, whatever

Cominue e *>sling: "Whatever

10

considered rattonal, so long
as the rational
is,

.

i

that ts," Strauss
confesses, "to

phthstmes

—

, «»>"—»

trivial

rat,0nal -

real

““ —r. -

„

constdered to be

real, the

is

real ,s

power of

the

at least according to
Strauss's gospel, unassailable.

Nietzsche, on the other hand,
assails thus power by
showing that the phthstmesteah.y ,s no, a, all real. Indeed,
it is so far from
teing real that i, must be taken
for the very
opposite ol reality: Artifice,
construction, illusion, and
delusion. Whenever Strauss
makes

a conlcss.on about

his

about a reality which
pleasing as possible.
la„h" than
laith" is

its

"new

is

his

And

alone-his own

and

artists

is

the great poets

be

at

work

to

leisure.

enjoy

content, he inevitably talks

faith," the

new heaven

of the "new

in general.

Indeed, this

HslhetischenHimmelreich ]' (§ 4 ), a

and composers stimulate

And

art's

[,

the

mind and

yet even here, in the private

stimulation, in the place

where

rooms
art

and

the

to

which

artifice

home, even here Nietzsche detects a certain
delusion and falsification at

work. For what the "blessed or the new
style arrive
to

its

construct, constructed to be as
aesthetically

an "aesthetic heaven

where

the philistine retires al ter

little

about

a place of music and song, of
poetry and composers, of an

ol art

to

talks

heaven. Like the old heaven
of the "old

imagination during one's hours of

ought

whenever he

nothing, of course, ought to
be more pleasing in Strauss's
"new

heaven, Strauss confesses,

heaven

faith,"

do with

art, let

at in their aesthetic

heaven" has very

alone with anything heavenly. Rather than
being heavenly, Strauss's

aesthetic heaven” turns out to be earthly
and ephemeral, and rather than being "aesthetic,"
It

appears thoroughly "unaesthetic [unasthelischY
(§4).

Strauss s
ol ait

aesthetic heaven" has nothing to

do with

have nothing transcendent about them

demands only

there

is

gtxxl reason for this:

cither aesthetics or heaven. Its

works

— they arc not the "sublime master works” (§2)

Nietzsche commends. Strauss's artworks aim only
philistine theory of art

And

at the "real"

world and

its

imitation.

The

the "imitation of reality" (§2). Rather than

transcending the mundane, the philistine demands the greatest possible
realism. According

to the gospel of the
,,

17

mVm

°f

"new

faith ’ " thrn
-m
n,art

the eVeryday

ranscenden. ability,

its

'

And

must practice the crudest
son of realism and corn

thlS

*

-«»

** service or the ph„, stine's

ab.l.ty «o elevate

one over the everyday, its
umtnate the tllusory naturalness
of the everyday -these
possibilit.es,

Ime rnaster works,- are
renounced by Strauss

•

turning art into one

more mechanism

Not only does
artworks so
t

same

is

Strauss's

which emerges

reality"

even

artificial.

in

ar,

in the

faith" believe in

become

faith" reverses the
process

world, no, only are works
of

the posstbtlities of

course of his reflections
on

an aesthetic heaven comprised
of

anaesthetic instruments in
defense of the real, bu,

when

returns to reality. In Strauss’s
topsy-turvy

it

turned into instruments of
the status uo, bu, the
q
picture of

The Old Faith and the Ne W
appears extraordinarily

Nietzsche detects

this artifice in the particular

man

unrealistic,

form of courage which

Strauss's "faith" inspires.
Strauss presents himself a
"troublemaker"

rabble rouser and a

art

for rationalizing the
real.

"new

"realistic" that they

ability to

by

disposition, a

unafraid to depart from the status
quo. Indeed, he insures his

readers of his courage, saying
that, as a "troublemaker"
by disposition, he has taken on the
"unpopular and thankless task of telling
the world
precisely

(§7).

To

be sure, Nietzsche says, one
hears

much

confession, but his aggression always
manifests

He

praises

Darwin and constructs a

just as quickly goes

on

materialist

it

least

itself in assertions

without consequence.

cosmology on Darwinian premises,

human being

is

human being and no mere creature

And

with

only

is

ol his sting

this, Strauss's

and leaves

reality

is

its

— "God," he says,

causation,

all

he renders

reason

that

you are a

unchanged: Rational through and through.

opposite:

"shows us

unreasonable master of the world, and that necessity,
manilest in the world,

moment

of

of nature" (§7). Aggressively advocating Darwin,

courage turns into

the world rational

no mere animal. He

in the process to the position

superiority undermined by that very theory:
"Never forget even for a

him

but he

ethical imperative, to avert the
unpleasant consequences

of Darwin's theory of evolution, restoring
humanity

Strauss robs

wants to hear"

that is aggressive in Strauss's

to reassure humanity' that the

even formulates an imperative, an

what

itself

"

(§7)

Cowardly accommodation. For not
that

that

chance would be an

is,

the chain of causation

— but by subjecting the world to a "chain of

action beside the point: Everything and everyone acts in

112

accordance with

strict laws,

and these laws prevent
any interference with

"reality."

trauss s courage, then,
is less real than
"artificial [kOnstlicher):
a "union of impudence
" £SS aUdaC '° US WOrdS
and COWardly accornrno
dation" (§7) designed to
impress
the phiT
philistine even to Hatter
him. Lacking character
and strength, Strauss
as
’

grades

W „h CharaCter and

‘

illusion
is not,

f

MscHeinr

(§7).

creating an affected
supenonty and a generalize

And

affecting

q ua„t,es he iacks,
Strauss inspires not action
but accommodation.

Nietzsche finds

mastheading as someth,

„g he

of these confessions no,
only in what Strauss's says
about
new fa„h," bu, even his style of
wnting and mcxle of
all

his

presentation confess to similar

beliefs.

The

logical structure of his
argument, for instance, constructed

thematic subd,vis,ons-"Are

Conceive the World?

We Still Christians? Do We Still Have

on the

basis of four

Religion?

How Do We

How Do We Order Our Lives?"

( § 9)-does not demonstrate
any
senous thinking or philosophizing
about why these questions ought
to be grouped together
and not others, for the third
question has nothing to do with
the second, the fourth is

unrelated to the third, and

all

three lack

and coherence of presentation, a
that

it

confuses

shows

itself

with modern science. But

itself

and philosophizing

"faith"

any necessary

in the

name of a

"faith" in

if

relation to the

which has so

first.

Rather than unity

little interest in reality

Strauss eschews the rigors of thinking

modern

science,

i,

is

because he less

interested in getting at reality than
in presenting a picture and
an image of reality which

pleasant and agreeable as possible.
for this, only art

something

words

as a

it

is

and

not.

"means

artifice.

To

this

And

neither logic, thought, or philosophy

His book employs the

end Strauss wants only

arts

in

to impress,

and to

destination:

all

end he uses

He

his

writes not to put

comfort and agreeableness of the reader's

final

in this pleasuie

the "pleasures" of the "arts" are at hand. Strauss himself
confesses that

he, a "genius"

ol ingratitude

this

which are dark and

The Garden of Epicures. No one should be uncomfortable

garden, where

even

to better highlight the

required

order to create feelings by means of an

aesthetic technique [asthetisches Mine!]'
(§9), presenting things

gloomy only on order

as

of seduction and masquerades as

for aesthetic effect [asthetisches
Effectmitlel]" (§9).

lorward an argument or to provoke thought, but

is

is

and a great

toward

critic,

my genius if

I

can enjoy these humble pleasures:

were not

"It

would be a sign

to take pleasure in the fact that, along with the
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r relentlessly

incistve critique,

was

I

simultaneously endowed
with the ability to
enjoy the innocent pleasure
of artistic creation"
(§10). This false modesty
is hardly
innocent. „ is,the rhetoric
of an artificer, of
someone who hkes to wear
the mash of genius
O .kes to be theatrical,
who hkes to play the role of
the naive genius and
the classical
writer. For Strauss
himself confesses that
"people have paid him the
unsolicited honor of
re^ar ing him as a kind
of classical prose writer"
'

(§10).

II is this

Strauss, Strauss the
"classical prose writer,"
the "class, ea, author

m0de ° f Germa " Wnllng Wh °
<*“ final| y
‘

-

sms. Strauss
bu, he

may

,s still

artificiality

reacted

is

who hkes

less gifted as a stylist.

incoherence and

former

be a bad actor

and content Irom

m

to be theatrical

And

and

latter in the

former. Style

Strauss's style, for all

its

and unity of a genuine
ansprechenden

is

inseparable from content,

be-and what

German
it

journalists as

it

creativity,

it

1

1).

is

,s

own

as inoffensive as

keeps to the everyday,

"style."
it

is

to the

Ol lending no one, creating nothing new,
with such regularity that

stamping

it

was taken for-,s

law',

it

(§11).

Once

a sign of

much

in the

allgemein

[,

jargon of the

"Hat, hackneyed, powerless, and

norms of
it

"today," and this

repeats the

common'

rules with the force ol an "imperative" (§1

1). It

the

it

"modem."

same phrases

upon the

ear" (§11),

home" anywhere else. What ought

common

the elements of a genuine style

makes

same words and

"at

health," while the "powerful,

its

1),

superiority over French culture.

finally "impresses itself \pragt sich...eiri\

a pow'er which exercises

1

unproductive. Thoroughly shorn of power
and

hackneyed, powerless, and

even as "signs of

disrepute
rule,

flat,

its

itself as

with such force that one no longer feels

be heard as

"rule,"

and

public,

not, Strauss's "style" discloses
less the uniformity

This tone manifests

does in Strauss's

(§11), this "style"

it

health,

cultural style than a "universally
appealing lone

To,,]’ (§

the genius

Indeed the

style.

appeal with the

pretends to

its vitality, its

But by pretending to be something

stylistic

and wear the mask of

"artistically rigorous cultural
style [kunstlersch strengen
KultursUls]’ (§

genuine German culture, of

to

sins-his

the

For just as Stiauss's doctrines
demonstrate the

remains deceptive and pretentious.
What

an

to his

of an actor and a deceiver,
so to does his

the latter,

style.

^ heard confessing

"

is

accepted as the norm and the

uncommon, and
fall

beautiful falls into

into disrepute, this norm, this

becomes an

ethical obligation

and a

"dominion [ Herrscluif, ]" (§11) w'herevcr writing takes
114

Un

""“

ovcment ol

“

tKc pc,,

«•

«,

„ becomes an "amhority
Regimenty
I

winch every German writes
and every German

And

the

icl/schc says,
lh£
no. the

0

"

”

,s

,

,)

,.

I,

is their

home. -Germanness,"

not a matter of
"nationalities and customs"
(§12). "Germanness"
'

German ***, and

GermanS '~ arC
C,od

al °" e

whom

one

is in

is

to be

is

home of the German spu n

the

German race* The "Gcrmans"-and

** *P'">

" neUiSllC bc "' 8s
-

against

alone

'

certainly no, the

‘

and a p>wc under

lives.

live in this language.

German an8Ua8e "

not St.auss s
1S

Germans do

(§

'ivea in language,

and

no, only

to this extent

„

is

danger of sinning.

It is language
itself which
danger<> bCing " Sinncd agalnsl
l^sundig,]: language— "the mystery
of all our
‘

German ness

home

WasMystenumaUerunsererDeutschheUY

ol spirit

Kahxemr

and the "mystery" of everything
German,

(§12).

Its

(§12).

German language,

then the

"something holy \ etwas
laws hold dominion over
the "Germans," not the laws
of the
is

journal, st, the Straussians, or
the fabricators of "literature."
These laws, not Strauss's

impci nine, govern the Germans,
and

stylistic

il

they

do not quite

constitute a "faith," they

do constitute a "mystery" which must
be heeded.
I

Iccdmg these laws, however,

car, a well-timed car, perhaps

is

by no means an easy matter.

even a musical

car.

For

this car

It

requires a sensitive

must be attuned

to

"sound"

as such, not merely to the
"universally appealing tone" of
philistine optimism.

Il must lx
attuned to the "aesthetically subtle
and powerful laws of sound under whose
dominion

\kunstlerisch zarten
write, indeed,

und krdftigen Geseize des Manges Herrschaft]"

under which every writer ought

molded by an incessant rhythm, by
ceaseless mantras of

impotence with one

filled

one ought

to

which have been shaped and

the sheer repetition of the journalist's
jargon or the

Hegelianism- "the

deafened by the drone. They lend

to "live." Ears

(§ 12)

to

real is the rational" -these ears arc
inevitably

confuse a style exhibiting weakness, lameness, and

with "signs of health." Strauss himself

is

guilty of such sins, of

such confusion and mistaken judgement. Indeed,
Nietzsche discovers Strauss confessing

such sins whenever his style employs a "twisted, overblown,
or frazzled syntax" ($11)
On Nietzsche's rejection of the criterion of race sec, Sttmtliche Werke, Kritische
Studienausgabe VII, 645. For a discussion of the passage sec Geoffrey
Hartman, The
Fateful Question of Culture (New York: Columbia, 1997), 5-6.
to

,

kuIous neologisms, and
metaphors which confusc
ralhcr lhan
essay with

some seventy examples of
such

^
which
exemplify a

^

drawn from

errors

^

Strauss's text errors

loss of feeling for
language

and the growth of
barbansm-eonfusion
meaninglessness, and the inability
to differentiate.
These examples demonstrate
not a
healthy German spirit, but
a spin, broken, weakened,
and
so confused,
fact tha, „
reverses the nature and
names of things" § 1 and
(
finds "signs of health"
1)
where none
exist.

These

signs, Nietzsche insists,

do not signify "health." They
are a "cosmetic
veneer," an aesthetic illusion,
merely "painted idols"
(§12), the masks of an actor and
a
deceiver, a genuine pretender.
Rather than signs of the
cultivated philistines' health,
then,
Ihcy arc the "signs ol their
dominion [Zeichen ihrer
Herrschaft}" (§12), signs of an
attempt
never consciously formulated,
to impose a politicized
style upon the nation, to
impose an
imperative upon writers which
dictates the conventions to
be employed and the rules to be
followed. So long as these
"signs" are taken to signify
"health," tha, dominion
will

continue, for the cultivated
philistines' power rest on
nothing other than then ability to
control language and reverse

names.

From
name

the

German

power behind them, and

spirit. If

"to overturn
in

the start of his essay, Nietzsche
attempted to read these signs of
barbarism,

its

identify the

mechanism by which

he has attempted, as he confesses

idols" (§ 12)

"cosmetic veneer" and painted face; he does
so

culture, a genuine
ol

built, created,

German

power

ruled the

penultimate paragraph,

and reverse Strauss's topsy-turvy world,
he docs so not only

order to expose the "sovereign"
(§12) behind

died seeking, as they

in the essay's

this

,t all,

in

to rob

it

of

its

victory robe,

order to honor those

who

and constructed a culture worthy of

culture, has never existed

and perhaps never

the

its

sought, and

name. This

will.

The founding

a Reich and the wining of a war are not
sufficient in themselves to guarantee that the

German

spirit

has linally found a home. The "foundation
[Fundament]" (§2) of

Nietzsche says towards the beginning of his essay, must
be sought
built.

II

one

listens, this

nowhere more

demand can be heard

clearly than in Goethe.

experiment, and Nietzsche hears
uttered to

Eckcrmann:

For

hall

it

in

It is

in writings

a demand

to

I

home,

after, constructed,

and

of the classical authors, and

seek and an imperative to

a simple sentence which Goethe

a century

this

is

said to have

have endured hardship and granted myself no
116

'

"

have contmually stnven

;;r

TO honor such

S

s

capabthty

Y C to

arc

W

n °‘ ‘° mCreaSe

8
one

sptrits,

one

s character

^

- *- - - - - m ,

Ntetzsche says, „ , s

,

h

.

mpe rat ,ve that one conhnuc

qUantUy °f "knowledge" or
"information," bu,
«1). .ncreastng "capabthty" and

to tncrease

culttvahng the sptnt-giving

these are the tasks with
which Nietzsche closes his
cntique

demands, no doubt, presupposed
by every

They

"culture." Bu. they become
ever more
imperative wtth the arriv al
of the "modern as such."
For nothing charactenzes
modern, tv so
much as the loss of clear dtsttncttons,
the confuston of qualit.es,
the mtxtng of styles,
and
t

e obliteration ol individual
diflerences. Nietzsche

mabthty to recogntze "dtfference,"
(§2). If this "capability" has

recogntze dtfferences

is

been

saw

the

coming barbarism and

"the difference between
the philistine

lost, it is

forgotten in

because the very need to

and

make

its

its

opposite"

distinct, ons

and

modem, ty. Modernity,

Nietzsche says, "has forgotten
IO distinguish [zu unterscheiden]
between living and dead, genuine
and counterfeit, onginal
and imitation, god and idol"
(§ 12).

Recovenng

that "capability"

"practice of warfare"
in

an age

and learning

which Nietzsche eventually

to

calls "great politics." Practicing

wants to hear nothing of distinctions

that

"capability" to distinguish, for

it is

make distinctions depends upon

is

the

polemics

the first step towards having the

the first step towards differentiating
oneself from a

fabricated opinion, a patented model,
and a barbaric system. But as Nietzsche
brings his

essay to a close, he admits that the
"capability" of distinguishing, of deciding
and judging,
finally rests

j

In

on nothing more secure than

"? n

the

"instinct [Instinkt]" (§ 12). 27

However

fragile this

0n.g ln of Language"

(1869-70), Nietzsche provides his clearest
not the result of conscious reflection, not
the mere consequence
ct rporeal organization, not the
result of a mechanism located in the brain
not the effect
of mechanism acting upon the spirit
from the outside and alien to its essence, but rather the
S Pr
r
° TI an< C
euste Leistung ] of an individual or a mass,
corresponding to
tPf
]
r
!H°
h
ts character
(see Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and
Language, [New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989], edited, translated, and
introduced by Sander L. Gilman, Carole
Blair, David J. Parent, 210; for the original
text see Gesammelte
efrmition

,

•

of

T

instinct:

1

1

it

"is

^

Werke
[Musanonausgabe], vol. 5, 469). Nietzsche's concept of instinct is
neither simply a matter
of unconscious and irrational biology or history,
but rather marks the point at which the
two meet. As such, it is subject to both cultivation and education.
For a useful discussion
of the concept, see Thomas Heilke, Nietzsche's
Tragic Regime: Culture, Aesthetics, and
rolitical Education (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1998), 141-144.
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«

foundation

may seem,

Nietzsche insists that
"instinct" alone

-ng and dead, gentnne and
utsttnet*

alone

counterfeit, onginal

is at ti»e basis

this

coutageous ,n

depends upon an

,t

the

"instinct,"

use of language,

,ts

o end opinion, unmask
that

power of

actors,

and

capable of deeding between

and imitation, god and

of tite new "concept of
pttiitics*

Meditations. For countering
the
original

is

dead over the

fitst

idol

And

heard in the

living, the imitation

Iflttitttefy

over the

upon anab.lity and a "capabiUty,"
w.lhng
to

employ a powerful

pull the robes off
rulers.

So

to be

style, indeed, willing
to

fragile

,s this

"instinct"

being "patented" by
"fabricators" and incorporated
into a "system," and the
„ is, it ,s no longer powerful,
courageous, or offensive; it
is something stamped

resists

moment

with the deadening mechanisms
of convention. However
powerful those mechanisms
e, Nietzsche never
tired of fighting them,
of fighting for the cultivation
of "instinct
"capability,"

and

"spin,."

"concept of politics"
in

it

Nor did he ever

judgement on

own

his

However

insists that

final this judgement

investigations into style and

its

when he

depends on

may sound and however decisively it may
seem

It is,

role in a

new

first

"concept of politics."

its

its

Above

renew

all,

however,

participants to take off their

Untimely Meditation did nothing

"free spintedness." This is

nowhere

Untimely Meditation which takes place

Nietzsche acknowledges

whom

to

ought not be interpreted as an

rather, a challenge, a challenge
to

in public. Nietzsche's first

needed Strauss to bnng out

against

the topic of style again

it is

challenge Nietzsche, to engage in a dispute
and enter into a highly

and show themselves

discussion ol the

up

he says, "infallible." 29

It is,

sublimated form of political struggle which
requires

it

takes

"instinct" alone, but he
renders a

efforts, this statement

attempt to bring the matter to a close.

call lor others to

it

instinct for style:

end attempts to evaluate Nietzsche's

a

find another basis for his
polemical style and the

puts into practice.- Indeed,

Ecce Homo, he not only

may

how much

he needed Strauss,

he could wield his pen, sharpen

his style,

in

masks

else, but

clearer than in the

Ecce Homo. There

how much

he needed an opponent

and cultivate

his agonistic instinct.

See, for example, Twilight of the Idols "The Four Great
Errors," §2. For a
discussion ol the passage, see Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich
Nietzsche and the Politics of
the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism, 72-7 4.
,

Ecce Homo, "Why

I

Write Such

Good

Books," §4.
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He needed a combatant against

whom

he could cultivate his
"capabilities" and practice
a

iorm of "warfare" which
attacks problems and
positions rather than
persons. Nietzsche's

rr tt""
or,

ut

t

!

”

“

“• *-

««

e traces ol this contest,
of this agon, never
disappeared. Indeed, they
are

everywhere apparent
8°

>

SChC

'

S

the Untimely MedUations
which

baUle agamSt ‘ hc

practice of warfare.” and
each

Phlllst "’ c -

_

„

^ ^^ _

«* renews the contest and reftnes his

an attempt to found a
culture whtch would
the hopes born of the
Reichsgriindung.
is
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finally realize

?

CHAPTER V
SENT, MENTAL EDUCATION:

ON THE USE AND ABUSE Of

HISTORY FOR LIFE

thcre

tasting?
e

ui

an

oi

S

n ° dlspulc

ovcr taste and
me is a dispute over taste and tasting!"
'

t

— Nietzsche,

7 hus Spoke Zarathustra

Public Sentiment
If Nietzsche's

hme

and

to provide

th,s

to

was

nted.tahon on David Strauss
exemplifies "great polttics"
lor the

tts

author's

first "theory."'

w„h
and

content™-, hen

firs,

the second Untimely
Meditation appears

.ndeed, nowhere else does
Nietzsche appear more concerned

the activity of theorizing,
with the formulation and
defense of propositions theses
laws, with the construction
of a systematic framework
capable of illuminating

phenomena, even with

Even

eternal.

that mosttraditional of

the genre of Nietzsche's

regarding activity of theoria.

And

metaphysician." Not only
"eternal conflict”

theoretician

essay's task

is

young

men" -Socrates,

between the philosophers and

discover

how

its

politics is possible

when

the scientist,

and the

predecessors, a contribution to the

the poets, the sciences

the tragic plays

deeds, even great deeds, are possible

the contemplative,

philologist's intentions cannot
be easily

Nietzsche's essay, like

and the tragedian-and
is to

objects of theoretical speculationthe

essay-the meditation-suggests

yet the

assimilated to those of "the theoretical

all

no small

role in the

when theory

theory not only

and the

meditation-but the

falls short, to

fails to

arts, the

discover

how

provide the foundations

necessary for action, but contr ibutes to their
collapse. This problem, which

is

for Nietzsche

und Nachteil der Histone fur das Leben," in
Samtliche Werke,
10 gl ° Co11 and Mazzin0 Montinan (Berlin:
Walter de
Gruviet io x *'
f
- 43 " 334 AI1 references
to Nietzsche's wntings will be to this
edition.
T ranslations from the German are my own.
Citations will be given in the body of the text in
accordance with the essay's numbered divisions.
A translation of the text printed in the
Krilische Studienausgabe may be found in
Unfashionable Observations, trans. Richard T

r

....

'

'

'

:

Gray (Stanford: Stanford University
2

Press, 1995).

°n

tragedy

,

Nietzsche's critique of "theory" and the "theoretical man,"
see The Birth of
§ 15; John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space
of Tragedy (Chicago-

University of Chicago Press, 1991), 132.
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e

problem of

modem politics,

faffs to "great
politics,"

^Sk °^ the

81 ”*1 ,

theorist

and

lire

toa form of pol.Ucs whtcl,
returns

original

the^polit'

aimof politics— the founding
of

culminates in Nietzsche's
complex portrait of perhaps the
greatest politician of all—
the
cgis ato, Zarathustra—
but

Umimely Mediati° n The
-

example

o,

Us founding,

„ originates, and

^

finds its paradigmatic
form, in the second

-Viues not so much

a ".booty" of "great
pohties" as an

legislative,

and constructive capacitythe very thtngs broking
lorn Ntctzsche-s
polemtcal mediation on David
Strauss-and it
does so

-he

most press, ng problem of modern

what grounds

,s

a people to const, lute

politics:
ttself

On wha,

order to address

basts is the tndtvidual to
act

undermined, once every norm
believed to be objective,
necessary, and true
idiosyncratic cultural product
and every belief

historicism?

is

He had

difficult

dilemma of founding a people onee

identified the

problem

in his meditation

is

its

house" (§2)

is

the traditional forms

not

new

to Nietzsche's

on David Strauss, where he

observed that the "foundation
[Fundament]" upon which "the German
construct

reduced to an

subjected to the relativizing
effects of

foundations have become inoperative,
invalid, and unjustified,

corpus.

is

4

This problem, the
<>l

and on

once foundational assumptions
are

spirit

might

missing. In that meditation, however,
he had failed to find a

satisfactory solution to the dilemma,
and lacking the requisite resources, he
turned instead
to the task of conceptualizing
the profoundly paradoxical
consequences of the German

founding.
finally

The essay shows how

the long sought after unification of
the

German

peoples,

achieved with the founding of the second
Reich and the constitution of the modern

German

nation-state, not only failed to constitute
a people, but produced a nation at

variance with

itself,

alienated from

itself,

so fractured and fragmented that

it

was,

paradoxically, the very opposite of itself"un-German" (§11). This Germany, the post-

war Germany dissected
,

at-

°?
Z

\994) To3

On

in the first

Untimely Meditation, appears

in the ghostly

^arathustra as a political legislator, sec Keith Anscll-Pcarson,
GS a P° itiCal Thinker: The Per ect Nihilist (Cambridge:

f

An

form of a

Introduction

Cambridge University,

Nietzsche and historicism, see Leo Strauss, Natural Right and
HistoryX Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), 26.

" " hOUl COntCm ° r 8CnUinC
s Pedfici *y. a Place
where barbarism -this

-

N,e, S ehe uscd-,s confused

with

is

the

Cure and where *** ls substituted

for Oeis,
lor content, the
exterior trappings of the
slate for theoriginality
of a people
a culture. This is the
ddemma Nietzsche inherits the
second

Orm

(spirit),

an

U^iy m1,L

S ,aSk:

Hc mUSt diSCOVer

secure enough to transform
the modern
nation-state— Germany servesas
the paradigmatic examp,
e-from a ghostly

mere lormahty and a mechanical
process,
genuine public, a body

faced with

this

traditional instruments

mighi bring the

abstract, on a

into

a

living,

sensuous unity-a united
people a
’

politic.

problem, the second Untimely
Meditation avoids

of politics.

It

refrains

state closer to the people,

all

appeals to the

from suggesting constitutional
revisions

and

it

that

makes no attempt to achieve political,

social, or cultural unification
through patriotic calls for loyally
to the nation, its parties or
d-s political institutions.
Indeed, it shows so little interest
in , he traditional
mechanisms and

instruments ol modern politics that
Nietzsche instead (urns

,n the

opposite

direction— inward, to the sphere
of culture, to the sensuous core of
the embodied
individual, to the sphere of
sentiment, sensibility, and style, the
place of taste, judgement,
and subjectivity. This turn, however-the
turn from the
social

microcosm

ol the

macrocosm

individual-docs not represent a turn away
from

anti-political stance that has been
attributed to him.' Ralhcr,

it

politics

to the

towards the

signals a displacement of the

macropolitical sphere of the slate into (hc
micropolitical sphere of the soul and a recasting
of
the terms of political debate. 6

This strategy emerges
purpose:

in the essay's

have sought," hc writes

"I

Forward when Nietzsche describes

there, "to depict a sentiment

[Empfindung]

his essay's

that has

Walter Kaufmann
1

is the most prominent representative
of this interpretation. Sec
hilosopher, I Psychologist, Antichrist (Cleveland:
Meridian Books, 1964), 352-

S

lL n 1

.

NitUsche

.

s
csl conceptualized by Leslie Paul Thiele; sec
Friedrich Nietzsche and
,^
olUicsofthe Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism (Princeton:
Princeton University
199°T Scc also David Conway, Nietzsche and the Political,
(New York: Routlcdgc,
7), scc also Alexander Nchamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature
(Cambridge MA
Harvard University Press, 1985).
,i
the

,.T^

1

*

.

I

"2*

•
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rT„r

T

en ° U8h:

W

‘ t]

"

enuttl,

"

ftrs,

N

th th S
'

tnhmattons of

“~

tak,ng reVenge

whole of hts essay and

the

prov.des the

'

'

detente

11

by

to the pnbl.c (<fe
the problematic

w h ,c h

J

the terms of „s
tnvestigation. ,„deed

it

pohhcal program, and
whatever else that program
may
„ requires the abandonment,
the handtng over,
even the saenf.ee of a
its

'

sentiment, and not to those

cel

who

ought to be, by right of
Nietzsche's training and
vocation
h,s presumed aud,ence-the
speeiahstsof the philological

“

community,

°

"Y

J

° UmalS ° r
'

the

c public at large, to the

Foreword as
abandoning

"the people." This
to

,t

community

them, he intends

community's sense of

itself

and

is

to inaugurate

,ts

common

it is

something public and

sphere

ol sentiment,

he identifies in his

a public debate on public
sentiment on the

sense of community.

He

relinquishes a private,

and asks the public

to the public at large, if
the existence of the

common

share in h,s sentiment.

who

to those

to all, requires that

And once

to

the recipient of his
sentiment, and by

subject, ve sentiment to the
scruttny of the public realm
that sentiment, if

the readers of the

of professors. Nietzsche
abandons his sentiment

community of non-spec, alists,

’

one

feels the

if it

recognizes

community, of

way Nietzsche does and

Nietzsche draws the public intoa
debate over the private

once he brings these two disparate
and even

antithetical

realms

together- the public sphere of debate,
the private sphere of individual
sentiment-he
arrives at the topic which will
dominate the entirety of h,s meditation:
sensus communis,

community

sense, or, in the language Nietzsche
uses in the Foreword -public sentiment.

The sentiment
Meditation

at issue is

already announced in the

- "On the Use and the Abuse of History for

the process ol abandoning

asks the public

if this

he suggests that

it

it

to the public

and opening

title

to the

second Untimely

Life"-and when Nietzsche begins
it

up

to public scrutiny,

sentiment defines the public's sense of

itself

when he

and dominates the age,

originates in a sensibility that not only threatens
the foundations of the

public and the public realm, but that poses
a threat to the very existence of a public and a
people. History, the

Nachteii'

title

says, can be abused, can

become disadvantageous

for

life,

— a drawback, a detriment, something injurious and harmful, a source

sulfering and inlirmity.

when a people

is

And when

history

comes

dominated exclusively by a

to

dominate a people's sense of

sensitivity to history
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and a

a

of
itself,

"historical

'

2

SimV

proposes to .nvestigatethen

sentiment

hen

'

i,

' and th S
‘

'

S

*

he

"

,h

™

e

W

«D

Nietzsche
can become nor merely
disadvantageous, bur dangerous
a

prey to the "historical
fever” (Foreword!
reword) and iv,
becomes sensitive to the flow
° *>me alone, to the transience
of all thln
ihines
io the
u— contingency
gs and to
of all beliefs.it can even
lead, Nietzsche insists,
to "the destruction
of a ,*op,e lam Verderben
eines Voltes
(F° reWOrd) l ° ' he
“s sense of self, its sense
of unity and its
feel mg of community.
In this case, the
possibility of politics itself
is closed
falls

'

community needed
is

off the

to support

it is

absent, and the

common space

needed for

its

found wanting.
This

enactment

is the

case Nietzsche's essay sets
out not only to diagnose,
but to cure heal
and remedy. ..requires the
skills of a cultural
physic, an capable of illuminating
the effects
o. h, stone, sm and the
historical sensibility through
a diagnosis of "the peculiar
symptoms

SympWm

^

of thc

•** (Foreword)— its senhments,

judgement. Curing a people of
these symptoms and ridding
turn requires countering
those sentiments, tastes,

it

tastes,

and forms of

of the historical sickness

and modes of judgement with

others,

with ones that do not undermine
a people's sense of self but
rather reconstructs the
unity that

makes

action. Nietzsche

politics possible

makes

it

lost

and unites a people around a public
space of deeds and

clear that restonng this unity

reuml ication politische Wiedervereinigung
]” (§4).
|

meditation on David Strauss makes
clear,

is

is

not simply a matter of "political

Political unity, as Nietzsche's

not sufficient to insure the existence
of a

people or a public sphere of action.
Restoring a
I

in

lost unity entails, rather, the

oundations capable of uniting a public without
making

it

discovery of

uniform, of constituting a people

rather than a mass, of laying the
foundations for singular persons rather than identical
individuals.

It

requires, moreover, the substitution of a
certain utilitarian vanety of

liberalism responsible for each ol these latter
possibilities with
esoteric

lorm
F' r
'

ol republicanism

Nietzsche

s

its anti thesis— a

highly

which Nietzsche derives from Schopenhauer and places
at

concept

ol the "cultural physician," see his notes
on the subject
Physician," in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from
Nietzsche s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, trans.
Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey
Humanities Press International, 1979), 69-76.
.

T
The Philosopher as Cultural
,

.

124

'

“1 1“
.

**
erm ^"‘ng

.

'

P-Ple. Realizing

this goal requlres
the

(§4), of the antithesis

between the spheres of the
public and
the community and
its sentiment,
the political world
is a task which
aims to recreate public
sentiment, eon
sense

*e stale and its people,

and individual

actors.

communis

and practices a

It

-

w hat Nietzsche calls the "sentiment

politics of the sou,.

macro-political problem
latecraft gives

way

He engages in a

of a people

micro-pohtica, strategv to

— the failure of the German founding to

rcle a

found a German people

to soulcraft here, and
the result, achieved
through a sentimental

education, ought to found a
non-national nation of a
non-national people which
justified

8

is

both

and just.

"The Shattering and Dismantling
of all Foundations"
Nietzsche's task in the second
Untimely Meditation,

is, in essence, the
recovery of
the political. Like each of
his earlier writings- The
Birth of Tragedy, "On Truth
and Lie in

an Extra-Mora, Sense," "David
Strauss the Confessor and the
Wnter"-h,s intention is to
lay the foundations for an
ethical form of community
and a jus, form of politics, and like
each ol his earlier writings, the
second Untimely Mediation casts that
task in terms of a
never ending agon between two
opposing world views, the
poets, the artists,

first tragic,

and the pre-Socratic philosophers, the
second

practiced by the

theoretical, practiced

by the
proponents of science and post-Socratic
philosophy. In the second Untimely
Meditation,
Nietzsche stages the conflict around the
problem of history, and he attributes the
problem
his essay investigates— the loss of
the senstts communis and the destruction
of public

sentiment- to the absence of a
that

tragic

approach to

history be a science” (§4), and the loss of a

to history produces a series of

sentiments.

On

tragic, poetic,

and even

the

artistic

approach

demand

that history

become a

science,

irony,

and

far

the role of micro-politics in Nietzsche’s political
thought, see

and the

demand arises

which appear as a peculiar senes of symptomatic

Each of these sentiments— nausea, skepticism, apathy,

cynicism— results lrom

Nietzsche

ills

history. In modernity, the

Political, 47-50.
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from supporting

David Conwav

penooters
un crmimng

these sentiments result
in the closure of
the public realm the
ol public sentiment,
and the disintegration of
a people.

Nietzsche attnbu.es each
of these
Proceeds, he slow|y draws
out

ills

^

to the onset of
historicism,

lts

T „ey

and as

his essay

oss of being, the unchangtng,
and the eternal, and the
loss of the stability
grounds and

«— »

r
"7

•°r
**"

’

ternal

an

rest

— -i j!:r
i.

i.

are lost and with

(§ 10 ).

».

The

"tireless

the "the foundation
IFundanent] of

all

of man's certainty

unraveling and histoncizmg
of the moderns," Nietzsche

wntes, leads to the "shattering
and dismantling of all
foundations, and their
disintegration
m.o a fluid, dispersing becoming
[Werden]" (§9). Far from
liberating a people or an
individual, however, far
from simply freeing them from
the constraints of absolutes
and
opening up a space for a diversity
of practices and
values, histoncism, radically
practiced

undermines the possibility of action
and leads
subject,

and the end of the personality.
The

to the destruction

result,

of the

self, the

death of the

according to Nietzsche's analysis,

is

an

overflowing, stupefying, and violent
historicizing" (§7), which robs
individuals of the

power

to act, d.sorients the subject
with an excessive influx of
historical material,

produces a chaos in the soul of the
actor which leaves
lever."

When one

it

sick, suffering

from a

and

"historical

educated on a purely historical basis,
the "strange symptoms" of
lever appear as a senes of
sentiments indicative of the destruction
of the foundations
needed to act:
is

the mass of impressions storming
into the young soul is so great the
surprising, barbaric, and violent
impressions penetrate so
erin 8ly
,,balle d Up ln !lttle clum s "
P
that the soul can only save
P
m intentional
ltsell through
stupidity. Wherever a more refined
stronger
consciousness lay at its foundation [zu Grunde
lag], a new sentiment

^r

-

—

,

oubtless arises: Nausea [Ekel],

[heimatlos] and skeptical of

The young person has become homeless
customs and concepts. Now he knows: In
doesn't matter who you are. In melancholy

all

every age it was different; it
apathy [schwermUthiger Gefullosigkeii he lets
opinion after opinion pass
him by and understands Holderhn's mood when
reading Laertieus Diogenes
on the lives and doctrines of the Greek philosophers:
"Here I have
experienced something that already occurred to me several
times before:
hat the ephemeral and changing character
of human thoughts and systems
]
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this

n

S

e

tnc S

“

"

'

raglC ,ha " lhC dC '"
nlCS

" anyth, g captures the
underlying

wc

lake to be the only

,n,x,d Nietzsche finds
expressed in Hbldcrlin if

any concept expresses
the unity of the
sentnnents produced by
a purely

educau on

nausea, skepticism, and
apathy-,,

y ^

ZZirT™ °“
'

8

'

S

is nihilistn.

“ CVCryWhCrC PrCSCm
°f rC aUV,Sm
'

'

lhC

To

historical

be sure, the concept
appears

iB lhC baCksr<>l " ,d

«"

l<>SS

t

“y.

F™'

and the

irruption
of d tsorder, struggle,
and connict be, ween
thefaet sand values of
different cultures and

d, leren, historical
periods.

ut

lutal

ent/on

He

is

describtng, ,n other words,
the

breakdown of fixed
horizons and the onset of
"continually shifting horizons,"
tndeed, of an "infinite

m

tn

whtch no opinion, thought,
or system

perceived to be superior to
any
meaningful differences are
erased. So potent are the
effects of this breakdown
.ha, they lead not only
lo the sentunents of
nausea, skepticism, and
apathy, however two
other .sentiments are also
produced, and Nietzsche
discovers them a, the basts
of the people
Ills essay investigates"irony" and "cynicism"
(§9). These
<>lhc and

is

all

feelings are indicative ol an
indifference towards oneself
and the world, and they result
in rad, cal privation-,
he retreat

Horn an alten world where one
has no home and a turning
inward
sphere above all others. Indeed,
these two

that valorizes the private

sentiments are mdicalive of the loss
of the world

and

the

withdrawal of the individual from

it.

"The individual," Nietzsche writes
of

this

condition, "becomes hesitant and
uncertain and can no longer believe
in himself; he sinks
inward, into Ins interior, which
in this case means nothing
but the cumulative jumble of

learned knowledge that has no
outward effect, of learning that
It is

this

and cynicism
lar

that Nict/.schc finds so threaten,
ng to public sentiment

far

life" (§5),

history, according to Nietzsche,

world and how

is

of the foundations needed

lo,

indeed, arc

to support them.

The study of

ostensibly undertaken for the sake of action, in
order to

lo act in

it,

yet

it

results,

when

action but inaction, not in one's appearance
in the world but

Radically pursued, the study

and public action, for

from founding a people, they contribute

ol, the disintegration

learn about the

become

sinking inward into the sentiments
of nausea, skepticism, apathy, irony,

from uniting a public,

symptomatic

fails to

ol history results in
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radically pursued, not in

in

one's withdrawal from

what Nietzsche

calls the

"weak

it.

(^ 4)>

and

the^w^y"
emus conunums
He world,

,s radicall

W6a ^ neSS

is

'

needed to support

tse * f indicative
it.

The weak

rea

0fmten0my

personality

itself.

beC °meS dlSSOC ated

'

'

wor2Tceds
d and
:

loss of Ihe public realm

^^

y dlssoclated from the publ]c

disintegration and bifurcation
of P u bl ic sentiment

° f tbc

The
fr°

is

and

ineapable of acting in

internal

^£

worl d of semimenl

-

m ,hC

external

action, producing an
antithesis

m

era

being,

m

tv, dual:

symptomatic of the very essence
of the
"The most proper property
[eigensle Eigensckaft] of
this modem human

Nietzsche wntes,

is "the

peculiar antithes.s between
an interior that corresponds
to

no extenor and an extenor
that corresponds

to no interior- an
antithesis unknown to the
ancient peoples of the world"
(§4). Unlike the ancient
peoples of the world, unlike

the

tragic

Greeks

who lacked a radical

aware of the changing nature
of all

awareness of history, the moderns,
things, are racked

who are excessively

by an unbridgeable antithesis

that

separates the private sphere
from the public, the individual
from the people, the actor from
the world. When a world,
a people, and a public losses
definitive shape, when its
horizons
continually shift and finally stretch
out into infinity, action is
foreclosed and the public
world is closed off. Nauseated
not by perspective bu, by
the breakdown of all
perspectives, the actor losses all
purchase

on

becomes,

in other

leeling for

it.

words, apathetic, lacking

This, Nietzsche insists,

overcoming those things which so
renounced, and with
lost.

Lacking pathos,

form of

it

all

sense of

sensitivity,

solipsistic idealism takes

is

the world

and becomes

insensitive to

One

any pathos for the worid and devoid
of any

the only

means

violently press in

left

upon

open

it"

to the individual "for

(§4).

The world

reality, all feeling for "the real
[das

and

,t.

itself

must be

Wirkliche ]" (§4)

feeling, a quasi-pathological state

emerges

in

is

which a

over and a radical, even barbaric subjectivism
emerges:

the habit develops of

no longer taking the real things seriously; from
this
personality" on whom the real, the subsisting
makes only a
s lght impression. Eventually
we become ever more negligent and indolent
towards the outer world [im Ausserlichen] and
widen the precarious gulf
between content and form to the point of losing all
feeling for barbarism
[zur Gefuhllosigkeit fiir die Barbarei
] (§4).
arises the

The

weak

loss ol the public

world Nietzsche describes here, the

personality into the sensuous content of subjective
interionty as

lorm of the world-this phenomenon

is

it

retreat of the

loses

all

weakened

sense for the

not only symptomatic of the destruction of a public
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space and the onset of
a barbaric .nd.fference
u> the world; „ also
indices how damaged
er " a "° r d ° f
SeM,ment haS beC ° me Far
from free
'"S up the individual to freely
,
Sent ' me " tS aI>d sens
‘ tiv ' t
y. *he loss of the real
resulting from a radically
practiced
pract^dh"
htstortetsm robs die
subject of the very
context needed to cultivate
the inner world
o senttmen, and w„h „
a free personal,
ty. And lacking a
point of reference in reahty
and
° FCtr a * n ^° 3 so ,' ps s dc
subjectivism which is the
very opposite of historical
object
objectivity, the
^ individual
'

'

—

'

'

loses

instead involuntarily

Play acting

is

all trnct
ir
trust in
in itself,

the personality

and one besms

asrhlsTo^rh^

to ,ose

becomes too weak

° neseir

,n hisiory

"
-

to act ,n

Thc

rdare t0tmst *emselves, but

the upshot of an excessive
education in history. History,
Nietzsche will argue

later in the

second Untimely Meditation,
can serve the invaluable function
of providing
exemplary examples of deeds and
acts, but when one is
educated exclusively in

histoty, all

perspective

is lost,

the great

and the mediocre become
indistinguishable, and the
overwhelming accumulation of historical
facts "bewilders" the individual.
Not knowing

how

to act, uncertain of oneself

and the world, "no one runs the

person, but instead disguises
himself behind the
Ihe poet, the politician"
(§5).

Out of fear and

mask of the

timidity,

risk of baring his

cultivated

man,

own

the scholar

one assumes a

role and a disguise,
and as a consequence the individual
becomes mendacious and deceptive, dishonest
no, only

to others, but to oneself." Historical
education, Nietzsche argues,

unethical and irresponsible, indeed,

personality
one's

own

C“

and robbing

impulses,

°"

it

it

forces them to

makes

individuals

become ham by weakening

the

of the strength to risk being themselves.
Rather than acting on

o ne becomes a mimetic machine and

lhls‘development

learns

how

to efficiently

copy

and Nietzsche's interpretation of it, sec Irving
Wohlfarth
a
lhC
R
°
6
°
f th e Subconscious'; Phantasmagorias
°"
of the Master Buiidcr
r
(with Constant p
Reference
to Giedion, Weber, Nietzsche, Ibsen, and
Beniamin " in
A " Architecture of Our Minds. " cd. Alexandre Kostka and Irving
Wonllarth (Los Angeles: Getty Research Publications,
1999), 141-198.
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CrS

™

^

COmC an ,m,taUOn ° r a Self
-“

th en, radically
practtced

o

htsfonctsm results

senttnrent, learns "to
dance, to patnt

2

persona

\

w htch

tt.es,

ourgeotste
11,6

the loss of the

self:

face, to express itself

»

.

"Inwardness

"

the realm

abstractions' and with

*he retreat front the
world and the

results

culm, nates in a "coerced
external uniformity"
(§5). Rather than
"much less free ones," one
finds 'anxiously

wo wear

ngs

y

its

8radUa,,y tC '° Se USelf "

m inwar

P'ay accor. Along with the
,oSS of the world

may

disguised untversal

the bourgeois cloak
of universality" (§5).

human

And however much

look like a genera, w,
II or a untversal
subject, Ntetzsche writes

VCry °PP° s ' te

capable ol neither

-» "eternal subjectlessness

real action

,e

mg er SubjectlosigkeUY

the

it is

in

(§ 5 )

or genuine feeling.

Thts loss of the subject and
loss of the world,

pubhc senttment, culm, nates,
accord, ng to Ntetzsche,
po meal doctrine— utilitarianism.
No one

this

in

dtsmtegratton of the publtc and

a extremely influential
ethical and

should be surprtsed, he writes,
when under the

influence of "utilitarian vulganty,"
a "people pertshes of petty
egoism and wretchedness of
OSS, f, cat, on

and

selfishness, after first falling
apart

Nor should one be
sense of

itself,

surprtsed

when a

and ceastng

people, having lost

all

to

be a people

a, all" (§9).

sense for the world and

all

breaks apart into a form of
individualism which knows

how to act only
accord, ng to a strictly utilitarian
logic. Having withdrawn
from "an infinite horizon" into
-Ihe tiniest egotistical realm,"
havtng become concerned only
with the private sphere and
sell -interest, this

logic dictates that the individual
"compromises, calculates, and

accommodates himself to

the facts; he does not seethe but
merely blinks and

his ovv n or his part) s ad\ antage
in the

This mdiv, dual

conformed

advantage and disadvantage of others"

— the bourgeois subject-conforms to the facts, to objectivity, and

to the facts, this

form of individual neither

them, instead, the individual joins a

political party

acts to

This form of individual

others, a prudent egoist

is

rebellion

and

interests

having

through

rational choices

and instrumental

and a member of what Nietzsche hyperbolical describes
ly

resistance,

(§9).

pragmatic and clever, deceptive and exploitative of

world system of egoism." Such prudent individuals,

finally,

recognize the

and so they welcome the founding of a
130

to

change them nor seethes over

and pursues

compromise, calculation, and accommodationthrough
rationality.

knows how

state

futility

as "the

of

which protects them

m the

r°

'

mPrUdenCe ° f the rebC,llOUS

as a very spec, a,
mtssion

and

resistant— "the working
Casses

the worid system
of

egoism

supposed to become the
patron of a„ prudent
ego, sms
”1

'

^

tery

' i.

P0 '' 06 ^orces from ihe

,n

h^msm y

1

republ.camsm and public

th,s ethtca,

and

pol.tical

stat
‘

,t is

order to protect them
with the

liorribie eruptions

1

antithesis of

The

that is to be founded-

sp.rit, the result

of imprudent egoism"

of a rad.cally practiced

doctnne culm, nates, Nietzsche

insists, ,n

a state

mihtary and pol.ce capacties.
The paradox, cal

s

result of this enterprise,
a state w.thout content
or genuine specificitypoUticd unity without a people
or a culture of tts own.
A police

owever,

,s

state is

founded to protect

self-interest

where

there are

no

Sentimental Education

The

task of the second Untimely
Meditation

is to cure a people of
the h, stone, sm
responsible lor this paradoxical
outcome and lay the foundations
needed to unite a people

reconstitute its

world.

It is

sens* communis, and open up a

a task for modermty

emphasizes

in the

in general

southern Germany:
aspire,

reunification

antithesis

and for Germany

concluding section of the essay's
fourth

the strictly political goal of
reunifying the

which we

space for action and

"I

and

autonomous

hereby explicitly declare tha,
to

in particular,

sect, on,

states that

i, is

deeds-a

i,

make up

it

northern and

German unity into

life

highest sense to

political

after the destruction of the

between form and content, between
inwardness and convention ”

founding task;

and as Nietzsche

extends far beyond

which we aspire more strongly than
we do to

- the unity of German spirit and German

public

(§4).

This

is

a

seeks to legislate the foundations for
a genuine political community by

reconstituting public

sentiment-a people's common sense and

its

sens* communis- and

negating the antithesis between the private,
inward sphere of sentiment and the public

world of convention where deeds and acts
take shape. Each of these tasks-founding
a
people, reconstituting
in

its

common sense, and opening up a world

of action-is earned out

response to historicism, and each requires that the
rule of history— the "sole sovereign"

(§8) in

modernity— somehow be overthrown.
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oldest topics in politieal
phitosophy— the education
of the youth— and it
leads him to an
nettpeete dost, nation.
It leads him
to the origin of
political philosophy,
to Plato More
an a
e ,se. Plato rejected
history, change, and
becoming; more than anyone
else he

“7 "

-

to ,h S
'

ZZoT'
’

'

° nt0l08y bU
'

t
PCnJS
UPO " ‘ hC

‘ '

ike P,al°’ he

CUlt,Va, '° n

°f

historically

and like Plato, he believes

that those

sedimented practices of the
past

in

iLsche

«* - founding Of a
according to

.

principles,

’

unchanging, and being.

pnncples must

new pedagogical

free the

young from

the

order to turn them attention
away from the

SP ere of change and becoming.
For Nietzsche and Plato
altlce, the micro-political
sphere
*
Senl mCnl -‘ hc SOU| -'°
battle ground where
fundamental political problems
are
°ught, and lor Nietzsche
and Plato alike, conquering
the sphere of sentiment
is only
possible on the bas.s of a
"new form of education”
(§10) which robs the young of then
historical consciousness
and allows them to forge, the
past. This is the micro-pol,
heal
q uas, -Platonic strategy Nietzsche
deploys to solve the macro-poli,
ical problem motivating
his essay
the lailure of the German
founding to found a German
people-and his
meditation presents this strategy
as a l.beratoty enterpnse,
as a freeing of the individual
'

I

rom

the coerced uniformity of
the historically educated
bourgeoisie, a freeing, finally

which founds a new form of individual
and a new generation. "True

historical natures,”

Nietzsche writes, are "great fighters
against history, against the blind
power of the real,”
and they light "not for the burial
of their generation, but for the founding
[zu begrtinden) of
new one" (§8). Nietzsche devotes the final
sections of his essay to this foundational
task,
to the legislation

of the foundations capable of transforming
the modern

nat, on-state into

genuine public united by a public sentiment
and a sensus communis, and he frames

the task

as a curative, healing operation
which provides the antidote to the historical
sickness

through a new, sentimental form of education.
Nietzsche uses two, quasi-technical terms to
introduce the principles guiding

new (orm

ol education.

historical sickness" (§

These principles- the "balms and remedies effective
against

10)— serve

as the "antidotes to the historical," and the terms

Nietzsche uses to conceptualize them indicates their
anti-histoncist character: "The
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a

this

the

d
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-w,

n ations needed to
support a people and
public realm,

order to broach the
problem of sent, mem. The

,S,0)

«.

JZJ.Z

and Nietzsche deploys them

firs, of these two
terms-, he
ahistoncal— provides Ntetzsche
wtthan educattve principle
capable of real, zmg

emand

that the

The

the

in

P.atomc

young

forget the past. "Wtth
the term 'ahistoncal',
he wntes, , destgnate
•he art and power to be
able ,ofor e, and to
g
endose oneself wtthtn a Itmtted
horizon"
,)
hts same art and power
also provides Ntetzsche
with a means for combattng
the effects of
tstonesm, lor whereas a
radtcally htstoricis, educatton
ends in the loss of honzons
as
.story expands tnto
tnfinity, an educatton
grounded in forgetting some
portion of the
past
Ntetzsche knows i, netther
can nor should be forgotten
entirely-allows the

«

lorm the honzons and
perspectives necessary
whereas the h.storicztng of
needed to

gam

modems

the

young

to

gam

a purchase

in turn results tn the

to

on the world And

deletion

of the foundations
access to the world, the
ahistoncal -its direct antipode
-serves as an

educative principle whtch allows
those foundations to be
reconstructed: "The ability to
sense ahistorically" Ntetzsche
writes, "lays the foundation
upon which something

just,

healthy,

and

great,

something

that is truly

human, can grow"

(§1), Only on the basis of this
education in sentiment- the cultivation
of the ability "to sense ahtstoncally
[unhistorisch zu
empfinden]" -can the young cultivate a
sensibility and a sentiment which
is their own, and
only on this basts can the young
form the horizons necessary to begin acting
in the world.

An education
combating the

grounded

effects of a

in the ahistoncal, then,

pedagogy dominated by

not only serves as a

the study of history;

it

means

for

also lays the

foundations necessary for action and deeds.
"All action requires forgetting"
(§1), Nietzsche
insists,

and without the honzon provided through an

perspective opened up through a turning
the

world and

falls

diligently tracks

law" (§

1)

the past,

one loses one's bearings

in

prey to the immobilizing sentiments the second
Untimely Meditation so

down-nausea,

and inaction requires
Nietzsche on

away from

act of forgetting, without the

skepticism, apathy, irony, and cynicism. Avoiding apathy

setting one's sight

this point that

he makes

it

on the

future, not the past,

and so

the law of action. Indeed, he

insistent is

makes

it

the "universal

of action, the apriori, transcendental condition of possibility
for every deed.
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thl
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i“

CglS,atlVe aC1 -

^

h0nZOn

d

“

--

*at one forge, what canno,
be meorporuied
one, attention on "what

, to

n .ton can deeds
emerge, and no, only
deeds, bu, just

WmeS

-

'

S

assim., ated into one's
honzon.

means exhausted w„h

>“

made

The

trough

possibilities

b e> (§

deeds- "every jus, deed"

the forgetting of

wha, canno, be

opened up through forgetfulness
are by no

th.s revelat.on, for
the

very same act of forgetting,
Nietzsche admits
very same deployment
of the ahistoncal, leads
no, just tojust deeds-,,
also leads to the
very oppos.te of the just
deed: "The unjust deed"
(| I ). The ahistorical makes al,
sorbs of
cods possible, just and
unjust alike, for while
it opens up
horizons,
i,

e ahistoncal

closes others off

may

be the transcendental
eond.Uon for every just deed
and forgetting may
'
e the only basis for action,
bu, because the horizons
they enable remain limned,
closed
and Unite, they cannot help
but be unjust to the past.
Whatever their ments-and Nietzsche
is the lirst to insist
upon them- they shut most
things out, close off access
to the past and
fmally appear less enabling
than terrifying, dangerous,
and deadly, "a dead sea of
night and
obi, v, on" (§ I ). Nietzsche
himself calls the ahistoncal
"the most unjust condition
in the

world" (§

1

),

and for

all its

necessity,

it is

a condition which

is

ungrateful to the past, blind to
dangers, and deaf to warnings"
lor

all

who would

risk acting, but a

nevertheless "narrow,

(§l)_a necessary condition

dangerous one.

This danger make the ahistoncal
a necessary but insufficient cure
for the
histoncism.

The ahistoncal may

us necessity lor every actor, but

lay the foundation for deeds
and Nietzsche
it

own,

more

it

is

And though

but,

it

because

may allow

it

the

closes others off,

young

does not necessarily unite a people and
restore

needed to achieve these goals, and

remembering

the past, not forgetting

and another (orm of judgement

is

study of history. History, as the

only disadvantageous to
life— the

life oi

life; it

it.

legislate

that

its

i,

cannot insure

It

may

that

a

to cultivate sentiments of their

sensus communis. Something

something

is

to be

found through

Another form of action, another form of sentiment,

needed, and Nietzsche proposes to find them through
the

title

to the

also has

a people and the

of

cannot insure the justness of the deed
or the actor.

open up a perspective on the world,
public world emerges.

may

ills

life

its

second Untimely Meditation indicates,

is

not

advantages, necessary advantages, ones which

of individuals-cannot do without. These advantages
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'° ** Pr° blemS reSU
"' ng fr° m thc
Whatever
n o, b
cannot
be incorporated tnto
the horizons opened
up by the ahistoncal n,u
s be forgotten
.e zsche say s and
because this act of forge,,,
ng makes one dumb to the pas, and
tnsensutve to
„ results
judgements about the pas.
whtch are themselves unjust
the
end, the problems result,
ng from the ahistonca, are all probiems
of judgement. Thc
a ,tant ol an .solated
alpine valley,” Nietzsche
wntes, someone whose
'

“cal.
,

,

“

-historical

.

knowledge and sentiment

is

very limited,-

may

be protected from the
dangers of

histoneism, bu, the "judgements”
whtch result from this limited
horizon will mevitably tend
injustice (§ 1 ). Isolated
in a valley, horizons
drawn tight, such alpine dwellers
are cu, off from the rest
of the world and their
judgement suffers as a result. Thetr
sense of
the world and abtltty to
judge it are, as Nietzsche
says, "very limited," and
„ is precisely
this limited ability to

p

ibility

examples

judge and lack of a sentiment
sensitive to the world

of unjust deeds. History

ol jus, deeds,

models

that

been swept away under the Hood

is

needed, and an openness to

it,

in

that

opens up the

order to find

can guide human action once
traditional models have

tide of historicism. History

must be remembered, and no,

merely forgotten, because htstoricism
destroys the
it

traditional guideposts of action
and w„h
those absolutes which once
resisted history's corrosive
effects. After histone, sm,
history

alone remains, and

deeds of the

past.

if

any guidance

Only

the

for action

is

to be found,

one must appeal

to the great

exemplary deeds of history are capable
guiding action once

its

traditional foundations

past and ability

have crumbled, and so everything
depends on one's sense of
tojudge it. The "general welfare
"
[allgemeine
Wohlfart ]

decidedly broad term for

this

In Nietzsche's attempt to found a
ol

on

— Nietzsche's

"everything"- "would require nothing more
than

widely as possible the seeds of the power
tojudge

the

to

sow

as

[Urteilskraft]" (§6).

new form of education capable of curing

the

ills

histoneism, everything, including the "general
welfare" of a people, really does depend
Urteilskraft

,

on the power tojudge and the sentiments judgement
expresses.

people's horizons are to be opened up,

if

the provincialism of the alpine dweller

overcome and a genuinely open public space

is

to take shape, then the ability

sense must be educated, cultivated, and allowed to
grow.

And

if

If

is

a
to be

tojudge and

deeds are to emerge

in that

public space, just deeds, then judgement and sentiment
must be directed towards the past,
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towards the exemplary
actors of history

“r,

founda

ns of acuon have been
swept

rdoes

that of the histortcist.
It

not direct

everything that has been,
nor does

°

J eCt ''

Uy

who are alone can

it

its

,

hln

away Th
-

r

'

.

,

s

attention to the past
indiscriminately to

seek, Nietzsche writes,
"what naive h.stonans
call

(§6) Rath6r ‘ han bUr> ing
‘ he fMUre under
lhe indiscriminate
accumulation of
as ( arhfacts,
f
this approach to
histoty seeks to preset
what the future needs

am

7

'

rar6St

° f thmgS

.guous terms- the

”

the h '* heSt a "d

loftiest, the rarest,
the h.ghest, the

amb, gutty, Nietzsche argues,
mythology" (§6)-of

w

tch

greatest of things"

that relieves the
htstorian

"objectivity." Htstory

must be judged and

tnterpreted.

The

is

(

§ 6).

These are

greatest-and

precisely thetr

it ,s

of the "mythology" -the
"bad

not a "photograph"
(§ 6),

,t ,s

something

loftiest,

the rarest, the htghest,
and the
greatest- these are quaht.es
which are endlessly fought over,
qualities whtch judgement
as trouble dectdtng, and
no science, least of all a setence
of history, has ever been able
to
resolve the quarrels they gtve
nse to. Htstory, Ntetzsche
learned from Schopenhauer
is not
the provtnce of sctence,
for "htstory has to do
with the absolutely partteular
and with
mdtv, duals," and so it rematns
tmpervtous to the genenc concepts
used for scientific
class, fication. Histoty,

approx, mates

Schopenhauer argued, cannot be a
science, "and thus

in all respects to

a work of fiction."” So too

qualtty to Nietzsche's approach
to htstory, and

is

it

there a certam fictive, aesthetic

when he

tlluslrates what this approach
looks
he pamts a picture of the histonan
whtch places the problem of judgement
al its very
center. The "genuine histonan,"
he writes,
like,

observes all the motives and consequences
of an event with such nuritv
?
'
it has absolutely
no effect on his
subjectivity; this

wWchThTrainter'
hich the painter,
St UOUS sea
hrn
h
things,
however,

in a

that

the aesthetic

is

l^gebundensein] from personal interest with
stormy setting among lightening and
thunder or on a

contem Plates

his inner picture; it is that total
immersion
a superstition that the image that things
produce in
such an aesthetically attuned person
reproduces the empirical essence of
things. (§6)
’

This

is

a telling example, and

history and historiography. All of

t
Jayne

in

it is

its

it

provides the key to Nietzsche’s understanding of

imagery

is

drawn from

the field of aesthetics. Indeed,

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and
Representation,

(New York: Dover,

1958), §58.
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vol.

II

trans

E F

,

drawn from a

,on g his.ory of works
which al.cmpC ,o

necessary for a very specific
aesthetic effect and a

detennme ,he condiho.

very specific aesthetic
sentiment— the
sentiment of the subltme.
Schopenhauer, hke Kan,
before him, uses , ighte
„ ing lnd
thunder" and "a tempestuous
sea" to exempltfy
those things m nature
which give nse to the
sentiment of the sublime,
those things which
to be sublime."
Schopenhauer’s

we>^

-ding, hke
dynamica
capa

Kant's, these

,y subltme.

av mg a

eo

dynamic

forces of nature give rtse
to a

Viewed without

dynamic

el

I

ect

on

merest, safely free from
danger, these forces are
the observer as well

se ves over our self-interest,
and, in the face of

and

cal, forth the strength

dynamic sentiment- the

:

They can

elevate us over our

temfying powers, they can
arouse courage

of resistance. Nietzsche,

a remarkable slight of hand,
makes

these forces the object of
his genuine histonan,
bu, rather than locating
them

discovers them

nature he

h, story, in the great
htstoneal actors

whose exemplary deeds call forth
our courage and stiength of
resistance. What the genuine
histonan observes-free from
the
self-, merest of "disguised
egoists and partisans that
wear an objective look," free from
the
interests of the times and
"the opinions of the present
moment" (§6)-free from all these
interests, the genuine historian
observes the
great

historical actors,

and observing them

free

sublime has always been defined
as the

great- what

makes

in the past is great

from

dynamic forces of

interest,

they are judged sublime.' 2

great, indeed, as the absolutely
great,

What

from

it

is

the

the genuine historian exemplifies,
and

what Nietzsche's youth must learn from
such a histonan,

free

and

The

and worth knowing and preserving"
(§6)-that Nietzsche

the object of the genuine histonan."

sublime— the ability

the past, the great

is

the sentiment of the

to judge the great, the ability to
observe the sublime figures of h.story

self-interest

and

free

from the

interests of the times.

And having

learned to judge

Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation,
t
vol.
trans E F
Xayne (New Y ork: Dover, 1958),
§39; Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement trans
WernerS. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hacked, 1987), 28
§
I

’

.

Jean- Francois Lyotard has developed this
approach to history in The Differend:
d/
Phrases
in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den
Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of
}
Minnesota Press, 1988), esp. 165-169.

„

.

Cultur,

„^ ee r

^

S(
?

^ as

in Kritische

Verhiiltniss der Schopenhauerischen Philosophic zu
einer deutschen
Studienausgabe, vol. I, 779.
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and observ e, having
become immune
'

l

to ihe Historical
fever an d

tlic dangers
of the
^e y° Uth areoncea
a
n
ready
£
to act— on the
basis o f the sentiment
of the
'

sublime^

SUb ime an

^ ' h38 8 for act on

'

the sublime

'

mora^ sennment.

|

°^ CnS

0 „e' s

perspectives.

It

,t

the

'

’

indeed, for moral, just
action, because

elevates one over the
narrow horizons of the
ahistorical
elevates the actor over
self-interest and the
interests of

preservatton or merely
pnvate tnterests. Inrleed,
so powerful is the
sublime, elevating
heightening effect, that it
allows one to "overcome
oneself [rfc/r
altogether.

(§ 10)

suspends the will
~
ill to 031(111310
calculate, to
to compromise,
and the narrowly interested.
Iti trees
frees one Irom
from ”,h»,
the tiniest.
It

to further the

merely pnvate

egotistical realm,"

to

accommodate oneself to

the facts

accommodation. Without regard
for
Wlt ° Ut rC8Urd f° r

from the need

and seek one's own advantage
through
the narrow, the limited,
the

pnvate and the personal,

lha ‘ reSlnCtS the growth
cu| hvation,

and development of persons
,t
genuine deed possible. Only
on the basis of the sentiment
of the subltme
-

ma
is

-es the honest,

a genuine act possible, and
without

Nietzsche, this

is

a moral truth

it,

one loses oneself under

al, rational

calculators

the

canopy of history For

and instrumental

rationalists

must

learn:

m(
/

TY

ia tei

/

/

°U no lon 8 er succ eed

in

holding fast to the

your deeds are sudden
d
E n y ° U accom P ish the greatest and mostclaps, not
wonderful
ii
, n
things, they will
still descend silent
and unsung into Orcus For the moment
>ou cover your deeds in the canopy
of history, art takes flight Anyone
who
C CUlale ° r comprehended in
a
f
should hold last in prolonged
quaking to the incomprehensible as the
su ime [/// longer Erschiitterung
das Unverstandliche als das Erhabene
nS
e] m 8ht bC Called rationa1
but only in the sense in which
°
^chU\Ir
]! of L
Schiller speaks
the rationality of rational people:
He fails to see some
S
a ChUd SCeS; he fails t0 hear some
thm 8 s that even a child
hears
5

S*

/

1

’

’

i

)™™

(§

What

the child sees

and the prudent, calculating adult misses, of
course,

possibility of acting without the

dictated

up

examples

until

canopy of

the

history, of acting otherwise than history
has

now. The child-and even more so

of Nietzsche's great historical

is

the youth educated in the sublime

actors— sees
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possibilities that

go beyond

the

«

'

-

—

prudent world of adult
understand in o

“*

- —*• “•*-

name— monumental

“

history.

Monumental

the history of great
historical acton
'•

°V

opened

it

up,

the history of the

who did not wear »hc

h,SU,nCal

;
These
h
singular individuals did

h, story ts

achieved what appeared
incomprehensible
not calculate in
accordance with reality.

and expanded humanity-,
he

achieved .something great,
and to

rational, the real,

this extent, they

They overcame it

and the possible. The

achieved something sub

and

incomprehensible. The sublime,
then,

is moral not simply
because
Inundations of prudent,
self-limiting and
self-negating calculation.

eXPOSCS lhe mdiV,dUal l
°
(

;;;
O onto,,

makes

that

rr

°f

appeared closed, destroys
limits
lhC

Wry 8reateSt

a, the greatness

|

Th,S

das Grasse ]

It is

is

It is

moral not simply

also moral because

“nun

once existed was a,

what monumental history

it

opens up

appeared natural, and opens
up the

Whal an

iS

that

that

consequently will probably be
possible once again"
possibility— this

shakes the

incomprehensible that-, f one
has the power

the honest deed
possible.

.

on/ons

it

(§2).

history teaches-

least possible at

The

one time, and

possibility of

teaches. Possibility

is

possible the

incomprehensible, the sublime, and
the great are possible-,
his is the lesson Nietzsche's
youth must learn. And they
must learn it, Nietzsche writes,
as a "commandment"-

"Whatever was once able

to

expand the concept of 'humanity'

further,"

monumental

history teaches, "must be
eternally present in order to
enable this expansion" (§2). This
the imperative, the moral
imperative, that must guide the
4
just deed.'

is

NietZSche Pr< vides two other imperatives
as corollaries: "know thyself” (Slot and
?
a PCOpl C
"ever conceive „ !ote noble a d
WheTTr! °r Speakr S to lhc dividual,
the second concerns

X™
,

'

-

lhe

,

***

“mun.ty

of the individual and
Act 8m
by the imperative "to expand the concept
of
V' lhc expansion of humanity through
deeper sell -understanding and a higher
, lh
,
’
hC
lm Pe atives is necessary and not arbitrary because
!" itc-Ts'T
"humam
unity
tef^r
acks d definitive
meaning in modernity and must therefore be thought
anew
dojustice to the problem; any contraction lacks

“

ta

™

J*commanded"
‘

“

!'

,

^

legihmactalto IteriteTh^onci'sm'™
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suprahistoncal

Whereas

(§ 10).

traditional gui deposts

the first of these
lavs the f

have been destroyed
by histoncism,

pranistoncal,

one

s

C

ga/e from what
ernal

2;
"

^^

htstonan— reveals

,s

in the process of

StaWe

says very

- --

Itttle

becoming

to

«-

*>

—

Nietzsche writes, are
"those powers that divert

about rchgton. but

its

what lends existence the
character

«.0, The

f

second UnUme.y

treatment of histoty-of
the genuine

the aesthcttc core of
a certain tndtspensable
form of

history— monumental

h, story.

The

greatest htstortca, deeds
exceed comprehension, and
so
cy arc subhmc. They
elevate the observer over
the gtven range of
htstortcal posstbth.ies
and so they elevate one over
the endless sea of
htstortcal facts and into
the suprahtstortcal

onumcnlal htsloty demonstrates
the
moral tmpcrattve
hlStOIy and
(§ 10>

-

^

,t

possibility of possibility,

commands- possibility must be eternally

mt ° elern,ty: ” The foundation

m de imiting

fr°

'

-

stablli/ ‘ n g,

of

possibilities.

up,

Holding

fast to the

to

"overcome oneself

this elevating,

1

,

elevates one over

of man's certatnty and rest"
this

extremely

who arc capable

sublime stops calculate

Far from holding one down,

commands one

posstble-

and dosing off horizons,

refined loundalton places
certainty in the hands of
those
the subltme."

all

and on the basis of the

in tts tracks

fragile,

of "holding

and opens up other

empowering foundation

[sick uberwinden]’
(§10),

fast to

lifts

one

and expands

humanity's horizons.

Everything really does depend, then,
on the
last to the

aims

at

sublime and the

taste for

it,

and Nietzsche's education

nothing more than the refinement
of

und dor Geschmack]," Nietzsche
[Seiner und sublimirter]"

(§4)

public sphere reopened. After

if

writes,

a people

all

ability to judge,

that ability.

in

on

the ability to hold

monumental

"Judgement and

history

taste [das Urleil

must be made "more refined and more sublime
is

to be unified,

its

common sense

restored,

and a

foundations have collapsed, after every norm
of action

has been swept aside, the sublime alone

is

left- the incomprehensible, the elevating,
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that

Y

-

*•

“"™

'

o

“ «*

» - «*.
r,

— »zi
^
«.

M"!^r™rVyT^™r"«ri^”
ercomes
and perpetually

pre

»"«-«> »«.»- Th ,.

.tself

“''LT”expands its horizons- not
through the
expansion of the nation-state,
no, through the
pragntattc utilizatton of
its nnhtarv forees
hu,
roug a people s elevatton
over its borders. The
nahonal culture which
1S

aCU

*

ov^d

tUr^°f l h c su blime,

the nation-state. This

is

^

Nietzsche seeks to

a culture of constant
self-overcoming, and constant^y^

a culture of the non-national,
for the sentiment

exceeds the confines of the
nation and
is

cu lure sec

lat

lifts

beyond the borders of

one over

it.

The

that

it

expresses

singular individuals united
by

the nation,

and the republicanism they
practice- their concern for the
"general welfare," their heroic
public spmtedness-extends
far

beyond any nationalism. Indeed,
these singular actors

com ines

o, the nation-state,

and the greatness they

These "singular individuals,"
Nietzsche

live in a republic high

strive for extends to all

above the

of humanity.

writes,

na

tins dialogue between
spirits continues, undisturbed
bv the wanton
oisy chattering of the dwarfs
that crawl beneath them
The
task of hisiorv
IS to be their mediator
and so to ever incite and Icnd sriength
to the
production of the great. No, the
goal of humanity cannot possibly
lie in its
P
end point, but only ,n its highest
exemplars. (§9)

^

This

is

the goal of Nietzsche's
sentimental education -to raise humanity
to the level

of ns highest exemplars.

education, a

new

It

proceeds from a moral imperative that
founds a new form of

culture, a new, non-nationalist

and- most of all -a new

form of cosmopolitan republicanism,

generation attuned to the sentiment of the
sublime.

It

lays the

foundations for a people by teaching them
to hold onto the elevating force of the
sublime;
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it

opens up the most public
of nnhlir

.

^^

humanity; it makes
genuine aCtj on possible
by^monsllui^ Us^ssib^lt^itV^
foundations for a new
fornr of state ,
hrough a new fom ,
of

the sensus

communis by Cul ti Vati ng a

taste for onI

incomprehensibly sublime
In the end ,h„

y sentiment open to all—'the

essay— the
founding to found a
German people.
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^°'

failure of the

German

e

CHAPTER VI

THE REVALUATION OFVALLES

.SCHOP£W^[»CR AS

i“&;K,sr
—

p

Nietzsche, Twilight
of the Idols

"Pieces"

Nietzsche’s four Untimely
Meditations have someth,
„g of the
.ncompiete, and unsystematic
about them. They have
this

rr
an

,

oft „

character,

emP ty nUmenCal

d,V,S, ° nS tha '

"" ^

it,

the

first

instance

^

the ‘ r

enough,
h d
destroy,
ng «heir continuity. They have

fragment

too,

co ected together by
Nietzsche and pubhshed as
a -book.- stand
one another, without mtroduct.on,

sections

because the med„a,,„„s
,„

apparent isolation from

foreword, or preface articulating
then untfymg ,dea

almost as pans of a whole
incompleteness, as

left

’

incomplete and unfin, shed.
Th.s sense of fragmentary

if the project

of the Untimely Meditations
had been suspended before

Nie
typically describes his works as "writings"
rather than "books." On this
f importance,
and its
see Jacques Derrida, "The End of the Book and
the
Begmmng of Writing " Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977 6 - 26
esp. 15 - 20
),
rii vti nnt
distinction

,

,
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.

it

'

be concluded, did no,
escape Nietzsche,
recognition.’ indeed, he
emphasized the
ragmenutry nature of his
collect, on of essays

when,

in preparat.on

for the publication
of
c Untimely Meditations,
he appended to the
t,„es of each of h.s
four texts the cautionary
tern,
"First
pieces [
ece: Dav.d Strauss
the Confessor and
Wr„er,"

W:

On

P,ece:

the

R

"Second

Use and Abuse of H, story

Educator," "Fourth Piece:
R, chard

N,etZSChC
„

'

for Life,” "Th.rd
P,ccc: Schopenhauer
as

Wagner in Bayreuth." 3

'

S

deSCnpti ° n ° f

- "pieces," or as "fragments,"

WS

.

~ lheSe t0° get at lhe sense of !he

Meditations

wTh*

°„aM

^

y^"™^

01

"

n

"parts

"
'

German word

?° m P leteness °f

Untimely

WOUld 1,0 ncedcd 10 bnng the
Project to fulfillment. Origi^y
he
60 c ssa - s man m °re
the four that were completed
*
than
>
and published as his
"I ?
°,
As late as 1885 some
twelve years after outlining
the prdec he
a
,
addm 8 three additional essays to
a new publication of his
initial output On Nict/lchl?^
see Richard T. Gray,
8 8 P lans lor lhe meditations.
"Translator,
!!)
ash'°'1fle
Observations, The
Complete Works of FriedrkhNietrsZvolo jif r
<Sta nf” rd SlanloRl University
1995), 399-400. For Nietzsche's
Press,
:
orieinil ”On7i’
n
he lists his thirteen planned
V i'of ly Medlta ‘'ons'," where
titles or fibtLi? see
ta ,
nS ranS
T Gray
e ai 'h

rT

’

,

.

v”

Aftc™«nW/^

,

t?

»1e
letters' of 2?<Sbt

'

**"*

*

'

^“t^y 1^?m

^

Kritische Studienaus 2a.be cd GiorpinGoiV
Gruyter, 1986) vol 4

(SS^Ts

\

'

^

**,
™" BU low nedrich Nietzsche, Samtliche
Briefe,

F° U lh fr men ry character of the meditations,
see
§,
^
y 187410 Ervvin Rho ^e, in Samtliche
Briefe, vol. 4 201-203 In
iL U m
7
u
N, c tzsc he, concerned that he was
failing to achieve the unity of style
,n
,
and thought
called lor in his first meditation,
^
asks his friend to subject the mode of
"presentation
un
^'
s
°
secon d Untimely Meditation to a "hard and
brief" critique In Rhode's
j t ?
his letter'
’

.

^

-

1

’

’

f

^

,

re

^

e

^y's fragmentary^w^k

th
lhe
criticisms, see Richard T. Gray,
"Translator's Afterword
Observations 404. See also Jorg Salaquarda,
"Studien zur

cha^tr
character. On
O^Rh
; s
Rhode

Unfashionable
unzeitgemassen Betrachtung," Nietzsche-Studien
13 (1984), 1-45,
Cancik, Nietzsches Antike: Vorlesung (Stuttgart:
J.B. Metzler,
,

esp. 9-15*

1995), 81-2* J

dUati0m

UnW^sTtyftess m9), *f

’

trans

'

"

in

zweitcn

R 1 H °"mgdale (New
'

Hubert

P

Stern

York: Cambridge

On the fragmentary character of Nietzsche's writing, see Maurice Blanchot
Nietzsche and Fragmentary Writing," in The
Infinite Conversation trans. Susan Hanson
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1993), 151-170. See also Philippe LacoucLabarthe, The Detour," in The Subject
of Philosophy trans. Gary M. Cole (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 14-16, esp. 17-18.
,

,
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y

Sliicke" and could be
used as
cultural

problem

that

its

translation

extends beyond hts
hi

—

own

,.r

'°

'

J pol '" tjl
- Philosophical, and

concerns about the
completeness or

completeness of his essay,
Thts problem, which
makes
n C rCdl SeS and dOCtnna re
W ° rkS

,t

more and more difficult

to

'

'

f ragmenurry

even

modern,| y'

and aphoristic character
of Nietzsche's own

that ,s first diagnosed,
but not yet

T
hT ^

»d whtch accounts for the

t^'

'

S lHe

° nSet °f n

'

named,

in the

writings, ong, nates

Untimely

mcreasmglv
an epochal

The

^

h lism in Western
modernity and the break-up
of the great
'

philosophical and theological
systems of thought of the
past that gave purpose
and meaning

u

political

else to

communities and individual
existence, Nietzsche has
done more than anyone
comprehend and diagnose the
debilitating

effects of nihilism in
modernity with its
isorienting destruction of
historically effective
systems of value and horizons
of meaning

and no one worked harder
than him
purposelessness

it

produces

to find the path leading

beyond nihilism and the

individual and collective
life alike. In the
Untime,

Meditations, Nietzsche
inaugurates this twofold task,
at once diagnostic and
curative and
1,5 f° Ur 6SSayS he
mak6S h S flrst
adempts— incomplete, fragmentary,
and
necessarily p,ecemeal_,o
transform the extraordinary
loss of meaning and
putpose

m

'

'

modernity into a liberating and
exhilarating opportunity

to formulate the possibilities
of a

post-metaphysical, secular existence
without sure footing.
Nietzsche's project of philosophizing
without foundations reaches a
certain apex in

he

third of his

Untimely Meditations, Schopenhauer
as Educator. The essay has long
been

A nsell- Pearson

Keith

is one of Nietzsche's few
readers to see the problematic of
imely Meditations (see An Introduction
to Nietzsche as a
PnIitl^l°Th
Thmke \l Ioer ect Nlhlhst (Cambridge: Cambridge
University,
1994] ^(Ph!
c
u
HlS C a
Ans 11 - Pears °n appeals to Nietzsche's Untimely
Meditation
i
Onlhln^fn^Ah
f
On
the Use and Abuse of
History for
Life citing its ninth section. It should be noted
however that the motif of nihilism finds its
clearest articulation in the meditation which
>penha uer as Educator. There Nietzsche confronts
the problems that defines
all ofhN fn 1 re explorations
of modern nihilism: the "senselessness [sinnlossV
life (§4)
m
.l?
fil
the worthlessness of his existence
Uinvert h seines Daseins]" (§3), and the
worthlessness ot the present age [Umverthe der
gegenwartigen Zeit\"

T

T

ye

th

U

f

/m
i

’

,

^

.

[

(§3).
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es for the

output and define his

final

political

purpose

phtlosopherof the

To achieve a decisive

human hie alter the death

to

Nietzsche

future:

insists, is

of

God and

"revaluation of all values

a pohttca, task, perhaps
even

the devaluation of
all values.*

"

to

Tim

task

*

petit, ca, titsk
an age bereftof goals
ceding hose of the
nation-state, and in
Schopenhauer as Educator, he
formulates „

emso, what hewdl
problem

ol nthttism

latter cal, "great
politics.-

and the

crisis

of values

it

Great politic,

foments

in the

necessi tated by historical
events, designed to respond
to the

y

C

‘

mcanms

politics.

As

politics all

though

is

Nietzsche's answer to the

West.

new

It is

a strategy

political conditions created

m m °dermly lhrou 8 h an expans, on and

refinement of our concept of
Nietzsche writes in a note to
himself, modern nihilism
requires that we "learn

overagain [ Uber Politik umlernen
mrd],” and we must do

so,

he believes

in

Untimely Mediations,

^^^ti^mown as the ^ond

orr°*

h cons 7mation of
Nietzsche's early philosophy
/
/
Psychologist,
Antichrist [Cleveland: Meridian
Books 19641

''(UriSCte
33)

1118

rXZ ChN.

Sflt^
c 61“65). In the essay that follows,
I develop
work, but I proceed along different lines
to reach
importance and meaning of Schopenhauer as

®
hit also
ulo-is that
.,i cr
ideas
appear in r'
Conway
dil lerent conclusions about
the
.

i

'

'

’i

s

Educator.

Twilight of the Idols Foreword; Gay
Science, §335. On the problem of vhIup
modernity and Nietzsche, see Gillcs Dcleuze,
Nietzsche and Philosophy,
,

S
Mil 7

rl dTll
'

•

\

I

’

fJ £’!r
m
Th Wl 10
S
aU

HaJtefcollTrT' 1991
ioon),
HarbcrCollins,

trans.

in

Hugh

b a University Press, 1983), 1-3; Martin Heidegger
ower as Klwwledge and as Metaphysics, vol
'

I

D

Vid Farrcl1 Krcl1 - Frank A Capuzzi (San Francisco:
n
Fu
? and. Antonio
Michael
Hardt
Negri, Empire (Cambridge

M

h

Harvard University Press, 2000), 353-369.
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ecls

rethinking the concept
of politics independently
of the

|

pra^*
actices and goals of
p
the modern

As

is

state

7
.

well known, Nietzsche
formulates his concept
of great politics

0"
'Petty politics- of the
European na, ton-states
and the, r reduchono,
questions about the
administration of the
affairs of the state
and the destiny of
nations Thi
reduction, Nietzsche

-the

,

pohiZ""

heheves, results front
a failure to reHec,
on the underiying value
support state-centered
politics, a failure
that .so appears
as an unwilhngnel
H
pulses and aims of the nationalistic politics that i,
promotes. The importance
of great
W '"' n8neSS t0

r

“—

“

^

state^and even more, to
engage in the

capable ol combating

modem

*e evaluative framework on
Nietzsche makes

it

much more

l

ucl

-rpnse refused hv the moderT

difficult

problem of creating values
nihilism without recourse
to the imperatives of
the slate and

which they depend. Already,

Sctopen^rasEOuvUor

clear that he believes
the philosopher, properly

undemtood

,s

'

best

suited to the task of
evaluating modernity,
dominate values, for the
philosopher more
an any° nC £,SC "
achieving the freedom necessary
to evaluate the values
of
the present age irrespective
of the consequences
'

and condemnations

is

so-and

that

may

result ,f this

Nietzsche presents a strong
case for his argument in the
third meditation- then
.he political philosopher
of the future must be ready
to investigate spheres
of life typically

held at a distance from
political

Nietzsche at

least, that the

life

by state-centered inquires

into polities. This means,
for

philosopher of the future must be a
political philosopher

cakes up the tasks traditionally
ascribed to political philosophy:

and legitimate conditions for individual
and

collective

life.

The

who

legislation of thejust

Unlike the traditional task of

political

philosophy, however, Nietzsche's
philosopher must legislate these conditions
independently of and in opposition to
the predominate figure of the
political in

modernity— the
Nietzsche

el

nation-state.

With

tectively transforms

this

its

reconfiguration of the task of political
philosophy,

domain and purpose.

77
tr ans. Walter Kaufmann
and R. J. Hollingdale (New York:
Vintage
image, 1968),
! 968^ somp!’
§960. For a further discussion of this passage
sec Lester H Hum
Nietzsche and tli£ Origin of Virtue, (New
York: Routledge, 1991) 39-40- see also Tracy
Y
7'
8,
(Urbane, and Chi^ag^
h
flnTvT
University of Illinois Press, 2000), 21 1-212.
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the problem of nihilism
necessitates it_anri
h„
and vei
yet because
no known values exist
,
to replace the devalued
values of tradition, any
new creation of values appears
lo lack thT
resources necessary to give
,1 the legitimacy
needed to make I, more than
JU s, an arbitrate
act of power, repression,
or domination. Nietzsche's
political philosophers-,
he
practitioners of what he calls
"%/ter pohtics .hohere
-therefore
,

,

mm,"

m a difficult, seemingly untenable situation:

find themselves

They can no longer claim, as
Plato's
Philosophers could, to be
philosopher-kings whojustify
their creation of values by
drawing on the resources of an

eternal

realmof values

leg,,, mated by an
ultima,evalue
called "the Good,'' for the
emergence of nihilism has rendered
precisely such eternal values
v

alueless.

'»

At the same

time, however, Nietzsche
wants his political philosophers
to be

more than just philosopher-tyrants
who leg, slate values withoutjustifying
or legitimating

sr^SKiSSlSSt'
^m^PobUcs ofFriendship trans.

George Collins (New York Verso^997Jean Lue
ncy, The Imperative Community,
trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus,
Michael
Holland
d Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1991).

Ecce homo "Why
,

I

am

a Destiny,"

§

1.

Twilight of the Idols "The Four Great
Errors," §2.
,

148

z
‘

"

7

L““ n '

“

»«,

==rr—
E—
r
:tt
* »- «» » «.

..

appears to lack a legtttmate
basis-, hat Nietzsche
wrestles with through
hts very las,
writings. • The essay
which ,t ,s firs, confronted,
however Schopenhauer as

-

MUCa,°r

deSen eS

Part CUlar

SCrUtmy for “>

'

more than any other of Nietzsche's

'

writings,

to
12

manages

to respond successfully
to the political

problem of meaninglessness
and

^

n e
bl
n hi
her :i
and P hil °®Pher-tynmts as
Nietac
sene,
h? see
Lcstcr
se^stoH
Hun? Nietzsche
v
"i
Hunt,
and
the Origin of Virtue, 42.
i

A

^T

it

applies

of

*5? Paradox Nietzsche faces in his efforts to revalue values is
in his discussion of Schopenhauer
as Educator (see
.y
7
[
Nietzsche.
Philosopher,
Psychologist, Antichrist , 133-152, esp.
134-135). Kaul mann
c aims that Nietzsche fails to resolve
the paradox. It would be more accurate
..

Mw° cT

d™*S”
by
alte Kaufmann

to say

of
Sc/wpenhaueras Educator at least, that Nietzsche does
not attempt to resolve the paradox
b
JUStlCe
,l an
hereby announce lhe only possible solution to the
devaluation
S,l°
o all
J°
u
values in modernity.
This
is the
-

^

thesis that will be tested in the
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pages to follow.

purposelessness ansing in
modernity without falling
prey to the charges
of philosophical
tyranny, aristocratic
conservativasm. or the
blunt imposition of
power from above.'
Political

Theology

In

Schopenhauer as Educator,

meaninglessness and purposelessness
perspective which

,s

Ntetzsche approaches
the problem of

m modernity from the perspective

informed, however, by
the recognition of
an even,

of

politics a

that,

Cher, is

more than any

responsible for the crisis
of nihilism. This event,
as Nietzsche would
later
proclaim is the death of God.
The decline of the power
of

'

religion over social life
the
eclipse of theological values
effected by the forces
of secularization, and
the waning of the
U6nCe °' the ChUrCh
mod

^hy-.hese developments,

modern

life

Nietzsche believes, leave

senseless [sumlossy
(§4) and existence "worthless
[Unwerth

]" (§ 3 )

bereft

genuinely meaningful meaning
and devoid of real purpose.
The decline of religion and
Che onset of nihilism are
for him synchronic
phenomena, onginating out of the
"agitated

ol

seas ol secularization
Che

bonds

problem

that

in

[VerwehUchungY

once suppressed

order to

(§4), and taken together, they
effectively dissolve

social antagonisms, creating
a social crisis requiring

pre^nth^ phlhwoDhvaTa^

^ *?
<

rafues derend^upon

'new

arist.

l

r

d**

pCrceive

^

hand argUeS
-

f

new

shor teomings in solving

lhat

N

'“'

s

this

™alt£n of

T^i^ers^ty

188 )- Ofelia Schutte, one of Nietzsche's
^
sterner
concludes her attempt to "unmask"
Nietzsche's politics by condemning it to
an
aught in the " ide°logy of superior/inferior
"
and good/evil" (see
f
Nietzsche without Masks [Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 19841
193). Mark Warren similarly charactenzes
"Nietzsche's political ideology”

crit cs,

,

'

Is

C

MA.:
Mi
Press 1988],Tt^^^^
MITTe1ri9881
3). Fredenck Appel characterizes
Nietzsche's philosopher-legislator an
artist-legislator who is in truth an
"artist-tyrant" (see Nietzsche contra
l

R

Democracy

flthaca-

9] 16
St
finally careless ‘y asserts that " no man
came
loser to the lull realization
t
of self-created 'values' then A. Hitler" (see
Friedrich Nietzsche
York: Penguin, 1979], 86). Responding to
all of these criticism and
’

fVf

do^f^hTfulW^l
New

T’

’

concerns wodd
k ° ltS Vn bu * dshou,d be said that the
are to o often the product of partial
Y
nnH nftp
°r
and
often hurried readings
of Nietzsche's works. At the very least, they do not
apply to one
of Nietzsche s works Schopenhauer as
Educator.

a

r

’

,
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COnC

'2‘fir
an age

whtch forces once

direct, on

or purpose, and

it

lUal,ZeS lhC CriS,S

is

«4),
ChUrCh

only thanks to the

power of the church,
Ntetzsche

relh T ’
•'
wrttes
es,

^

delT

^

haT^
“

" m0dem ty
'

'

'

'

mP° Se mean '" g

^

au hontative value „
denves from mmntaining

r:rr"^

offtechurchis

result,

check-

now

"*

'

(M ,

—

lfe

social order.

These are the charactenstic

°

letZSChC * ana ' yS1S

mhtltsm an enormous

developments

denved

,t

^

hC

by ,he deCli
"'"S

As a result

assumes

Under

Ntetzsche argues, "the state
wants peopte to worshtp
previously worshipped in
the church"
(§ 4 ).

With ° U ‘

anew out of itself -m

the state

PUrP ° Se °"

value of ref

a

“
“

mt° "* V °' d

^

Cleaning and purpose
to „fe,

^

m0der "

lh °

to organize
everything

provide a bond that w,„
ho,d these tntmtca,
forces

^ SOClal

modernity as an

7

heldTc^

believes, that anarchv
does no,

thechin-ch

by

i

^^
previously

thts role.

And

,ust

fro "> 'he authoritetive

the forces of

the vety

that broadly define

same

idols they

modernity accord,

°P^er as Educator, and they make the problem of

ng

Sch

political

problem.

I* magmtude can be gauged
from the fact that the
solutton to the problem of
nihilism appears ,n the
development of the modern state
a
development that, for Ntetzsche
a, least, serves to
exacerbate the problem by shift,
ng the

locus ol soctal authority
without in any

way resolving the problem at its
source: Nihtlism.
Rather than solvtng the problem
of nihilism, the development
of the modern-state obscures
d through its assumption of an
authortty no more leg,,, mate
than that previously held by

the

church.

The

result, as

Ntetzsche makes clear in his
meditatton,

is a form of political
theology, a secular, zed theocracy,
produced by a transference of value and
power from the

religious sphere to the secular
world. Far from liberating

religious

dogma,

this transference

human, ty from

of value and power subjects
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it

the chatns of

to the control of a

new

,

'

idol, the

modern

state,’ "the

colder
nil „
oiuesi nf
ot ail
cold

monstpr« "
monsters.

4r

_

rii/-> a
The danger that Nietzsche
uncovers ,n this development,
an, whtch has arguab|y
only
understood, lies in the new
form of power that
emerges, a form of
power

thaulperates on

i r rr

an obscure

,n

seir' concea " ng

fash, ° n

,s

^

°h s
e well-known form
of a monopoly on
physical v.olence, for as
Nietzsche
writes— and Bismark's
state-founding strategy of
"blood and iron" is no
'

-

,

'

^

cr

doubt hts

point here

more

than

create a

anyone

new

it is

else,

the

who

social bond.

military despots
[mUilarisclien GewaUherrscher] ”
(83)
use the state to "organize

everything

On

the other hand,
however, over

power, another form emerges

Schopenhauer as Educator,
of repression

in

far

anew out of itself" and

and above

this first

modernity according to
Nietzsche's analysis

more

form of

in

subtle in nature and free
from the obvious objections

and coercion.

This second form of power
does not act publicly through
force, violence or
coercion, but pnvately, through
the consent of
individuals. Nietzsche
discovers

state's ability to exert its
,LS

power not only

ab "' ty 10 nnUenCe 3nd
'

own

in public life, but

re * ulale

it

in the

m private life as well. Through

education, the shite

is

able to promote

its

system of values, values which
extend beyond the promotion
of the

state as the
legitimate entity lor providing
"protection from internal enemies,
protection from external

enemies, and protection from the
protectors" (§7).“ Under the
"new
(§7) that
life

emerge

in

as such into the

modernity, Nietzsche argues, a
new form of power appears
political sphere, politicizing
the

extending Ihcgnp of the

state

beyond

e

0f

that

draws

seemingly neutral domain of life by

the sphere of juridical-political
institutions. Nietzsche

N W

°n lhe Phenomenon of political
e Carl Schmitt,
seeS
s?h^XhC'
f
Political,rf
Theology:
Four
Chapters on the Concent nf
f trans. George Schwab
vereignty,

uicoiogy,
theology
‘

political conditions"

(Cambridge, MA.:

irth

MT Press,

1988).

Michel Foucault has done more than
anyone else to advance Nietzsche's analysis of
of specifically modern power. Sec,
for example,
of the Prison trans. Alan Sheridan (New York:

toJSSS

Pantheon, 1977).

,

n a yS S ° f
le of culture and education in
promoting the power of
the "idor'c'dlcd
idol called the
mYsslate fforeshadows Louis Althusser's
investigations of the role of
culture and education in furthering
"ideological state apparatuses.” See "Ideology
and
atU SeS/'
Uni " and Phil°sophy «nd Other Essays,
P
,

RrfweSf rt
a
brewester
(London:

FV°

'i

^
New

m

Iran’s.

,

Left Books, 1971).
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Ben

uncovers
'd

it

stole that

work

at
,,

promoto^ ml
promotes
culture only

i

promote

itself"

(to\

A

»

the Pr° mOtl0n

th£ S,ate S

° f P hll °s °phy

Kulturs tacit

uhe sees n

,

'

to be

one of

at

its

work

in

tasks"

'

°f

-ever,

the

state's promotion
of
osophical education—
for Nietzsche, any
complete education
culminates in the study
of
Gr kS dem °nStrated

"

NteZ
and
d

WnteS

S
rV,
CI

hUS r
"° ° lhCr mtCreS

’

Cn S ” (§8) ThlS
'

iS

-

7'
ua ton o modem

;va

politics.

indi viduals into citizens

as

nation-state as ca

•

in order to

modem stale reeards

2 :T
P

™
promotion of the German

1

the fact that "the

tSRt

in Bismarrk-'c
Bismarck s

**

- m °t,VCd * own
,n, crests.
*
iS

‘

in thC universi
‘y lhan

-

educate submissive

Culture and education,
promoted by the

who are obedient to the

v.nues of the nation-sta.e
and the freedom

cvclopment

it

state,"'

of the problem tha,
Nietzsche uncovers

subjects by subtly inscribing
them with

its

having

"The

,,

imperatives of the

power even

state,

bis

transform

state, constituting

them

as these citizens celebrate
the

provides from foreign
powers. This was the

tha. Nietzsche witnessed
firsthand with the founding
of

German Reich and the
unleashed in the press and
public less than three years
before he composed
Schopenhauer as Educmor, and this
experience undoubtedly allowed
him to see that,
numphalism

it

whatever hbert.es and rights
may be won when individuals
achteve the
individuals as citizens remain,

hie

in the

state,

form of the

citizen,

to the public sphere of
th t polls.

development

With the

powers

figuring

is itself

where

the political sphere

of the nation-state

undertaken, and

it is

in

modernity,

the discovery

and foresight of the

third

.

development of a power operating

human beings

By

17

Nietzsche further conceptualizes

sphere by clanlying

rise

that accounts, ,n part, for
the originality

Untimely Meditation

the

subjects of the state.

in classical political
philosophy,

however, the politicization of the
private sphere
ol this

status of citizen

life-pub, ie as wel, as r,va,e-,s
drawn into the order of the
P

a development unknown

was limned

more than anything else,

its telos. If

the

this turn

ol the state, then the hig hest

the

deployment of public power

at the previously unpolitical
level

modern

into citizens of states,

from

and

if

politics

to

of the private

of the nation-state transforms living

citizens are thereby destined to be subject
to the

aim of life— its proper

telos and purpose-can only lie
n wilhout so muc h as saying so, has furthered
Nietzsche analysis
nf
n
t
f
ol ihn
the politicization
off the
private sphere and deepened his diseovcncs.
See Homo Sacer
Sovereign Power and Pare Life

S!^

10

Agam b

’
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m serving the state.

According

to this loeir

existence and the very
fibers of

rhetorically
* of h,s fellow
uow Clti
ct.zens
zens.
(

„

^A ,

order

titan
an

^

—
and

^

"Wh “^ “

PUrPOSC

*

The
Th answer he
ic

^

receives
leceives

is
is

to

^

PFaCt ' Ces enab ** ng the
articulation of popular

r

P° WerS ,ndeed

thlS

'

whtch

through

reduces

eusc

life itself is

r

ble

’

.1

"

'

the state

'

SUlte

^

<§8 >

mst.tut.ons of culture
and education that

»

—

estranges

it

this

rife

sacrificial

sacnfice"

(*) a

> Penetrates

from

itself

rife

and

energ.es towards the
ends of the

,ts

state. C.tizenship,
then, accord,
ng to
e s account, ,s a
pract.ce of self-sacnfiee,
corresponding to the "dogma
that

rife.

aim of humanity and

to a confusion of

The aim of life- the a.m of
individual existence-can
only be a political

porit.es ,s capable of solv.ng
the

controlring,

asserts

a man can have no higher
duty than

that

« 4,» Nietzsche attnhutes the power of th.s "dogma"

to the state"

poht.es and

a.m,

citizen"

demands against

form of c tizenship
points towards a

sacnftced to "a state that
demanded

0n y

that the state is the
highest

sc.ee

^

become a good

appears more as a strategy
for regu!atin
g conflict and maintaining

.

P< rites

lnscr ' bes itsel ^
nto the very core
of
'

life

and manipulating existence

meaning of hfe? what

is

state act, on. Nietzsche

problems of
itself,

rife, if it is

capable of alter,
ng,

so that existential

problems-what is the
the purpose of ex,stence?-can
be persuasively solved through

does believe that ex,stence

is

maleable, that there are different
fonus

of existence- tragic, Socrat.c,
and Apollinian are some of the
examples his writings
prov.de us with
but he does not accept the
claim that the state is the

-

appropriate vehicle

for such transformations.

"Any ph.losophy

Pmbkm deS DaS€im] ran >* altered

that believe, that the

problem of existence [*,

»lved by a political event poliHsches
Ereigniss],"
|

Nietzsche writes,

"is

a sham and pseudoph.losophy
[Spaass- und Afterphihsophie]'

Such a philosophy, he suggests-and
Kulturstaat— would
itself into the

was

this

(§ 4 ).

the purpose of Bismarck's

result in a total politicization of
existence in

recesses of an individual's being by
dictating

its

which

the state pushes

ends and reason for existing.

This sort of all-encompassing philosophy,
Nietzsche recognizes, can only be a product
of
Hegel's time" (§8), a period

w hich could

f SaCri r
c°
r

C

1

"Politir^'Nn

r£

of Minnesota

mi 'Z-Zi

!f

T

believe that "the founding of the

^^

new German

ed by P° l,t,cal lheol °gy. see Jean-Luc Nancy,
;5

Ct

'
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S Libre « (Minneapolis: Universriy
'

Reich represents the
decisive and deviatino

thc r„u

<

^ 08

or a

^

thc

extension of state power
into "existence"

None of
’ ability
to

these developments
establish

ii "‘
°"

n

would have been

possible, however,
without the

to o W „ values as the
dominate va|ues of

»**>•*» «*

Jr8UmCm ThC
'

m ° rC

Temanation of values and

the

itself

cy a,C ,call/cd to an
unprecedented degree.

’

rr^

w

c

'

w

„„ ,2

««,„

Undamental P roblem

the role they play

^

hm

meditation addresses

lies in

m furthering

speeifie forms of life and
types of power. In
Nietzsche's en.iquc of .he
modern state this
problem, as wc have already
seen, is solved through
the spheres of education
and culture
n
esc two realms, the
suite imposes its values
through the promotion of
its own interests.
re
of culture, 11 docs so-al
p
least in the German
example Nietzsche takes as his

peculiarly

modern

m<^e ~ through Bismarck's

"CulturkampJ” (§7), an attack on
the

last

vestiges of religious

authority exercised by the
Catholic Church, designed to
draw a sharp line between
church

and

state

and solidify the

Ihe ease ol education,
entitled, al ter all,

suite's

which

Nietzsche writes, "selects
its

own

where

who reflect

its

own

who would attempt

it

selects just as

the opposite, as

manv as

i,

Schopenhauer

the stale according to thc highest
value of philosophy,
in

thc perspective of thc slate,
of course, such a decision

"Were someone

through the

dear, the suite selects Us servants

truth— could be assured of not secunng
a salaried position

From

is

the needs and interests of
the stale. "The stale,”

As Nietzsche makes

according to their values, and
anyone

Nietzsche-h,s meditation

suite exerts its influence

philosophical servants, and

institutions" (§8).

did- to evaluate and critique

as marriage and divorce.
In

the real conllict lies for

Schopenhauer as Educator- the

promotion of philosophers

needs for

is

power over institutions such

a philosophy department.

would be perfectly justif ied.

to appear," Nietzsche writes,

who really acted as

though he wanted to measure everything,
including thc
by the standard of truth, then the statebecause above all else it
allirms its own existence- would be
justified in banishing such a person
and heating him as an enemy, just as thc stale
banishes and treats as an
suite,
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8 Hn
'

thal SeLS
ilSelfatovc

state

and wants to act as

its

Nietzsche's essay revolves
around Precisely this
conflict between the
slate
itc and
t
the
philosopher, between a
state that affirms
its own existence
and the values that
support its
existence, and the
philosopher who wants
to ev-ilmto a
the state according
to the criterion of
truth. And it is
here

with the

Nietzsche turns to the
fash of

legisia^

nihilism without recourse
to the values of
the

modern

nation-state.

Culture

Nietzsche presents his
revaluation of values
in Schopenhauer as
Educator as an
essentia
y .beratory task. In the very first
section of the meditation,
he declares that his
essay exists to promote
"the true liberation
of life [«ter teahrhafien
Befreiun, des Lebens, "
'
a liberation of life from the
values of the state, and
a liberation of life from
the rituals of

citizenship that

ways.

I.

,t

depends,

enforces. Nietzsche
conceptualizes the process of
liberation in several

of all, on a rejection of
laziness and fear-fear of
the suite, fear of
public opinion and the
values of the day, and
laziness in adapting
toconvention and
avoiding the struggle to become
oneself. Becoming oneself,
or rather obeying the
imperative to "be yourself!"
(§ 1), defines the task Nietzsche sets
on, for his readers
firs,

a, the

star, of his essay,
.1

and

if

it

requires turning

away

from the realm of convention and
opinion
also depends on not retreating
inward into the sphere of the
subjective ego. "Your true

essence Wesen] does not he
deeply hidden within you,"
Nietzsche writes, "but rather
immeasurably high above you"
(§ ). This higher self, this liberated, true
self, can only be
realized through a process of
education, Nietzsche believes, and
genuine "educators can be
nothing other than your liberators"
(§1). The third Untimely Meditation
could just as easily
be titled Schopenhauer as Liberator,
and Schopenhauer, if not Schopenhauer's
philosophy,
|

I

certainly plays a decisive role
,n Nietzsche's essay.
his

example. Indeed, his example

is

Above

all,

Schopenhauer's value

precisely that of the liberated

life,

lies in

of the "liberation of

the philosophical life" (§3).
"Schopenhauer," Nietzsche writes, "wanks to have

little

to

do

with the learned classes; he keeps to
himself, and strives for independence from
stale and
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society

what

this is his

is

example,

his

model" (§3)

“~

exemplary
u educational
education ,!
y and
h

nr

“' N

to understand

i„<; u
m
Schopenhauer's nature"

agmativedetournecess

,

-

-

very next

^ tocom ^^

(§ 3 ) After

,

u

-

sentl,

phnorr
P r S €ye trained on existence; he

seeks to establish its
value [Werth] anew
For it
has always
1
been the pecuhar task
of great thinkers to
be legislators of the
measure
, weight of things
and
[Gesetzgeber fttr Maass,
Mibtze und Gewicht der
Dinge]’ (S^With
is sentence,
Nietzsche tells us that the
source of Schopenhauer's
liberatory exemple lies
aUt0 " 0my W " h
legislates new values.
This understanding of the
Philosopher ,s easily imagined,
and Schopenhauer's
example seems to prove la
possibility:

^

*

shuns the suite and society,
and values things independently
of

va ues.

He

is,

in short,

an example of Nietzsche's
philosopher

the

who

predominant scale of

freely revalues values

without recourse to the values
of the sate. Here, though,
we encounter the problem of
evaluating values previously
discussed: On wha, basis
does Schopenhauer's
revaluation of
values hike place? What

anew?

legitimates h.s legislative act,
his establishing the value
of existence

How can we

be sure that this pessimistic
philosopher assigned the correct
value to
existence? Nietzsche's answer
to these questions, and
the paradox that poses
them in
modernity, is perhaps grasped
through a consideration of the
specific character of
Schopenhauer's revaluation of values.
If, as Nietzsche insists,
Schopenhauer
is

legislator,

what does he

and weight

legislate? Nietzsche tells us that
he legislates the measure, mint,

ol things, as well as the
value of

same paragraph of the

a

human

existence.

And

he also

tells us, in

existence's value aims "to be just
towards existence [gerechtgegendasDasein]"
(§3).

Schopenhauer, then, on Nietzsche's account,

value— it remains

the

meditation, that Schopenhauer's
evaluative, legislative judgement on

to be seen

what

short, legislates the just laws that

this

,s

a lawgiver

who

assigns existence

its

value is-and does so justly. Schopenhauer,

govern true existence and should govern the

157

in

political

-

h

community. The dedsive
question, around
which the whole of
Nictzsch
turns,
therefore asks:

What

is this

law?

'

mcdttahon
,

“

In Nietzsche's
meditation, he tells
us

^

what the character a a r
but he does so slowly,
in p.ecemeal
fashton, almost as
if he ,s d,s
, enng
'*cor
it as he writes.
He begins, in the first section
of the meditation b
by s,m P Y telling us
that we "must live
accord’

1

be discovered through
introspect, on. Rather,
Nietzsche
proper self
OrUndgesetz deines

W

J

8

s
tha

T

rt:

the

^

6 ,aW SChOPenhaUCT
"

°" e

sTh
Schopenhauer

‘

he feW

”

m ° ral

!

the lawgiver

mendacious values of the

^
^
— — -- insists"

(§

ond section ° r

Wd

b V-

^

-

>»

„

‘

h

*,s law, Nietzsche believes,

that

made

”

eXemP,arS (§2) ° f OUr

made hts own through a

a" d

“-

same law

legislative ac, that revalued
the

state:

"Schopenhauer," Nietzsche
writes, "never wants to
create
appearances, for he wntes only
for htmself, and no
one likes to be deceived,
least of a„ a
philosopher who has made
this his law: Never
deceive anyone, no, even
yourself!"
2)
» imperative, hke the tmperative
"Be yourself!", issues from
Schopenhauer's example
°" e ShOU d llVe 11 COmma "
ds °>*d,ence to oneself
rather than the state. But
Nietzsche does not end his
discussion of Schopenhauer's
law here. And indeed he
could
not, lor while the command
to be truthful is virtually

«

'

'

uncritic, zable,

needed

,,

lacks the criterion

determine what decides truthfulness.
Here Nietzsche takes an unexpected
turn which leads through
the problem of nihilism
and into its solution:
to

All existence that can be
negated deserves to be negated
and to be truthful
to believe in an existence
that could not possibly be
negated and that

means

* alsehood
That is vvh y the one who is truthful
senses th^meaninBofh’1S aCtl Vlty
metaP hysical something that is
exobcable onTJ
explicate
only by the ?
laws ofr another, higher life [Gesetzen

E

und hohern Lebens ], one

'

?

>

eines andern

that

is

in the

most profound sense

at lrmative— regardless
of how much everything he
does appears as the
destruction and violation of the laws
of this life [Gesetze dieses Lebens}.

Nietzsche juxtaposes two laws here, the
laws of
"another, higher

life."

The laws of this

life

"this life"

and the laws of

are the laws of the state, of conventional
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turn, a

morality and custom.

The laws of Nietzsche's nth

u-

,

'

conventional or customary
the L ° nt,ngeW
t
true

laws of

"life" itself

Producte

define „fe,

life,

1

6"
its

values.

To live acLarding ,,}^,^^

by contrast, are
not

particu,ar

^^

The

er

**

Se ^'

^

socie^ or Ste te, but
the

wUch
terms

state

and

transcend
^d^h
the state, Nietzsche
argues
g“es, means to
hv „ according
live
to laws that one
"senses" nr "h~i
.
,
to be "metaphysical."
I, is significant
that Nietzsche, who
chooses
<>t

m

hi, v

S

,

and believing (glauben)
rather than^e
more ernph^ht^being^

aW

,

C ^^ C * ,0 ,en ^ aU * r
*

our.se
^w^^°'^*
metaphysical,
^| ^
Ntetzsehe

^L^I^thenh

*^s a es— "Never deceive anyone,
*

^

1

.

rom

the Respective of
nrcUtphystes.

ic /.sche,

states that this

„ is

this

^

l

° " VC n C° nf0rmi with
‘y
'

‘"is

metaphysical ex,stence-w,th
a "higher
criterion

must be concetved of

,dca-,he idea of metaphysicstha,

i,

reality.

for

does no, confuse the law
or the existence

law with the actual
achievement of a

life-

beyond the physical plane
of extstence-t, ,sa

which remains always just
out of reach,

achievable

truth

provides the criterion of
truthfulness needed to
justify Schopenhauer's

egis ative act and
prescriptive law. bu, since

“

law of

more a regulative idea than

19

an achieved or

The remainder of

Nietzsche's essay unfolds
the consequences of
the metaphysical
hlghCr " ,e ” l° CXplaln
Schopenhauer's example setves
,0 guide human hie
towards values and aims that
are independent of those
of the state. These values
and aims
are articulated and
prescribed m the imperatives
tha, Schopenhauer's
example exemplifies
The imperatives ''Be yourself!”
and "Never deceive anyone, not
even yourself!" are
justil led and legitimated
by a metaphysical idea of life
that places the meaning and
value of
"hie" beyond any and every
particular evaluative ac, that would
define its value once and
lor all. I, therefore places
„ beyond the confines of the state.
Bu, i, also, in turn, places
"hie" beyond all attempts to
evaluate itsdignityor meaning
definitively. The attempt to
revalue values in modernity, then,
finally devolves into the impossible
attempt to evaluate
what has becom e, with the diss olution
of all values, invaluable. The moral
imperatives that
"
thc
°f metaPhysics" after its decline, see Theodor
Adorno

'“"'a

"

“y

Continul

l^ste’

“ Ne«ati ^ Dialectics.
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trans.

E

W

B.

Ashton (New York:

-ue rom

Schopenhauer, example of
the

l

freety evaiuating
philosopher are therefore

capnctous or impostng,
but necessary, and
the inaccessibility
of the ultimate object
under

Nietzsche can deploy
Schopenhauer as a

evaluation— "life"

way ou,

values without letting
his example

imperatives of power.
Schopenhauer,

yourself!”— does not tssue
va ue.

in

politic, zed,

particular

form of

cond,„on-an

The

German people

ultimate consequence of
this understand,

creatton of a

new senes of moral

o modern nththsm and

and

tdea of "fife” that
transcends

that

life

final

all

from „s truncated

commands one

to be one'self is

does not subsume the
possibtlities of life under
one'

say tha, of the

Itfe,

r

no, even

life that ass, gns
it a deftnittve

modern form. The cntenon
of truthfulness
it

t

prey t„ the abyss of
arbitrariness or

fa],

begtn the pr^ess of
Itberattng

erelore truthful to the
extent that

dc

of the problem of
nthtlistn and the

a positive definite,
of

to

,s

huhT^^

itself

,aw-”Never deeetve anyone,

u, rathe, att.culates
the negattve

ev luattve attempts-needed

their lawful
necessity

"duttes" (§5) that

the rtse of the nation-state.

living within a

ng of

tell

German

"life" is, for

wha, ought

to

form so

Ntetzsehe the

be done

m the wake

These duttes are already implied
by

imperatives Ntetzsehe articulates
in his mediation, and
they are untted
"berating life from its politicized,

modem

state

that life

may

finally

,n the task

the

of

become itself

’

unaltenated and independent
ofltfe-denymg values. In an
tmpera.tve that Ntetzsehe
articulates

m the first sentence of his meditation, sixth

and necessitated by the
the task

demanded by

sentence, an imperattve
legitimated

loss of those past values
that gave life value

theses duties:

and purpose, he

states

"Humanity [ die Menschheil] should work
ceaselessly

toward produemg singular, great
humans [einzelne grosse Menschen
)_,h,s and only
should be us task." Thts task,
Nietzsche argues,
is

rather a

communal

task

path beyond nihilism.

and a communal duty

And

if

not a task for isolated indivtduals,
but

humanity

is

to find a just

and legitimate

these tasks and duties, Nietzsche
goes on to write, are

essentially cultural in nature:

One

thing above

These new duties are not the duties of a
on the contrary, through them one is integrated
into a
powerful commonalty [Gemeinsamkeit], one
that, to be sure, is not held
ogether by external forms and laws, but by
a fundamental thought
[Grundgedanken]. This is the thought of culture [Kultur],
all, is certain:

solitary individual;

capable of charging each of us with one single
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this

insofar as

task:

it is

To foster the production

is

T

::=:—n~:=rr
W„ ^ ^
che a transfigured
physis

and

liberates ttse.f

^nen

(§3) , a sphere

,

«

whjch ,,e

by taking possesslon
of ltseIf

.

harges us

w„h promoting those forms
of life

us to renounce the
illusions of thp

which promote

"life":

The satm who
ho
'

,c
h
teaches

•

•

,

empmea! eg °;

the philosopher,

who holds out the hope
he metaphysical
against the tyranny of the
phystca,; the artist, who
spurs us on withl
image of perfected nature.
Our duty to promote these
forms of life and so to
perfect the
fe “ le8U,mated
“*
d
"
ccapse of those va,ues that wou,d
° CrWISC dCfme thC
PUrP° Se 0l llfe From the
Perspective of "life,” then-and
"life" alone
remains valuable after the
devaluation of values
modernity- value anses from
„fe,
perfection. The more perfect
„fe is the more liberated,
autonomous life, the one wh.ch
has
tea .zed most fully what
« means to be a living, human
being. The duty to perfeet
life, like
I
e imperatives that Nietzsche
discovers emanating from
Schopenhauer's example, is
medfrom the laws of higher lilt,"
laws that come into existence
in ihe absence of
earthly laws that could
persuasively solve the problem
of "life's" value and purpose
Once
earthly laws-the laws of the
church, state, or custom-fall
into disrepute, then life can
appeal to nothing other than
"the laws" of "life" itself,
laws which withdraw into the
,
r

,

.

—

'

*-

'

inaccessible sphere of metaphysics
and always, of necessity, remain
yet to be achieved,

and which command, as a duty,
the increasing and unending
perfection of earthly
Anything less, Nietzsche insists, would

life.

violate one's duty to "life."

It

can

now

important role

He

is

be better understood

in Nietzsche's meditatton.

rather- although

perfect

lile.

who

The

this necessarily

perfected

life,

Schopenhauer's "example" plays such an

Schopenhauer does not represent

life

perfected.

remains open to argument-an example of
a more

the completed

life,
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which would be completely

"life,"

'

purged of the diluting

traces of e

m p lrica, „mc and place,

would be a genuinely
ctaphysical achievement.
Nihilism rules out
'
this possibility
for Nietzsche
tzsche, and so he
,
no choice but to proceed
has
by
1

way of examnle Pv
Examples are
P

-

,

•

necessary because ihrv
suggest distinctions
once the values
underlay,
ng h.storically cl fc
‘
lost their authority.
They alone can promote
the cause of
,

this true life the
th
'

^

^

"‘wttat defines

^^

,

example
sample b
but more broadly

""

C ° nCePl ° f

imperatives

is

W "«

per

ecu*. No

L

rCfCrS

’

m~
^

therefore

remam

“ Ws mcd,tatlon

CWn °
task

no, to fix the concept
of

’

l

* SUbSUmal

life,

cyond the problem

humamty once and

end 0ther

for

"dudes" and

all, but,

as he wrote in his

expand the concept of humanity
through

when

this

its

expansive process

laws, duties, and
imperatives,

our attention towards

however are
this

unfathomable

and taken together, they
provide Nietzsche with a way

of nihilism

that

»d translated ,„to a

commanded by N.etzsche,

m ScHopentiauer as Educator that d.rec,

inaccessible law of

means

and most valuable
examples [der setiensten
und

to perpetually

itS

i„access,ble. This

not only to Schopenhauer’s

genera, law ex.sts winch
could finally define

UOn haS ach,eved

articulated

life itself,

to "the rarest

second Untimely Meditation,

^^

,

rem£" nS fundame
"^ly unfathomable, and the
"laws” of

—

EXemPlarer

ii

progress

and the values of nationalism.

Against the ungrounded
imperatives of the nation-state,
Nietzsche's laws, duties
and imperatives command
obedience to life itself, the sole
remaining value and end for

hving human bangs
hie, a

good defined through

Nietzsche
this

in modernity.

is

also

its

Like Aristotle's description of the
end of life as the good

the cultivation

and perfection of

life, life's

purpose for

perfection. But for Nietzsche,

,t is not the stole
or polls that furthers
end, but a "powerful commonality"
(§5) that exists independently of and in
opposition

to the state’s elforls to

commonality

is

make

life

serve

its

purposes and submit

a commonality of culture, a sphere
of activity,

to its
in

powers. This

which individuals take

possession of themselves, overcome
themselves, and free themselves from the
values and
standards ol the modern state. Nietzsche
fourth and final Untimely MeditationRichard
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=
—
he example of the

-.deal- „fe (§5
)

e^p.irJ^Z^^S^h
^ ^C

of the freely evaluating,
liberated individua!

1

in turn

servesthe

T

^^

^

en ^aUer S exam e
Pl
'

;:r—
su, te

,

and „

y ne process of secularization
and the emeruenro of
is

a strategy wh.eh
N.etzsehe never abandons.
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CHAFrER VII

THE COMMONALITY TO COME:

RICHARD WAGNER ,N
BAYREUm

^
Ub,ime

,td.

[4oStete *]-

«—

,ifc

K

lhc >

makeSXit hS^

nto

™^1 ^7uUJ ^P^rian
T

S

ip

"True Art"
"Richard Wagner

in

Bayreuih"

is

the last of the

VnUme.y Melons.

I, serves as
labored effort to solve
political, cultural, and
ethical problems
unresolved by Nietzsche,
previous wntings, a vast
monument and testament to earlier
opes, a recapitulation and
transformation of themes in
a single, tnumphant swan
song-a
vtsion of a future society
and state free from the ,11s
of mtxlemity, an image
of

summa: a final,

their

come, transfigured by tragedy
and born anew
Everything in the essay revolves
around

this

humanity to

into a rapturous world
of freedom.

programmatic, utopian vision of
the future,

just as the essay itself
revolves around the programmattc
event at
the Bayreuth Fes'spielhms
in 1876 with the first
performance of

Der Ring des Nibelungen, a
poles,

tetralogy ,n the

between the event of Bayreuth and

unfolds.

From

the

from Bayreuth

start,

it

mold of Greek

the realization of

its

This task,

Between these two

program, Nietzsche, essay

proposes nothing other than the
discovery of the path leading

to the future, the Feslspielhaus
to its audience, the

at

ongin- the opening of

Wagner, monumental

tragedy.'

community, even, and perhaps above all,
from tragedy reborn
state.

its

once a defense of art,

political

to

work of art

to

its

a transformed society and

value and redefining of

art's relation to

On

the essay’s relation to the opening of
the Bayreuth Feslspielhaus (Festival
e
ra ns ator s Afte ™'ord," Unfashionable
Observations, in
Tfe
WolL of
nf Friedrich Nietzsche
,
Works
vol. 2, trans. Richard T. Grey
(Stanfordtanford University Press, 1995), 405-6.
Quotations from the essay are from "Richard
agner in Bayreuth, Samthche Werlce,
Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli
and
° ntman (B rlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 429-510.
1,
Translations from the
i:
CVirnan^
n r
C,tatI0 S WlU 50 glVen ,n the
y
of the tcxt in accordance with the
cs
n
A
u
essay
s numbered
divisions. A
somewhat
unreliable translation of the text printed in the
Kritische Studienausgabe may be found in

G

ComTuu

F* 7

'

'

.

,

G

-

M

r ST

Grey (Stanford: Stanford University

Unfashionable Observations

Press, 1995).
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,

trans.

Richard

T

„

back into the world.
rationalizing logic

It ,s

an

*77^7

and sequestered

sensuous fulfillment— so
that they
transformation and realized

in the aesthetic

“

^“

ha " S>

^ *"*
^

spheT^r^lrC.Ir!,;

may he harnessed

for the purposes
of^sodaTand^

I

,

'

,n the

practice of eveiyday
„fe. This audacious
progranT
propose once before in
The Birth ofTragedy,
is again taken
up
"Richard Wagner’,
yreuth, and whatever
its course, it
ends, or ought to end,
a world transfigured
r_ t0
‘ hC
N ClZSChe W '"
l°
tS " m " S

^

^

(7 An
A
§

h° ,s
this

'

Nietzsche, bold proposition

world, and as the reformer
of the world,
society equal to that of
Greek tragedy

When

Nietzsche turns to

it is

in his final

to be

its

of ar„n the

first

with fidelity and take sides
in

consciousness of the
Already,

artist

its

and valorizing the didactic

sphere, and in "Richard

on

its

section of the meditation
and

from
I.

politics to art

demands

conflicts, insisting

The Birth ofTragedy, Nietzsche
had

liberalory force depends

contemporary

path back into the world,
he avoids the well-

Pam ',i ar routes. The first charts
a course directly

life

in

the

Athenian,**

goal by ml using the aesthetic
sphere with political values.

ponray

Wo'rmirtr

mcditation-can reform

accorded a stature

the ancient

this vision

begins the slow process of
delineating

^T^n*

-

'

that

works of art

on the sociopolitical

possibilities

of the work of art.

rejected this strategy, arguing
that

freedom from the pragmatic goals
of the

Wagner and Bayreuth," he
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and reaches

art's

sociopolitical

again refuses to locate art,

its

J

emancipatory potential in
aesthetics with
politics,

its

and

politici7aiirm 2rru

,

,

^

illusion with

and undermining the
cause of freedom
and for

^ ml° “ aeSthC

‘'

^

C de0l °
8y
'

th

aesthetic values into noiitir-c rru'
politics. This strategy
dialectically inverts the
first and

seventh

^

se2on^ofT/2ll>2oE2<?^^^

Klein's "political
explanation" of tragic art
vvhicfH
sociopolitical sphere" and
makes the traeic rhnm
law of the democratic
Athenians"

,

theories of art originates
in the
COncerned lhere with
refuting J. L
tes tra gedy's ongin
in the

1S

"

the immutable moral
and precursor™ a
This explanation of tragedy
constitutional popular
assembly "
Nietzsche^rk nou a
"
18 appealln
politicians," but it forgets
lo
the
ears of some
8
that
OU
religious values—
lt for ets tba
t its
embodied in the mvthicaf traLr 8 ! f’ USt
8
6
strict opposition to
6 of Dionysus-exist in
18
the Apolhnian values
”/^
of the
ee^P°^ sand society—
hierarchy, harmonious
measured
integration and wpii.
Stabl lty ForKlein
Geschichte des Dramas, vol.
s theory, see his
I (Leipzig:
IS6S) 162

wSn*Y*
'

i

^

^

Cr^

^

i

'

’

'

rS
theories of art similarly
unmediated line between the
drew an
sL\omhtica[sDhe ^hh
16 firSt Version of the
wntten under the influence of
Ri *g>
Bakunin's
cu rbacfIfs social radicalism,
Wagner's own participation in
and
the revolutionary nnh
^ of
ph avals
1848 ~ 9 was intended to be
politicized work of art in
a
the service of a revoIubon
revolt
f
stl11 more radical
than the 1789
bourgeois revolution in France A, wl!
u
R
Sh ° U,d " make clear to the
of the revolution the meaning
mcn
of that revolmfon 'init ‘h)
Se " Se
Gertrud Strobel, Werner Wolf
Briefe ed.
a ° d ohannes Forner [Leipzig:
Deutscher Verlag fur Musik
VEB
1967 1 letter^M \ m’

anarch^^T'

,

|

>

,

theS-th^

revised version of
nnTJ
revolutionary enthusiasm of Bakunin nr

WW°2'p

lh

,°y«

h

L°

n art and

2

vfS1 ° n m le
p

u

^

No ember 1851 In the final, much
r
);
zscbc discusses— it is no longer
the

P° ,ilics wntten
’

r<*;a^
Mi*

-f

’

publl^ed

see o,V

u

u,i “

In,;;
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i

ture, the styhzatton

of life, and the
domination of the material
world "Richard
aV °' dS 'h' S Palh “d
U refra nS
°f ,hc *>* as a work
ttrinuT
aons to
t
the art of pohttcs.’
Jus, as t, steers
dear of temptations to
politicize art i,
e a^theticization of
politics.* Neither
the politicization of
art nor the
aestheticization
or poht.es
,*J*
successfully ,„te rates art
g
hade tnto life, and with
these two opttons
foreclosed
Nietzsche must find another
path capable of bringing
art back into the
world and placing it
g
in the service of
emancipation.
’

W

f™ “

'

^n*

"true

arr"

T

^

^^

-

““ "*

Fo ucault-placed
"aesthetics of existence

med.tatton,

to a long tradition,
is netther a luxuty
to be contemplated

f
"

and the "trrhn-

.i 2,

r

the

u

arts

this strategy

of exis tence," the

«s^*a*;sj«jjr<sss!s

>«

-{a 1869 6, Mtaart

RenlsMItahu^S

Civilization

An
C^T
^lemore (New

oj the
G
1990), 19-97. See also Hannah
Arendt "TheCriri; fn

-”

in

The

York: Pengu.n,

32“r^

nversiiy press,
1998J, 4), but this claim

he

me
*e

«

^K

aesthetic state
SheUc
s
V

not supported bv Nietzsche's texts for

f
aeSthetlC -tate; NietzfcTe co
in h?.
his discussions of the "Done

r

m ^ dSto a

state" in the fourth section

he descrit>e s

of
of The Rirth

it as "a permanent
military encampment of the
and ruthless polity [Staatswesen]." Nietzsche
goes on to contrast
imperial, Apolliman" state— "the
Roman imperium" (§21) and the modern nation state

/nr,1Hn^ and a
Apolliman
''

s

is

"

k

S?C

.

cruel

his

o

P0
T
ww do
^
™
hls

ht

£ ldeal; «

'

form, he argues, is punfied of the excessive
inates *he Doric state," and so it no
longer succumbs to a
total
rvait
f
tal politicization
that treats the state as a total work of art,
impervious to what lies beyond
its borders and incapable of
withstanding the internal dissent that would fracture
its
U ty and ormal ,nte nt y- Heilke draws
heavily on similar claims made by Josef
8
rhvtvTr
J
m 7 /le Esthetic
State: A Quest in Modem German Thought
(Berkeley
Jr
a ^ ?
y and Los
Angeles:
University of California Press, 1989).
"wMiticsS

'

111

1

tbat

•
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a. a distance

by cultlvated
expens safe
y
,

^

less aesthetic

unsr

or politica,

^

,

^
1250 *16 l b crc fore
describes

thaT>nTogi<T— TaTT!^

(57, and discloses a

new unfami
,

J“^ndT “

and unimaginable
within

its

limits

world or the mundane,
the everyda

Zrr
Wer l °

*^

“

*

letzsche argues, happiness
and

IrZ

3

Th

°f

thC

WOr d

'

«

"“«»

« r- ,,

‘

"“m

^

and aesthetics^but
11

In "true art,"

and

„ alone

fulfillment are presented
as real possibihties
and
'

8ht bC fre °

t
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fieed from the categor.es
of aesthetics and the ends
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world.
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of philosophy," hc
writes

and form lunabdnderhche
Artung
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courage

struggle) Nietzsche
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improved-, s no different than
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°f t^lat “spect of the world recognized
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to changing the
world.
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(§ 3 )
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meditates

Kampfhe ascribes

to

great
po tucs in £cee homo. Both
put into practice a "concept
of politics { Be
griff Polity based
on a spintua, battle against
the dominant structures
of power, and both aim
to perfect a

and

falsity.
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tran^JracWm^eugro^hd^New York 'Tt’
Young Nietzsche: BecomTe a CeZTt w
v"

as

a„

D eska u, Wagner and
Q
1974)
84 ' l3a See also Carl
Fre Prcss
186-195;

F,sc h e ['

'

.

'

Nietzs^SZ^pJ^

Waller KaufnTann,
'*>D.
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towards those aspects of the world that are
not
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may

thcconcept of

"great politics," see Nietzsche's Ecce
Homo, "Why am
rw; y
° n N^tzsche's "political perfectionism," see Daniel
»
W. Conway
p f
y Nietzsche
andthe Political
(New York: Routledgc,
6-27.
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Nietzsche calls great
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on the necessity of this
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and above
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art "true art"
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Richard Wagner at
Bayreulh

all,
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and ihe found,n8 or
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as the

unavoLable
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as a inevitable
consequence of

struggle agatnst
Platonism, the attempt to

rPhuomsm. Each, sanecessary response,
,

battle in

Kampf,as a man, Station of
necessity

the logic of history,
even,

itself.

poe,

politics.

n ced, he views this

outcome of

Plato

abstraction and

he language of
abstraction and bringing
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bnng ar, bach

into the

neither arbitrary or ace,
dental, to the language

an attempt, necessitated
by language's Right into
ideahty to
return language to the
world and restore its long
severed tie to humanity.
More than
anything else, Bayreuth aims
to reestablish language's
connection to things, free from
the
a stractness, arbitrariness,
and accidentally of the
Platonic tradition, it aims
to recover a
language capable of expressing
"the powerful impulses
of feeling [starken
is

Geflihlsregung J"

(§5) that guarantee

tts

would "correspond

to the real
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vol.

I:

meaning and communicative

force.

This language, Ntetzsche writes,

needs [den mrklichen No,ken
emsprechen ]" (§ 5 ) of
Nietzsche's "eternal battle," see
The Birth of Tragedy, 17,
§
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MundGesCUcHafiV
or of

r

t

mgs Wachl

,

l3r8et

nd

‘

he

1
,h e " collect,
ve senstbtltty
t

P ° lK,Cal

•***

^

It

wages
ages

its

[<fe

h,s

no„-

SlrUg8le agamst the
inheritance of

battles not

SpMren

concept of art it depends

^^

only against "the sDheres nf
i

^

'

bn, agatns, "power,
law, tradition, contract,
and the whole

Geselz
,S

^

meCU,ati0n '

thai defines this
struggle, like the

v,o once a „d
mjustice, the state
t

r

tU

•

^

Ver, mg

,

S ‘ rUCtUre

°f

" Sdf

’

th °

SphCre ° f

[G***,]. (§5) that expresses

^

and

and desires

^^

,,
.

ery heart of the hunran
sensotrunr, that N.etzsche's
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bent, e the ,nd,vidual and
the collective alike from
the "monstrous

s.ckness" (§5) produced by
language's estrangement from
human, ty. If as N.etzsche

wntes, winning

this battle

depends on overcom.ng the

umntelligibility [kUns, lichen

moment

then „

,s

final meditittion declares
that

in the essay, N.etzsche
turns to

,,

does-and

if,

at precisely

Bayreuth for an antidote to the
conventional

because Wagner's "true art"-"the
enemy of al, convention" (,5)-is
capable of

combating the effects of alienation
with

the unconventional language
of ihe mus.c-drama.

In Wagner's art, N.etzsche
argues, a path

accidental

norms of modernity, and

society and a

new

political

Iob

Trarv

alienation and

Entfremdung and UnverstandUcMeUY
produced by

conventional language-and the
th.s

"art, fie, al

E
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em ?

is

opened up

this path ends,

order grounded

that leads

beyond the arb.trary and

or ought to end, in the creation of
a

in necessity

new

and purified of convention.

resulting from language's alienation

from the human being see

P°“^S ?f TramMuratbn (Urbana and Chicago:

UnTvem
university
ol Illinois Press, 2000), xxiv-xxv.
tTof’inmot'^S
On the problem of
Wagner in Bayreuth see Julian Young, Nietzsche's

"convention"

Philosophy of Art, 57.
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Lichtbringer]"

ottght without the
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t

to the pale
abstractions
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(§6)
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form of thought"
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eploycd to stop the world
of its film of familiarity,
break the habits of
perception iha,
truncate expenencc, and
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tnaccessible to the theoretical
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Ntetzsche wntes,

new

uncanny [unheimliciiY
(§7) and

(§4).
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"momently transports

"the usual

longer recognize the most
familiar
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from conventional

us outside this culture"

perspective on the world ,n
which the "ordinary appears

something "unusual and complex"
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congealed
obscure understand,
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leave of the world

(§10), opening up a strange,
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and commonplace" are transformed

(§4). It presents us with a reality
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[.

^

?>

^iT^'

thC SP C ‘at r fr°

?

°,

m tHe W ° rld

'

deie 8' tim ^"g the authonty of
reality

YoiTs"

mt^Tv
Ct UaI

Malcump
Malcum Pasley (Berkeley and
I

e,deg

R ° ger Hausheer

N
>

in Nietzsche:

r
'

Imagery arid Ttwughfc
d
?

Los Angeles: University of California

172

f

Press, 1978)

1-32.

.

^
over

its

subjects and alienating
them from
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convenes

" Noth,
to
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term Nietzsche uses
for an art form that
refuses to imitate
petrified
lh,S Cm,Ca f0rCe
' and
"«* -e conventional, i, opens
up a
path to a true human
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s«\ and
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ueiy (§8)
a new political order
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transforming society that

* truthfulness would be the necessity of
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this possibility in
the final

die possibility of art
effecting sociai and
political

Wagner s art so thoroughly
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St0rt' nS effects

for^
h,s^
foundation drives the
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Untimeiy MeditaUon.

He

msists on

and even on the possibility
of
i,

would become a

true society

The

fou„da,,on-i,s lack of
continue

op P°wer— and more
than anything

else, the search

final

Untimely Meditation and
defines its centra,
problematic
This same problem „es at
the core of Wagner's
music-dramas and the founding
of
Bayreuth, and in the Ring,
Nietzsche argues, it takes
center stage. The problem
of
ations, the problem of
their necessity and
legitimacy, of their authority
and
validity— each ,s staged
the Ring, and each
emerges
the
stniggles of

inescapable, concrete dilemma.
Nietzsche says as

its

heroes as an

much-and a good deal more-when

he

claims that the "tragic work of
art a, Bayreuth" stages
"the struggle of singular
individuals
ampfder Einzelnen] against everything
that confronts them with
seemingly invincible
necessity [scheinbar
unbezmngliche Nothwendigkeit], with
power, law, tradition,
I

and the whole order of things
[Mach,, Gesetz, Herkommen, Vertrag
und game,,
Ordnungen der Dinge]" (§4). T his
image-an image of fighters who struggle
against
contract,
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asks, without so
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society, to guarantee
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h
g heroes,

of the Ring
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search

society, beeause
their struggle follows
the logic of

Nietzsche makes clear,
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and Nietzsche
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to the struggling
heroes

arbitrariness
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new
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Nietzsche turns
foundation for a
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posed by the struggles
of Wagner'!
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the nemii
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' "’ CV,lable

legitimacy and validity,
to found n and

Each of these problems

Thi,

the problem of

as saying so,
what would be necessary

its

finds their solution
in

oppose "the se

f

neTss^lf

and punfied of all
voluntansm. This struggle
as

a bathe against
subjectivism, individualism,
and perspective
C° nVent '° na*’ acc
‘dental, and solipsistic,
and it can only be
won^^accedj'ng'to
a
^tiTd
standpoint that would be
so .me, universal, and
necessary, that „ would
be free from al,
partisanship and devoid of
any self-interest. Everything
in Nietzsche's
is

jo - around the struggle for
the struggle- not

Ogle

o

its

presentation

this elusive, difficult
.xtsition,

successes- that the

struggle, the logic of

final

and ye,

Untune,y.Mention

,t ,s

the difficulties

emphasizes. The

overcoming and transcendence,
of transgression and

cross, ng-,h,s logic
necessitates certain unavoidable
difficulties, and in the
struggles of
agner's heroes against society,
they come to light. Wagner's
heroes struggle with all
their will to transcend
the norms of social
convention, to overcome individual
I, mas
exceed the fragile bounds of
human reason, and badge the gap
that separates the partiality
of the individual from the
truth of "the uni vernal"
(§4). This confiict-the confiic,

between

the willful, heroic individual

tragedy for Nietzsche, and

—
_—
f

teach es in ihc Ring,

in

and "the universal knowledge
of things" (§4)-defines
Wagner's music-dramas,

its

ruthless logic

is

exposed.'"

arr ogant, heroic willing
[heroisch-tibenntilhigen

As

Wollens ]”

ssSSSssSSSSS*
174

‘

™ » “-» “««»
no other purpose than

„

o,

iehl

'

- m,m ’ -

„d

’"“^-dramas have

'

to distance us

from our

faith
*

„c
'"'""potenceof the

will and
from
m ine
the concc
concent
pt ofru
the individual it
sunmne
k,
,el/schc ^gues, is
the
fundamental lesson of the
Ring
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u
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also reveals a new,
entirely different
'
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"dahon
for action and
struggle. This
foundation-the foundation f
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«. human

u*,

deeds,
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to the individual
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eapactncs of the ind, vidua,( § 4). Wagner's heroes
disclose

»d ‘he
Ihts

coni, ict in their relentless
strivings for pure
self-sufficiency and perfect
self-identity and
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breaktngof their will— in the
/?mg,

Wotan s

wit, breaks
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read in the last section
of the final meditation

up [WiUe bricHt sicHV

-

this vety breaking
apart of the aggressive
herotc individual reveals
for Nietzsche an authentic
concept of subjectivity and
a new

ground lor action * This
moment,

the

most important moment

patnlul inadcqualion, of
incapacity and msufficiency,
and

wntes, u

,s felt

in the Ring, is

Wagner's tragedies, Nietzsche

as "something sublime
[etnas Erhabenesf
(§4, §7).

efforts of individual heroism
fail to

a moment of

When

the titanic

measure

up to the demands of the
universal, when their
sin vugs prove insufficient
and a "feeling of inadequacy
[GefUhle des UngentigensT
(§4)
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found
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conceptual form of

[««» gmtz IKUell

knowledge— Nictysrh^
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„

in particular

suprapersonal [etwas

Vh

a unes us to so m eth,„
'

me .h' n8

^

„
11

'

MJ

^oretical, non-

^ eM,rdy

of understanding

t-rsicnen
Versteheny
j
(§9)— is sentimental sensnni.c

providence of no one

S t° S °

Tl „

and accessible

lche

^

lo all,

(§4) Tragedy _
.

g suprapersonal, to so m e,h,n

thal 0311

and so Nietzsche

^

calls

fina ,

g that stands over , Uber)

il

\ OI

8

J^'"
m . l, d^

thought but never perfectly
comprehended- truth toe
e laws of life
[*„ Gesetzen des Ubens]’
(§4) themselves. With the
nonconcept o the suprapersonal,"
N,etzsche identifies
"something" that resists

univ
n, versa

1,0

t

I—

" and

tr

“
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^

all

norm -and though

it

comes

to

personal inadequacy
IpersonUches

Ugh. only through

VngenugenY (§4) of Wagner's
heroes it
nevertheless forms the sole
adequate basis for Nietzsche's
new concept of suavity
^ and
new
foundation for struggle.

This new concept of
subjectivity-this new form of
identity and individuat,on-,s
an effect of Wagner's sublime
art.

The

affec,

which transforms

itself Iclt ,n "effects

on

sublime, Nietzsche argues,

subjectivity and attunes

the

human

soul

it

to

is

a force for reform an

something beyond

itself. I,

makes

[Wirkmgen aufmenschliche Seelen:]"

(§8) in
effects that alter the structure
of "inner nature [Na,«re...nach
innen] " (§6) and leave us
"transformed into tragic human
beings [zu tragischen Menschen

umgewandelt]’

concep, of the human being

is less

the absolute origin of

destiny than a split subject,
an individual suspended

limits— its unavoidable,
resist theoretic

tragic

madequacies-and

determination and exceed

all

in

its

(§7),

fate or the perfect master
of

yet attuned toa truth and
universality that

positive knowledge. Nietzsche
places this

on "suprapersonal" grounds, on a foundation
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its

a slate of tension, conscious
of its

tension, this schism and division,
at the foundation of h,s new,
tragic concept of
subjectivity. This subject rests

Th.s

(hat

is

”

insecure, unstable, and
alwaysjust out of reach
*

n

t *'

^

e ent' ment

It

cannot hn

t

^

1

su '3 i' me ' > n a
non-subjective,

non-personal feeling thm

elevates
th^
he, nctutdtta,
J beyond the .llusions of
, hew, „ andover
theltm.tsofconvcnl.n The
WnteS
the e " emy ° f
C° nVenlion of a "
“rliricial ahenation
and
unintelf'
"
br^tT
HUman be ngS [dK Fei "
dinaUer C

“
“
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'
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* ^hUnstiichen

Umm a"dliChkeil
‘

tnlta, ion,

conven ton and al,ena„on>
Once
once P

truth, universality,

at the heart

of human,
ty makes

8rOUndlCSS 8r ° Und ° f ‘ he subl
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‘

them a

itself felt,

and on

- Ntetzsche

the final

Empftndung] (§5)

in

an age of

and necesstty become
tnaccesstble,

osophy, theory, and the
concept become inadequate

i

absence

andMemch): and

const, tutes the sole
"correct sentiment [richtige

this

to their ends, the

sentiment of

tmposstble foundat, on-on

rcxrts his tragtc tndtv,
duals

and gtves

basis for struggle.

The sublime
In the sent,

mem

serves the cause of struggle
by maktng the need for
struggle known.
of the sublime, something
that exceeds
subject, vity is

that no,

only afienates us from
convention, but from our claims

necessuy.

The sublime

registers our inalienable d,
stance

from

fell,

"something"

to truth, universality

trath,

colon, ze the universal, and
once this sublime, "suprapcrsonal"
truth

our inevitable
is

and

fa, lure

to

aeknowledged,
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N.etzsche msists,
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n

we are

placed ,n a state of tension and
inadequation that needs to be

p /f°a'^W ° ry
e
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'mpo^ceor the sentiment of the sublime in outage

seeStephcn
Postmodernism (New York: Cambridge University
Press
Jean-Franco, s Lyotard, The Postmodern
Condition- A Report on'
5
Bna " Massumi (Minneapohs: UnivetsUyof
Minnesota
Mmnetota Press 1984),
9fSf 77-81 Jean-Francois Courtine et al., Of the
ut!
1991) 83-90.
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anew-is

the

"new and

out into the open.

1, is,

Nietzsche argues, a necessary
g oal, an unavoidable goal, demanded by the
.resolvable
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rcs t°re the sense

political

be "reformed

itself
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artistic

would
would

'he necessary, Inal, enable
inadequacy that

and by attuning

of tension, division, and
non-

community can do without. "Someone
who
do

refotms that would attune the
political community ,0 these
foundational

same "someone" might even be
justified

in persuadtng the
reforming
leave the community and
"go to another republic." "The
rest of us, however, who

live in this republic, but
in slates of an entirely
different

and the

society

republic," Nietzsche writes
in the seventh section
of his essay, might

s

inadequacies, and this
arttst ,0

^nm

M °- than anything else,

sense [GemeinsinnY
(§ 5 ) and
’

wtthout the

sensibility

'
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g effect
real reform
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and demands morc
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aUUnCmCm lS,immUnSr
(§7X

and community would
become

t0

it

-

artist's

reforming power, and

we need

them, Nietzsche

inheritance of Platonism and
realize a true society, a just
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slate,

son" (§ 7), need the
inststs, ,0

artist

overturn the

and a genuine community.

his society, state,

and community
would be define i h
y an overwhelming feeling
It would be
a kind of v
°""'""" S a communit
affective community,
y of sense and an
less a mailer
of commonality.
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of

set

of conventions,
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lhan of a

common
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’

modernity— the age of nihilism
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and he contrasts
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'

™

S
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commonality shares nothing
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based in family,

emei„r

undecidability, and
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to

something

inadequate, and

that

this

is

opens

i,

- contained

up and keeps

i,

that attunes

open

or fraternity. Indeed

notafonn of

indeterminacy

the experience of
commonality,

something uncommon, to a
sense and a sentiment
se

(§7)

faith,

but a shared experience
of community's

unraveling, „

common

place-, he nation and
state-and „ cannot be

zsche s concept of
"commonality lG
all,

~—
,n

a

with a form of
being-together that transcends
the

compre ended with a concept
of community

at

"y

coterminous with the
spheres of "violent

11 is

by
y the empirical detcnmnalions of
people or

(Gememschaft)

In

sc t?onds, deals,
and

•

injustice" (§4).
Nietzsche, notion of

mo cm

°r

i
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y

- lhe hi

-

it

to

community responds

to

something other than

an experience of non-identrty
and

"something," Nietzsche says,

is "suprapersonal."
In the final
meditation, the suprapersonal
i s the
indetenninate, non-personifiable
basis of community,
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Wagner's cry

'

™

S

°°

g " e t0 b ° SChemat,Zed

“ Nietzsche's meditation, then
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an ima « e for
through

con.emponrry form of the
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state,
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"supnt-
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leaves them ud to

how
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their final conclusion.
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f° r ,he rea,izati

He

provides no program, theory,
or blueprint to guide the
struggles

,S

to fou

i,

The

V

respond to
of an lm pera„ve, of

and tnventton-.'Help me,'
thus he [Wagner]

announces nocntenon for
determining

calls

ouf-but

demands and

,t

it

though, of commonality

* realization, and

if

dissociation from the

it

is

given shape

a, all

modem concept of

and existing modes of community
and

Each of these- the modem
concept of nationality,

the

contemporaiy form of the
and existing modes of community
and society-depends on a thought
of the will, a
desire for power, and a
need for self-assertion, and each
is united in its search
for
state,

an
ultimate identity, a sell-enclosed
purity, and a perfect self-knowledge.
Nietzsche's "great
fighters [grossen Kampfer)3 )-his
(§

future fighters for the

commonality

to

come-refuse

the though, of self-adequation,
of personal self-sufficiency and
self-identical individuation,
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Wagn^t
8 "^ artis supranational and
even

Nietzsche does leave
these tasks up

dissonant call of tragic
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statc uitimateiy
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SUbIime

Nietzsche writes,

bounda

- a whole.
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cannot be appropriated
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"to be enclosed
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in their refusal
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uni versal
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another need anothe, ,

Nietzsche, meditation,
and this law-this
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laW of ^adequation
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'

permanent, ,nf,„,te-,s

.one announced

dslawalonede, ermines
agner
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m
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personal, or

all

tins negative
prolubition
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less is

ts this

demanded by

and
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-Rtcha'rd
to

come
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paradox, cal logic, adequationpolitical

that haunts

the moral

,„ turn

on

every deed, knowledge,
norm or

demand announced

Wagner,

tragic

paradoxical morality-, his
supra-moral, unconventional

oundat, unless foundation of
h,s

Justice,

announced

of the paradoxes defining
the commonality

morality- that Ntelzsche places
at the center of his
meditation as
I

Wagner, ar,

communal -depends on madequation,
and being adequate depends

Nothing

dramas, and

the imperative tssu.ng
from

- — **— -

formalizes

a responsible response to
the madequation
identity.

Inadcquat, on-endless

the eourseof the
great polttica, struggle

-* *• »“•

Accord, ng to

itself.

the groundless

ground and

new thought of commonality.

Love, and Freedom
Nietzsche,

rethinking,

new

thought of commonality

on and around

is just that:

a thought, a thinking and a

the concept of commonality.

The final Untimely Meditation ,s
perhaps nothing more than a thoughtful
mediation on the possibility of commonality,
on the
possibility of a form of community
that is never perfectly exemplified
by a particular
community and never perfectly
Nietzsche's meditation

is

theorized with the instruments of
theoretical labor.

driven by something that proceeds the
planes of theory and

empirical examples alike, and this
something

thought in motion and attune

it

is

the sentiments, needs,

and desires

to the sphere of sensibility. In "Richard

Bayreuth," this motion and motivation

is

the "violence
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at the "spheres

with those "theories
of the su„e

by remaining resolutely
",
apologetic
institutions.

These theories are theories
of

their great representative
for

Nietzsche— and they see
no tension

and leave no room for
perfecting the

reality

of violence and

political

community

zsche opposes them not
with a new theory, but
with a new form of art
ruggle and makes the
irreconcilable gap between
the real and the
.c

s

that calls for

ideal felt ,n concrete
senttments. This art registers
our distance from any
supmpersonal ideality, and in
Nietzsche's meditation, ,,
transforms the struggle
against contemporary
political

institutions

Justice
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'

"battle forjustice

and love- these are

pages of h,s

and social
and love [Kampfe urn
GerechUgkei, und Uebe ]
(§4).

the concepts guiding
Nietzsche's "great politics"
in the final

final mediation,
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if

they

tragic tension irreconcilably
separating

these fighters

announced

become

in the

demand

that "great fighters"
(§3)

them from any

lovers of a very peculiar
sort. Nothing else,
Nietzsche writes,

music-dramas

that get this struggle off the

call for

ground- The
the

integrating

is

Flying

Ring of the

love and justice, they articulate
the two

concepts that define the future of
commonality. The commonality to come

human

to the

final perfection, they
also insist that

Dutchman. TannMuser. Die Meistersinger,
Tristan and Isolde, and
Nibelungen itself (§11)— and in their

the limits of

do justice

will

do justice

to

willing and the failures of individual
cognition byreflexiveiy

them into a new concept of community,
and the recognition of these

failures will in turn transform

human

suprapersonal. Love, Nietzsche

limits

beings into lovers of the non-personal
and

insists, takes
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per aps a ways wtll
exist, and though
Wagner's art makes them
heard for the first time
v, th air uncanny
clart,„, s not m order
to hnng them to a
Cose and end the struggle for
a
,

P

-t 7 just poht, cal

community. Wagner, Nietzsche
writes

a, the end of his
long essay
evoted to the future, sees
no end to the demand for
justice or the need for
love He ,s "no
utoptan," and his
music-dramas do not prophesy
an "ultimate ideal order”
(§ , 1 ) j us , over
the horizon. In the final
section of his meditation,
Nietzsche sees something
elsejus. over
t C honzon,
and this something is not
"an immobile mintow" of
"superhuman goodness

and justice,” but the

real possibility

imperative— his demand
possibility of

human

evil

to rethink

"evil

community on

[fl&en]" (§11). Wagner's
moral
the basts of justice and
love-risks the

by leaving "the morality of
tradition [ die

s Spoke Zaralhuslra,

in "Discussion

of human

trans. R. J.

tfa ?al°r ivTudwTn

Sittlichkeit des

Hollingdale (Baltimore: Penguin,
1975), 87
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up the possibility of evil
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nation, free from the
arbitra7and

just as

it

love,

law of inadequation,
and

;

°nc must departure
from

dequat]on by |eavjng

^
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it

prevents the worst, and

^
if it

opens

opens upthepossibihtyoferror,
bhndness.and

be honest [Ehrlich-seinY
(§11) about

demand ° f WagnCr S

from anyth,
ng suprapersona, and

not guarantee the best,
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at all-ifi,

necessary limits and
tneapl'.nes

of the

this
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poss.b.hty for the

first ttnre.

Th.s

is

the
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demand, ng honesty

lutpetatire, of his

in moral matters,

,,

new, extra-moral tmperahve,
and by

holds out the hope of a
"distant, merely poss.ble

bu, not demonstrable
future" (§8) ofjust.ee, love,
and freedom with others.

Wagner's
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art tells

of

this poss.bility,

"a foretaste, a fore-expenenctng,
of joy

and

and

if

life

Nietzsche

is to

be believed,

of the highest sort" (§9). Thts
joy

happiness of commonality, of
be.ng-together with others and being
th,s

same joy

is

the happiness of being free

this telling

and being just- with

all

in

is

the

love with others, and

of

its

risks,

and dangers. Tragedy-and tragedy,
more than any other aesthetic genre,
brings these risks to light and
teaches us to respect them-gives
us a taste of this joy and a
feeling for this happiness, even
as it holds them out for the future.
difficulties,

And

them out for the

future, for the

future-the future of ideal love, justice, and
freedomThis concept ol freedom has been
rigorously pursued in Jean-Luc Nanrv's Th*>‘
ienCe °fFreed0m trans Brid et
S Mcdonald (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
’

l993)

tragedy does hold

-
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never quite arrives.
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perfect the political
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whole order of things
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c to

announc«'^» Wagner's

I

"singularities

lheir f

to

*

community and incr^l^h^h

that these free
betngs free,y

^^

*> they

_„

^^
S '" 8Ular

be n 8 s ->hese
'

"^^s.bility of the universal

vcrv

,

.

" '-““""-—-»»

,

7

rccogn.ze the fragde
ground of the s.ngular deed
and dojustice to

ass, even

emands,

that

we

Th,s task, Nietzsche
wntes,

umantly"

(§ 4 ).

„

take responsibility
for the future

its

demands And „

commonahty it supports

the "supreme task"
and "one guarantee for
the future of'
pr0 m,ses not nations,
nat.on-states, or self-enclosed
commun.ties bu, a

commonahty of singular

be,

,s

ngs- free, just, and

utopian, and ,f N.etzsche,
like Wagner,

is

in

love without vtolence.
Th.sgoal

"no utopian," he nevertheless
holds

t,

is

on, as the

only moral responsethe only supra-mora,
response-to the unravehng of
commun.ty ,„
mo ermty. Thts ,s the prom.se of
"R, chard Wagner ,„ Bayreuth,"
and N.etzsche leaves it to
us to decide if it will
have a future.
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CHAPTER VIII

THE FUTURE OF NI

ETZSCHE'S MPERATI
VES
I

Become who you

are!

-Nietzsche, Thus Spoke
Zarathustra

—

After writing "Richard

- ** -

" -..culminating,
:rr
*;

a, the

Wagner
.

in

Bayreuth

-

end of his authorship,

to insure his distance

8

Nietzsche endoH h

on

•

'

"

from the inventor of

the

a senes of bhstenng
polemtcs
the

"music drama"

r

SlgnalCd thC Cnd ° f hlS
drCam ° f a reblrth ° f
traged y and tragic
culture
of
h opes or a catharttc
cleanstng of nationalist
sentiment from Germany,
of his belief’
that the German
sensus communis could
be purged of the values
of the nation-state^

J

r

11

Nietzsche an.culated, on
more than one oceaston,
his reason for breaking
with
Bayreuth and the man who
had created it. Summanzing
his motives
iuuno he
wro.e: What did I never
forgive Wagner? That
he condescended to the
Germans—

^

Became reichsdeutsch.

that

Nietzsche, break

e nations represents a
break with

German

Retch, the

German

w„h Wagner after completing
his

evening reichsdeutsch,

nation-state, and,

national, sm that defined
their identity

with the

more than anything else,

and helped determine

Vntineiy

Gem, an
the

he

nation the

German

their ends. In the years

between
hold out the ho,* that the
Reich and the Germans, along
with the nation-state they
formed, might be salvaged, that

1870- 876, Nietzsche could
1

still

their parochtal insistence

"German”

identity might

bow

on

before an expenence of justice
and open to the non-identity

core. In the wntings that
appear after Nietzsche, break with
Wagner, this vision of
collective transformation is
no longer nourished by historical
signs of progress, and so

a.

its

gives

way

it

to the less ambitious task
of isolated, individual self-perfection.

Nietzsche, break, after 1876, with
everything reichsdeutsch was complete,
as was
his renunciation of h,s
hopes Cor the Reich and die
Deutsche,,. Hts shift in position,

Ecce homo "Why
,

I

am

so Clever," §5.
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however, does not
represent a break with n

-

In lhosc

never was simply
a matlcr

life.

Rather, his concern

v,s,on of political
life thal

°

f

Unc enl an<^ nuxlcrn
'

ail

along was

vvit h

^

tl^^j^sibj^y
Mi ty of moral community,
of a
'

"commonality "as he often

,

,

Sr ° UndCd

ha, transcend the
dtvistons separatin
tragic

works

conditions— that

f

„

at decisive
juncture^

purpose
F ^

!

^

in

reSS ‘° n

m the mora

'

6

l; becomes
I
o you arc

[

'

imperatives

P

—

*‘

meaning and

wrili

'

•

*

V

"^

that Nietzsche
chooses to express

increasingly important
in his later works.

Du soils, der Werden. der du
Hs,

toan unavoidable

It

appears, for example in

a reworking of the
tmperative front

* seller,

ifse.f

Thus Spoke Zarathustra,

each casc-and there are
many others-, he imperative
form
universally valid

w

in Nietzsche's no,,
°*- Wagncn

" Ur8Cm “ mmand

command announced

ol life

that people
Nietzsche's

'fc, ol

Schopenhauer as Educator, "Be
yourself [*,
categorical

0"s

^'‘--properly^

i

the

'

IO " S

and the r ngutsfc form
f

Pr

“ m °re fUndamCnU" COndll

^ ^^

modorni tv ih
modernity—
they do not recede
hey become more promment

them

-

car;::r::r<n1'suUcd
‘r-a r

a precursor

to the

"Become who you areis

used to announce a

command, an

"ought," legitimated and
necessitated by the withdrawal
in
modernity, of universally
accepted conceptions of who
we arc and of wha, the self
is This
problem, originating in the
parallel phenomena of
nuxlem nihilism and the

emique of reason and

philosophy

the natural sciences,
cannot be solved

by appeals to the nation the
nahon-state, or nationalism.
Their principles, whether ethnic
or civic, remain subject to
the

problems

that give birth to
Nietzsche's imperatives, for
these

problems are inscribed in the
veiy structure of human
finitude. The imperative form,
and even more, the form of the
categorical imperative- the
absolute

command -arc our only available response

problems, for they dispense with
claims to truth and

tell

what ought

claims are robbed of the
authorities needed to justify them.
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to be

to these

done once

truth

In

one of Nietzsche's

last

writing Th»

imperative whtch sums
up this situation
imperative

an uncondittonal

a

,•

,

.

™'

0
.

"
^Soncal

demand-bu,

„

i,

categoncal tmperatives:
"Each should tnvent
his
imperative " This nf™.

~‘
22

,n

n Schopenhauer as
Educator
Educator,
•

rr
PP

'o

.-crz:::™

*•

isal
is
always

»

^x

-

T

1Ctzschc alread
y

a matter of "being
yourself

*"
encourage the creation
of any and

invent his

w/j categorical

’

ugnt to do to remain
singular This "rmoM
i

^

.

.

»

of

- »> »»
all

own form

made clear
•

»C

categorical imperatives"each should

of killing” would be
an extreme example of
such license gone
° PPOSI,e ,S " ' rUlh ' he
“*= A -egonea, tmperattve tha,
commands us to
reate imperatives that
revere life, thatdojustice
to its manifold
possibilities, , ha, advance
s perl eel, on and, as
Nietzsche puts i,t„ Beyond
Good and Evil, extend our

^

i

"responsibility" to

life.

Nietzsche's imperatives,
then, respond responsibly
to the new and
unparalleled
conditions of life in modernity,
to the loss of those
honzons of value that have defined

human, ty

,n the

Wes,

for millennia, to the

the tendency to solve
these

Elapse of traditional systems

problems by huddling together

moral "oughts" respond to these
problems, to the
nationalism,

by teaching us

nationalism has run

where he

first

modernity, he

its

to revere

course: Life

wha,

itself,

is left

bare

of mcantng and

,n defensive collectives.

terror of nihilism

and the

terror of

over after nihilism has token

life,

His

,

to toll

and

naked and homeless. In the writings

formulates the imperatives needed
to guide humanity out of the
desert of
tests the

various paths along which

life

might make

its

run through the political sphere,
but they also run through regions
of

189

escape. These paths
life that

do not

h s calls,
oflife [neue Partie
des
Leb e«vl " 2
esUbens],

m a discu ssion of his first book

onwards— Nietzsche allied

himself with this "Doliticni"
Paity
This
Th ls ddiscovery takes

,

.

to

have discovered
overed

it
tt.

place in his

announces

hts allegiance to
life and the
imperatives
31 ^°^

OW *^ S a^ e g' ance
'

^t'ecTori
refined.
One result

also will

it

eternally."

3

It

was

onterges ,ro m Nietzsche,

imperative to

i

s

of this refinement,

a categonca, tmperaUve,
for

"Know

i,

says:

this

first

writings,

its

command

where Nietzsche

examined

77, c

The Gas

it is

it

in

V

n

such a

way that you can
count, that finally

ultimate* rooted

Birlh ofTrage

final

^

hfe^ h

imperatives are extended
and

will, wil,

to "be yourself!"

Par ty

bc said

imposes upon collective

first articulated
in

"Whatever you

h°

'

command, which makes every
decision

thyself!" first

Wagner and

it

confirmed and

imperative that led Nietzsche,
after completing his
.stance from

"tho
c nevv

’

p
r
u
Fromthe
start- from The Birth
of Tragedy

^

and

m the Delphic

,,

_^

Vnthnely Meditation, to
seek

finally

abandon him altogether.
Nietzsche, imperatives freed
him from Wagner, life-denying
pessimism, and though they
forced him to abandon the
composer of Parsifal, they insured
that

he remained true to the end
to the "party of

Ecce homo "The Birth of Tragedy,"
,

190

§4.

life."
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